August 2001

On May 16, the Bush administration announced the Andean Regional Initiative, requesting some $882 million for the 2002 budget to assist Colombia and six neighboring countries - Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil. The State Department's public statement spelled out the rationale behind the new effort: "In contrast to last year's Plan Colombia supplemental, less than half of the assistance will be for Colombia and only half will be for law enforcement and security assistance. We have already briefed this initiative in general terms both to other donors and the recipient nations, and it has been well received." Thus, the Bush team sought to assuage some of the fierce opposition generated in Europe and Latin America with the adoption a year ago of the anti-drug, mostly military $1.3 billion aid package to Colombia.

Yet it is not entirely clear to what extent the new "regional approach" actually represents a departure from last year's U.S. contribution to Plan Colombia. To be sure, in public relations terms, the Andean Regional Initiative may help temporarily quiet some of the criticism of US Colombia policy (especially the concerns about the effects of spillover onto neighboring nations). But in substantive, policy terms, the Bush approach differs little from what was approved last year under the Clinton administration. Then, as now, the Colombian crisis is viewed chiefly as a drug crisis and the standard recipe - a mix of eradication measures, alternative development, and institution-building programs is prescribed. The difference now, of course, is the better balance between the military and social components, and the fact that the funds will be more evenly distributed among the countries in the region.

The Andean Regional Initiative appears to reflect a decision made by the Bush administration to put off a serious review of how the United States should respond to the deteriorating situation in Colombia. Since the administration of Colombian president Andrés Pastrana is in its final stage - with a newly-elected president to take office in August 2002 - it probably makes little political sense to significantly alter the policy currently underway.

Still, barring some unexpected breakthrough, at some point the Bush administration is bound to consider a range of policy options to address the Colombian crisis. It is instructive to examine at least some of these possibilities and corresponding scenarios, with the aim of identifying the elements that might eventually be put together to build a coherent and constructive U.S. Colombia policy for the long term.

Although the course of gradual disengagement is highly improbable for a variety of reasons, analyzing this policy alternative is a useful exercise that serves, at a minimum, to sharpen the arguments -- and demonstrate the need -- for continued involvement in Colombia. It is tempting to look at the Andean nation's profound and unrelenting crisis and conclude - as some no doubt have - that the United States would be better off not being involved at all. The situation is simply too complex, messy, and overwhelming. The United States doesn't understand Colombia - and never will. There are too many risks involved, and not enough at stake for the United States. Perhaps it would make sense, the argument goes, just to "let it go."

This view has a certain appeal, especially if one gives primary importance to keeping the United States as untainted as possible. The problem, of course, is that policy prescriptions actually carry consequences. In this case, were the United States to withdraw its support, it is a reasonable bet that the condition of sheer lawlessness and insecurity that already grips Colombia would get even worse, producing higher levels of violence and greater human tragedy.

Indeed, if one were to extrapolate current dynamics - the growing military and financial strength of both the paramilitary groups and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and spreading criminality, all fueled by the drug economy - the picture that emerges is a dire one. The fundamental problem - the inability of the Colombian government to protect its citizens - becomes exacerbated. Although it is possible to argue that in the short term the deterioration may primarily impinge on Colombia and to a lesser extent its neighbors, in the long run, the United States - its basic interests and core values - would be deeply affected, and in multiple ways.

Colombia's deepening tragedy - the country's acute humanitarian and human rights conditions are beyond question-- demands positive U.S. engagement. South America's oldest democracy is at serious risk, and the United States, consistent with its commitment to democratic values, has the capacity and responsibility to help reverse the downward spiral. The crisis, moreover, undermines the broader U.S. goal of building a secure, democratic, and prosperous hemispheric community.

Other key U.S. interests are also at stake. First, Colombia's deterioration could well continue to spread conflict beyond its borders, causing instability in a region that is increasingly uncertain in political and economic terms. Second, Colombia is South America's fourth largest economy and the fifth largest U.S. export market in Latin America, making it a strong and valuable partner in the region. Third, Colombia produces between 80 and 90 percent of the cocaine and roughly two-thirds of the heroin consumed in the United States, and as a result, is a vital partner in tackling the drug problem. And finally, worsening conditions in Colombia could well provoke an even greater exodus from the country. In the last five years, more than one million Colombians have emigrated, with the United States being the principal destination.

The likely effects of a complete U.S. disengagement from Colombia are frightening to contemplate. To adopt such a course would be the height of irresponsibility. Rather, the challenge for the United States is to find the most productive way to better enable the Colombian government to protect its citizens, in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of law. Nobody believes this is easy, and in fact many doubt (with good reason) whether this is even feasible. Yet it is imperative to try.

In light of Colombian history, there is no question that for the state to perform its legitimate function is a monumental, formidable, long-term task. Indeed, Colombia's state has been historically weak, having little control over much of the national territory. The challenge is also impressively wide-ranging, encompassing social policy, economic development, and political reform. But there is an immediate, pressing problem of public order, reflected in the now familiar, shocking statistics about sharp increases in the number of internally displaced persons, killings, kidnappings, and related violence. In these grim categories, Colombia has managed to break a number of world records (including more than 3,000 kidnappings last year). It is not altogether clear how Colombia can possibly turn to its broad social and institutional agenda in the midst of such chaos.

Similarly, from a perspective of protecting human rights, it is hard to imagine an optimistic scenario in Colombia unless the state begins to reassert its control and legitimate authority in the country. And it is equally hard to imagine that the state will be able to do this on its own, without a substantial external role, the right mix of pressure and support. In this context, the role of the United States is fundamental, even inescapable. Two crucial tracks - wide-ranging assistance on the one hand, diplomatic and political backing on the other - need to be pursued simultaneously, and skillfully.

In order to address the urgency of the Colombian situation, meaningful security support is essential and can only come from the United States. European countries are neither able nor willing to provide such assistance. To be sure, critics of U.S. aid are rightly concerned about the widely documented ties between Colombia's military and the paramilitary forces, against the backdrop of the troubling record of U.S. military involvement elsewhere in Latin America. The fear is that U.S. security assistance could be used, even indirectly, to help fund the country's "dirty war." Yet, since the disengagement option is likely to significantly extend Colombia's conflict, it makes more sense to focus on how the United States could exercise its leverage and power in a positive way. This would mean not only applying necessary pressure to sever the military/paramilitary ties, but also urging Colombia's security forces to perform their proper function in a democratic society, bringing under control all actors operating outside of the law.

It is important to recognize that, under the Pastrana administration, the Colombians have already taken a number of steps in this positive direction. Though still too rare, there have been some confrontations reported between the military and paramilitary forces. There have also been an increasing number of arrests and dismissals of military officials because of links with paramilitaries. According to the State Department's 2000 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, "from 1997 through October 2000, 934 members of paramilitary groups have been captured, and 150 members have been killed. The Ministry of Defense reported that during the year the security forces killed 89 members of paramilitary groups and captured 315 members. In 1999 the army reported that it killed 26 members of paramilitary groups and captured 102 during that year." Efforts to seriously pursue the paramilitary forces are just beginning, and much more no doubt needs to be done. But it is hard to deny that to the extent that there has been any progress on this front, it can be substantially attributed to US engagement, and to a lesser degree, other international pressure on the Colombian government.

The principal problem, however, is that current security aid provided by the United States is not targeted in a way that will best contribute to Colombia's peace and reconciliation. Indeed, even though Colombia is the third major recipient of U.S. security assistance in the world (following Israel and Egypt), there are few signs of any guiding strategic concept. Instead, the $1.3 billion aid package approved for Colombia last year - the U.S. contribution to the more wide-ranging, multi-year, $7.5 billion "Plan Colombia" - is, as noted above, a mostly military, anti-drug program. The policy responds less to Colombian realities than to U.S. domestic political realities and pressures. To the extent that the aid has any connection to the key goal of helping the Colombian state protect its citizens, it is largely indirect and mainly a rationalization to justify going after the piece of the Colombian puzzle the majority of US officials care most about -- drugs.

Current assistance to Colombia emphasizes the standard U.S. anti-drug formula: eradication and interdiction. It is doubtful that such a formula will have any positive effect in helping, even narrowly, to reduce the flow of drugs to the U.S.. But it also appears clear that focusing aid on buying expensive helicopters and training a few anti-narcotics battalions to secure the coca fields in southern Colombia is far from the best way to turn around the country's rampant lawlessness and continuing deterioration. Indeed, there is ample and convincing evidence that fumigation is often counterproductive, helping push coca growers into the hands of lawless forces, on the right or the left.

U.S. assistance is misguided and needs to be substantially reframed and reformulated. In order to change the narrow focus on drugs and help Colombians deal with their urgent problem of public order, the strategic emphasis of U.S. policy toward Colombia should instead be, in the short-term, to promote professionalization of the country's security forces. Professionalization transcends the counterdrug/counterinsurgency dilemma that frequently comes up in policy debates on Colombia. Critics often charge that what drives U.S. policy is military defeat of the guerrillas, using the fight against drugs largely as a pretext. But reorienting U.S. policy in a way that puts greater emphasis on enabling the Colombian state to reassert authority in a democratic context would be a welcome shift - and something quite different from either a counterdrug or counterinsurgency approach. In order to undertake such a professionalization effort, the U.S. should focus less on providing military hardware, and more on training, military restructuring, intelligence gathering, and establishing effective monitoring mechanisms.

More importantly, professionalization would be a necessary step in strengthening the Colombian state, which would help the country move towards a peace settlement to the decades-long conflict. Security forces behaving with greater professionalism - increased capacity and, crucially, full adherence to human rights norms of conduct - could very well change the dynamics of the conflict, altering the calculations of the FARC and making them more inclined to negotiate in good faith.

Of course, from 1996 to 1999, the U.S. cut off assistance to the Colombian military because of reported human rights abuses and widespread corruption. Instead, support was directed to the Colombian National Police for counterdrug purposes. But such support, still mistakenly geared towards fighting drugs, proved inadequate to deal with the country's underlying problem of spreading lawlessness.

The overall objective of U.S. Colombia policy should be, rather, to increase the capacity of the security forces to restore and maintain public order as well as to improve soldiers' discipline and enhance accountability for their actions.

To be effective, such assistance should be complemented with long-term, sustained aid in non-security matters. Expanded support for institutional strengthening - including judicial reform and rule of law efforts aimed at bolstering human rights guarantees and reducing corruption - is essential to assure that those accused of committing human rights abuses are properly tried. The U.S. should also offer sustained economic support - with special advantages in the trade area to increase access to U.S. markets - to help Colombia deal with its many social problems. Humanitarian assistance and well-developed social and alternative development programs that address underlying inequities in such areas as education, health, and land tenure patterns should also get priority.

In practical, political terms, it makes sense to concentrate energy to go beyond the current, narrowly focused package and try to build a consensus behind a broader, more constructive U.S. strategy towards Colombia. Starting from scratch - the suggestion made by some critics of US policy - is not feasible. Further, it runs the risk of resulting in the previously mentioned policy option of gradual disengagement that, though improbable, cannot be entirely ruled out given the Bush administration's foreign policy tendencies. As discussed, that would be unfortunate, even more harmful - and with more severe human rights consequences -- than the badly skewed and admittedly disappointing aid package now being implemented. The options, in short, are not terribly attractive.

To be sure, it will be hard enough to try to get officials in Washington to design and shape U.S. assistance in a way that contributes to strengthening democratic institutions in Colombia. Perhaps even harder is the task of energizing Washington to play an essential - though not necessarily high-profile -- catalytic diplomatic role in assisting the Colombian government to achieve a political solution to its conflict. Many policymakers continue to accord low political priority to Colombia (and Latin America generally), pay more attention to other trouble spots around the globe, and mistakenly believe that the agencies in charge of drug policy will somehow be able to take care of the problem.

Indeed, the signals appear far from encouraging. Following the Summit of the Americas meeting of hemispheric leaders in Quebec on April 22, President Bush said, "It's going to be up to President Pastrana to make the peace. Once he does so, we'll stand by his side." Such remarkable passivity is profoundly troubling. The Bush administration needs to get involved politically and diplomatically to help Colombians devise a strategy and build a national consensus to advance what is at best a shaky peace effort between the government and both the FARC and the country's second major rebel force, the ELN (National Liberation Army). With presidential elections in Colombia less than a year away, Pastrana cannot be expected to make much progress on this front before the end of his term. In the meantime, however, the United States should not remain on the sidelines and simply wait for a break on Colombia's stalled talks, as suggested by President Bush's comment.

Rather, the United States should vigorously mobilize support within the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and partners in Latin America - Mexico and Brazil, particularly - as well as in Europe, to set up a framework within which serious negotiations can take place. The Colombian government, for example, should no longer be both convener and party to the conflict, as it is today, but rather concentrate on playing the latter role. By spearheading such a multilateral effort, the U.S. will be engaging the international community and directly responding to the many criticisms about current U.S. involvement that have emerged from Europe and Latin America since the adoption of Plan Colombia (and are likely to be only temporarily muted by the Andean Regional Initiative). International dissatisfaction with current policy - a disapproval of the United States' lack of consultation and unilateral decision-making in its dealings with Colombia - may be mitigated through participation in multilateral arrangements that stress consensus-building and dialogue. As other conflicts in the world have shown, sustained international engagement is critical if a faltering peace effort has any chance of taking hold.

With the possible exceptions of Mexico and Cuba, Latin America seldom gets the kind of high-level, constant political attention more commonly given to the Middle East or Europe. Yet Colombia demands precisely that kind of attention. It poses one of the most formidable foreign policy tests for the Bush administration. The big question is whether the U.S. will be able to meet the challenge by transcending the myopic focus on fighting drugs and instead exercise leadership to help the hemisphere's most troubled nation relieve its humanitarian nightmare and move towards an enduring peace.