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ICTR defined rape and sexual violence for the first time in international
law. Rape was found to constitute "a physical invasion of a sexual
nature committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive."
Sexual violence, which includes and is broader than rape, is "any
act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances
which are coercive." The Trial Chamber convicted Akayesu of genocide and crimes against humanity for a number of crimes, including historic convictions of rape as a crime against humanity and as an instrument of genocide. Prosecutor v. Kambanda This case represents the first time that a former head of government has been convicted of genocide or crimes against humanity by an international tribunal, and confirms that heads of states do not have immunity from criminal responsibility for certain international crimes. The accused, Jean Kambanda, was the Prime Minister of Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. Charged with six counts of genocide and crimes against humanity for extermination and murder, Kambanda pleaded guilty. The Trial Chamber accepted his guilty plea as valid, and in its Judgment (Sept. 4, 1998) sentenced Kambanda to life imprisonment. Kambanda appealed both the sentence and the judgment, challenging the validity of the guilty plea and seeking a new trial. The Appeals Chamber Judgment (Oct. 19, 2000) upheld the judgment and sentence. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza This case, in which the rights of the accused were central, exploded in controversy well before it went to trial. Jean Bosco Barayagwiza was charged with genocide and crimes against humanity. However, after alleging that his due process rights had been violated (including that there was a substantial delay in transferring him to the Tribunal after his arrest; that he was not promptly informed of the charges against him; and that his writ of habeas corpus petition had been ignored), and consequently that his arrest and detention were illegal, he filed an extremely urgent motion to review and nullify the arrest. The Appeals Chamber (Nov. 3, 1999) agreed with the accused that his due process rights had been repeatedly violated by the prosecution. As a remedy, it dismissed the indictment against him, with prejudice (meaning that no other court could prosecute him), and ordered his immediate release. |
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