April
24, 2003
Justice
for War Crimes in Iraq
By Anthony Dworkin
The
day of Iraq's liberation will also be a day of justice, Pierre-Richard
Prosper, the U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Issues said recently.
As the fighting stage of the war in Iraq winds down, U.S. officials
are beginning to focus on how to hold Iraqis accountable for war
crimes and atrocities committed in the past and during the present
conflict.
The
clearest indication of U.S. thinking on this issue was given in
a briefing by Prosper and W. Hays Parks, special assistant to the
Armys Judge Advocate General, on April 7. In general, Parks
suggested, everyone against whom there was credible evidence of
war crimes would be prosecuted: The position of the United
States government is to do everything in its power to bring to justice
anyone who, by action or inaction, is responsible for violations
of the law of war. Prosper added that the U.S. had begun to
catalogue all Iraqi violations of international humanitarian law,
and that U.S. soldiers in the field had been charged with securing
and preserving any evidence of war crimes they uncovered.
The
two officials laid out a process that would involve different courts
for different categories of criminals. Specifically, the United
States seems to be dividing the crimes it intends to seek justice
for into two categories: war crimes carried out during the war against
coalition forces, and past atrocities committed by Saddams
regime.
For
crimes committed during the war, the administration intends to try
suspects in U.S.-run courts. We believe that we have the sovereign
ability and right to prosecute these cases, Prosper said.
The administration has not yet decided on the precise form these
trials will take, but Parks made it clear that there are three options:
trials before standard military courts-martial, trials before military
commissions, or trials in civilian courts.
According
to Diane Orentlicher, Professor of Law at American Universitys
Washington College of Law, international law sets detailed requirements
for the trial of any Iraqi regular soldiers who are given prisoner
of war status. (Regular soldiers who commit war crimes do not forfeit
the right to be treated as POWs.) Under the third Geneva Convention,
POWs may be tried either by military courts or, where the
laws of the detaining power expressly permit, by civil courts (this
is the case with the United States).
If
tried by a military court, they can only be convicted and sentenced
by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the
case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power
(Article 102) in other words, they would have the same rights
as U.S. military personnel who were being court-martialled. In addition,
the laws specify that POWs would have the right to be represented
by counsel, to have the assistance of an interpreter, to have fair
notice of the charges against them, and the right to appeal.
It
seems most likely that Iraqi POWs accused of war crimes will
be tried in regular military courts.
However,
not all Iraqi detainees are likely to be given POW status. Some
of those picked up are members of irregular forces such as
the Fedayeen Saddam or Baath Party militias and it
may be decided that they do not meet the threshold to qualify as
prisoners of war. (The U.S. will hold a series of tribunal hearings
to decide which category individuals should be assigned to, if there
is any doubt.)
For
detainees who are not given POW status, the U.S. is not obliged
to follow the procedural rules required for court-martial of U.S.
soldiers. In this case, Orentlicher said, it need only meet certain
basic minimum standards set out by international law. A summary
of these fundamental guarantees is found in Article 75 of the first
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (the U.S. has not
ratified Additional Protocol I, but this article is generally taken
to be a reflection of binding customary law.) It states that all
detainees should have the right to be tried by an impartial
and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized
principles of regular judicial procedure including
all necessary rights and means of defence. For instance,
defendants must be allowed the right to examine witnesses against
them.
In
other words, it is possible that these irregular combatants will
be tried before specially-convened military commissions, perhaps
along the lines that have been proposed for the al-Qaeda detainees
who are being held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
As far as the previous crimes of Saddam Husseins regime, Prosper
emphasized that the United States believed the Iraqi people should
take the lead in enforcing accountability. He said that a process
with indigenous roots would do most to reinstate
the rule of law in Iraq, and he said that the U.S. was working
with members of the Iraqi exile community to create an appropriate
mechanism. Prosper also said that the views of internal personalities
would be sought at an appropriate moment.
By
talking of an Iraqi-led process, Prosper appeared to rule out a
wholly international tribunal, of the sort that was set up by the
United Nations for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. (Prosper himself
was formerly a prosecutor for the U.N.s Rwanda tribunal.)
Nevertheless, he admitted that there would be a question as
to whether or not the system within Iraq has the capacity to address
these abuses. Therefore, Prosper said, the United States was
prepared to assist in any way we can by providing technical,
logistical, human and financial assistance, and he said that
the U.S. believed that the members of the international community
should also step forward and be prepared to assist.
In
Sierra Leone, East Timor and Cambodia, courts have been set up which
combined a large domestic element with some international representation
under the auspices of the United Nations. But the administrations
comments suggest that this possibility has been ruled out for Iraq
it seems the courts will be run by Iraq and the United States,
rather than the United Nations. Orentlicher suggested that one reason
for this was that U.N.-backed tribunals typically do not allow the
death penalty, which both the United States and large parts of Iraqi
society may favour for certain cases.
Orentlicher
said that in principle she supported the idea of Iraqi involvement
in trials, because it would give the country greater ownership of
the process of accountability: There ought to be a starting
presumption that domestic processes are to be preferred to international
ones. She added that the precise form of the process should
be decided through wide-ranging and inclusive deliberations
among Iraqis, along the lines of the deliberations that took place
in South Africa following the transition to democracy there.
But
Orentlicher said she doubted that the Iraqi judicial system had
the capability to mount trials by itself at the moment and
that if there was to be an international element, it should be sponsored
by the United Nations, not just the United States. To have
the United Nations involved would give a greater appearance of impartiality,
and make the process more credible, she said. A process that
was essentially dominated by the United States would be open to
the impression of victors justice.
Related
links:
Department
of Defense Briefing on Geneva Conventions, Prisoners of War and
War Crimes
April 7, 2003
U.S. Plans for Iraq Tribunals A Mistake
Human Rights Watch
April 7, 2003
Prosecuting Iraqi War Crimes: A Consideration of the Different
Forum Options
Statement of Ruth Wedgwood Before the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs
April 10, 2003
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