In light of Colombian history, there is no question that for the state to perform its legitimate function is a monumental, formidable, long-term task. Indeed, Colombia's state has been historically weak, having little control over much of the national territory. The challenge is also impressively wide-ranging, encompassing social policy, economic development, and political reform. But there is an immediate, pressing problem of public order, reflected in the now familiar, shocking statistics about sharp increases in the number of internally displaced persons, killings, kidnappings, and related violence. In these grim categories, Colombia has managed to break a number of world records (including more than 3,000 kidnappings last year). It is not altogether clear how Colombia can possibly turn to its broad social and institutional agenda in the midst of such chaos.

Similarly, from a perspective of protecting human rights, it is hard to imagine an optimistic scenario in Colombia unless the state begins to reassert its control and legitimate authority in the country. And it is equally hard to imagine that the state will be able to do this on its own, without a substantial external role, the right mix of pressure and support. In this context, the role of the United States is fundamental, even inescapable. Two crucial tracks - wide-ranging assistance on the one hand, diplomatic and political backing on the other - need to be pursued simultaneously, and skillfully.

In order to address the urgency of the Colombian situation, meaningful security support is essential and can only come from the United States. European countries are neither able nor willing to provide such assistance. To be sure, critics of U.S. aid are rightly concerned about the widely documented ties between Colombia's military and the paramilitary forces, against the backdrop of the troubling record of U.S. military involvement elsewhere in Latin America. The fear is that U.S. security assistance could be used, even indirectly, to help fund the country's "dirty war." Yet, since the disengagement option is likely to significantly extend Colombia's conflict, it makes more sense to focus on how the United States could exercise its leverage and power in a positive way. This would mean not only applying necessary pressure to sever the military/paramilitary ties, but also urging Colombia's security forces to perform their proper function in a democratic society, bringing under control all actors operating outside of the law.

It is important to recognize that, under the Pastrana administration, the Colombians have already taken a number of steps in this positive direction. Though still too rare, there have been some confrontations reported between the military and paramilitary forces. There have also been an increasing number of arrests and dismissals of military officials because of links with paramilitaries. According to the State Department's 2000 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, "from 1997 through October 2000, 934 members of paramilitary groups have been captured, and 150 members have been killed. The Ministry of Defense reported that during the year the security forces killed 89 members of paramilitary groups and captured 315 members. In 1999 the army reported that it killed 26 members of paramilitary groups and captured 102 during that year." Efforts to seriously pursue the paramilitary forces are just beginning, and much more no doubt needs to be done. But it is hard to deny that to the extent that there has been any progress on this front, it can be substantially attributed to US engagement, and to a lesser degree, other international pressure on the Colombian government.