To be effective, such assistance should be complemented with long-term, sustained aid in non-security matters. Expanded support for institutional strengthening - including judicial reform and rule of law efforts aimed at bolstering human rights guarantees and reducing corruption - is essential to assure that those accused of committing human rights abuses are properly tried. The U.S. should also offer sustained economic support - with special advantages in the trade area to increase access to U.S. markets - to help Colombia deal with its many social problems. Humanitarian assistance and well-developed social and alternative development programs that address underlying inequities in such areas as education, health, and land tenure patterns should also get priority.

In practical, political terms, it makes sense to concentrate energy to go beyond the current, narrowly focused package and try to build a consensus behind a broader, more constructive U.S. strategy towards Colombia. Starting from scratch - the suggestion made by some critics of US policy - is not feasible. Further, it runs the risk of resulting in the previously mentioned policy option of gradual disengagement that, though improbable, cannot be entirely ruled out given the Bush administration's foreign policy tendencies. As discussed, that would be unfortunate, even more harmful - and with more severe human rights consequences -- than the badly skewed and admittedly disappointing aid package now being implemented. The options, in short, are not terribly attractive.

To be sure, it will be hard enough to try to get officials in Washington to design and shape U.S. assistance in a way that contributes to strengthening democratic institutions in Colombia. Perhaps even harder is the task of energizing Washington to play an essential - though not necessarily high-profile -- catalytic diplomatic role in assisting the Colombian government to achieve a political solution to its conflict. Many policymakers continue to accord low political priority to Colombia (and Latin America generally), pay more attention to other trouble spots around the globe, and mistakenly believe that the agencies in charge of drug policy will somehow be able to take care of the problem.

Indeed, the signals appear far from encouraging. Following the Summit of the Americas meeting of hemispheric leaders in Quebec on April 22, President Bush said, "It's going to be up to President Pastrana to make the peace. Once he does so, we'll stand by his side." Such remarkable passivity is profoundly troubling. The Bush administration needs to get involved politically and diplomatically to help Colombians devise a strategy and build a national consensus to advance what is at best a shaky peace effort between the government and both the FARC and the country's second major rebel force, the ELN (National Liberation Army). With presidential elections in Colombia less than a year away, Pastrana cannot be expected to make much progress on this front before the end of his term. In the meantime, however, the United States should not remain on the sidelines and simply wait for a break on Colombia's stalled talks, as suggested by President Bush's comment.