The
war in Sudan is over the very soul of the country. Powerful factions
in the north, spearheaded by the NIF [National Islamic Front], believe
that Sudan is an Arab, Muslim country and that anyone who wants
to be part of it must either adopt this identity or consent to being
grossly marginalized. Southern Sudanese, most of whom adhere to
traditional religious beliefs, and the modern elite of which is
primarily Christian, believe that Sudan is African, syncretic, and
pluralistic.
These
are mutually exclusive realities, mutually unacceptable modelsthe
basis for a genocidal war, even if there is no widespread intent
to physically eliminate the other group. Whether they can be reconciled
within the framework of unity, or the country split into two independent
states, is the critical question confronting the Sudanese.
We
must consider not only the vast numbers of individuals that have
been killed in this war, but think as well of the communities whose
existence as identifiable cultural entities has been destroyed.
The Nuer and Dinka are among the best-studied peoples in the world.
Anthropologists have established a clear picture of their identity
concepts, social structures, value systems, initiation rituals and
other rites of passage. These cultures have in common a holistic
system which centers on the notion of linkage with the past through
the lineage.
There
is a continuity of identity through procreation, family and the
community, which confers dignity on the individual, and great reverence
for the dead, whose presence is maintained among and through the
living. This total social context that constitutes a people has
been shattered. If you eliminate a community by saying "You
are not good enough unless you change and become something else,"
that, to me, is genocide. Millions of people will be destroyed as
well as their source of livelihood, their communities, sense of
identity and continuity, their very future. I cant think of
anything worse.
In
order to analyze genocide in this sort of conflict situation, we
need to approach it differently. It is not simply a question of
preventing genocide, and, if genocide has taken place, of punishing
those individuals who are responsible. When I visited Rwanda for
the UN, after the genocide there, I found that there was a risk
of justice being confused with revenge. There is no way the numbers
of individuals who would be tried for genocide would be commensurate
to the numbers of people killed. And when trials are seen to be
insufficient, then people may be prompted to take justice into their
own hands. We need remedies that go beyond trials, that are comprehensive,
holistic.
As
Sudanese, we need to stand in front of the mirror and ask the tough
questions: Who are we, as a people? Are we as divided as we think?
Do we deceive ourselves with mythologies of identity? It is extremely
important to dismantle structures of "otherness," in a
context ripe for genocidal actions, especially given the obvious
fact that this "otherness" is largely a mythical perception.
There
is a tendency to think of Sudan simply as a North-South dichotomy.
That is an over-simplification. If you think in terms of economics,
parts of the North are just as poor, or poorer, than the South.
Races and ethnicity are also mixed. Those who call themselves Arabs
today are, in essence, a mixture of indigenous Africans and the
Arab Muslims who came later as traders. Sudanese who converted to
Islam, spoke Arabic and became culturally Arabized were accepted
and elevated as Arabs. If they could claim Arab descent, that was
even better. In contrast blacks, who were seen as heathens, were
considered inferior and the legitimate objects of enslavement. Many
northern Sudanese today look much more African than Arab. The overwhelming
majority of Sudanese are not Arabs; they may be Muslims, but their
version of Islam is very Africanized, indigenous, and liberal. The
southern tribes have been fighting for equality and are gradually
becoming respected by the Arabized Africans in the North, some of
whom are now coming out of the closet and "confessing"
to Dinka grandmothers. So who are we, really?
I am
from the border area between Bahr-El-Ghazal and Kordofan, and my
views on the situation have been colored by that background. Our
people, the Ngok Dinka, have been for many generations under the
paramount chieftainship of our family. My great-grandfather, grandfather,
and father did the most to bring the North and South together. As
southerners, they chose to be part of the northern administration
of the border province of Kordofan in order to ensure better protection
for their people. They established good working and diplomatic ties
with their Arab counterparts, and through those ties, linked themselves
to the central government. But they enjoyed local autonomy and great
power over their own affairs. Even the neighboring Dinka tribes
to the South were under the leadership of our family before the
British annexed them to the South.
I see
this area as having been particularly important in bridging cultural
dynamics, which makes me hesitant to conclude we must split the
country. Ideally, I would like to see a Sudan that reflects its
internal composition. So my preference is to create a country where
everyone can feel a sense of belonging and roots. My father, although
a minority, was so influential and respected among the Arabs that
their leaders elected him to be the President of the inter-tribal
rural council in which the Arabs were the overwhelming majority.
He was neither Muslim nor Arab, yet there was that degree of mutual
recognition and respect.
Accountability
and leadership, justice and peace are principles that must be carefully
balanced in dealing with genocide. Obviously, we should prosecute
offenders according to the Genocide Convention. But in the long
run, in the Sudanese context, it will be more important to heal
the present crisis of national identity. I understand why people
go to war; the problem now is to motivate the Sudanese to make peace.
In this context, not every crime will, or should be punished. I
go back to my grandfather, who after the upheavals of the 19th centurywhen
tribes fought, slavers arrived and middlemen betrayed their fellow
Sudanese into bondagecalled all the people of the tribe under
his authority together. Under his direction, they literally gathered
their rubbish, dug a large pit, threw in the rubbish, covered it
over and performed a series of rituals to cleanse their hearts and
communities. He asked them to forget all the ills of the past and
reunite in peace and harmony.
In
1969, our country had been embroiled since 1955 in a terrible civil
war marked by rampant atrocities. In August my father died in Cairo
and my brother Zachariah Bol and I took his body back home. (At
the time, Bol was practicing medicine in England and I was working
in the UN Secretariat in New York.) Upon our arrival, we were informed
that the local commander had killed our uncle on suspicion that
he was allied with the rebel forces. When we confronted him, he
admitted it, and said further that he had sent troops to surround
our home in order to shoot on sight the local rebel leaders who
were our cousins and who, according to rumors, had been expected
to come at night to pay their last respects to their deceased uncle.
Despite
the bitterness of what he had done, we told him that our main task
at hand as successors to the leadership of the tribe was to work
for the security and welfare of the living. Toward that objective
we were prepared to cooperate with him. And indeed, we endeavored
hard for a month to restore a semblance of security in the area.
But the situation remained very precarious as we left for Khartoum
and back to our assignments abroad.
We
eventually wrote a report for the authorities in Khartoum, which
led to that commander being transferred out of the area. At the
same time, it was never my intention that we should take revenge
as I recognized that he thought he was doing his duty under extremely
trying conditions. Later, when I married in New York, this commander
wrote to congratulate us, and then when I was appointed ambassador
to Scandinavia, he came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to pay
me a deferential visit. That brutal war, which had raged for 17
years, was brought to an end in 1972.
Sudan
became a model of peace and reconciliation, a factor for moderating
influences in the African region and in the Middle East. It became
the one Arab country that supported the Camp David accordsand
we did so by applying the logic of our internal reconciliation.
I was then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. We had just negotiated
the end of our own war through the highly acclaimed 1972 Addis Ababa
Accord, how could we not endorse Camp David?
As
it happened, President Jaafar Nimeiri and I were in the United States
at the time, and it was clear to me that we could not join the Arab
rejectionist camp and go against President Carter on what was likely
to be the signature issue of his presidency. All our national institutions,
in their position papers, wanted to stand with the Arab rejectionist
group. The position paper I had prepared for the President on his
request was the one he eventually adopted as the basis for our policy
on Camp David. And it was in large part based on the way we had
ended our own war.
The1972
peace agreement was ultimately violated by President Nimeiri himself,
plunging the country into the war that has afflicted us since1983.
The June1989 coup backed by the NIF was an effort to save Islamic-Arab
identity of the country from the rebel forces in the south [SPLA,
or Sudan Peoples Liberation Army] that were calling for a
secular, pluralistic nation. They wanted in essence to "de-Arabize"
the country, which of course threatened the very core of the northern
national project, which is why they called their coup the Revolution
of National Salvation.
It
was at this point that Sudan began to host radical Islamic elements
who started coming to the country. Here again we come up against
the crisis of national identity. I think the West got stuck on the
issue of Sudans link to international terrorism without fully
appreciating the domestic roots of this link. It is indeed the conflict
of identities in the Sudan that prompted the regime to reach out
to the terrorists and de-stabilize the neighborhood. Sudans
deeply entrenched identity crisis is the essential point: it has
triggered every internal conflict and fueled the consolidation of
an Islamic agenda that pits itself against the West, against Christendom,
and, of course, against Israel and Zionism, which they mistakenly
or exaggeratedly assume to back the South against Islam and Arabism.
The
present focus on terrorism is fully understandable and laudable,
and if Sudan is an active partner, then it should of course be made
accountable. But in the post-September 11 campaign to root out terrorism,
Sudans more complicated problems and the domestic roots of
any alliance the regime might have had with international terrorism
must be understood in their proper context. Those roots lie in the
civil war, which must be ended as a matter of priority if Sudan
is to experience peace, security and stability, and de-link from
externally generated terrorism.
Sidebar
Ethics
and Rules of War Lost
by
Dr. Francis Mading Deng
Photos
Copyright © George Rodger / Magnum Photos
The Nuba tribe from the Korong Jebels (hills) in the Kordofan area
of Southern Sudan are herdsmen with cattle that graze in the lower
valleys. In 1949, Sudan was ruled by a Condominium government of
British and Egyptians. Though the Nuba follow their own culture
and rituals, the region is ruled primarily by nomadic Arabs.
Sudan. Kordofan. The Nubas. 1949.
Sudan.
Kordofan. Nuba woman of Mesakin Qusar waters the tobacco plants.
Additional Suggested Reading by Dr. Francis Mading Deng:
His
latest Brookings publications include: Strategic Vision for Africa
(forthcoming ),co- authored with I. William Zartman
Masses
in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement (1998)
co-authored with Roberta Cohen
The
Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced (1998)
co-edited with Roberta Cohen
African
Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance (1998) co-edited with
Terrence Lyons
Sovereignty
as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (1996) co-authored
with several scholars
War
of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (1995)
Protecting
theDispossessed: A Challenge for the International Community
(1993)
The
Challenges of Famine Relief: Emergency Operations in the Sudan
(1992)
Conflict Resolution in Africa (1991)
Human
Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (1990).
Among
his earlier books is a biography of his father, The Man Called
Majok: A Biography of Power, Polygamy and Change, published
by Yale University Press in 1986.
His
first book, Tradition and Modernization: A Challenge for Law
Among the Dinka of the Sudan (1971) also
published by Yale University Press, won the 1972 Herskovits Award
offered annually by the African Studies Association for the best
book published the year before.
Human
Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, co-authored with
Abdullahi An-Naim,was the 1990 winner of the Excellence in
Publishing award sponsored by the Association of American Publishers.
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