September
21, 2001
Introduction
The
September 11 attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center and damaged
the Pentagon --using civilian airplanes as weapons of mass destruction
have been universally condemned as barbarous acts. They are
also fundamental breaches of international humanitarian law, which
governs the rules of armed conflict. Yet the rapid resort by political
leaders to use of the terminology of war has caused both the public
and some other governments to question whether the attacks are to
be viewed first and foremost as acts of war under international
law, as terrorist acts, or criminal acts.
The distinctions matter. International humanitarian law, which in
its present form reflects the lessons of the Holocaust and World
War II and is codified in the form of the Geneva Conventions and
other universally accepted treaties, sets out the binding criteria
that determine what is legal, illegal, and criminal in armed conflict.
It also defines crimes against humanity and genocide, abominations
that can occur in war or in peacetime.
The question remains, however, as to how to define the assault on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon according to the terms of
the accepted norms of international humanitarian law. The assaults
appear not to have been carried out by a state, but rather by a
shadowy organization that has not even claimed responsibility for
them. This raises the fundamental question of whether international
humanitarian law is adequate to address the nature and scope of
the attacks.
To encourage a substantive debate both on the assaults themselves
and on the legal norms governing any possible retaliation, the Crimes
of War Project has so far interviewed a number of leading scholars
of international humanitarian law from the US and Britain, with
plans to interview others around the world. Those interviewed so
far include Robert Kogod Goldman , Professor, Washington
College of Law, American University; Eyal Benvenisti, Professor
of International Law, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and Visiting
Professor, Columbia Law School; APV Rogers, OBE, Author,
Law on the Battlefield, joint winner of the 1997 Paul Reuter Prize
Fellow, Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, University
of Cambridge, England; Michael Matheson, Senior Fellow, U.S.
Institute of Peace; H. Wayne Elliott, S.J.D., Lt. Col. (Ret.)
U.S. Army, Former Chief, International Law Division, Judge Advocates
General School, U.S. Army; and Steven R. Ratner, Albert Sidney
Burleson Professor in Law, University of Texas Law School.
Their responses, which follow, point to several preliminary conclusions.
H. Wayne Elliott sums up the crimes in the attacks on New York and
Washington: Of course, U.S. domestic law prohibits what happened.
But, even under international law and the law of war, these acts
would be prohibited. The initial seizure of the plane would be a
violation of the hijacking laws and treaties; holding the people
on those planes amounted to taking hostages; crashing the plane
into civilian targets was a war crime. And, if this was simply the
first (or merely the latest) act of war it amounted to an unprovoked
attack on a sovereign nation.
How should the U.S. respond? A.P.V. Rogers remarks: There
has been talk of reprisal, retaliation and
revenge. Only the first of these terms is defined in
the law of armed conflict. It relates to coercive measures resorted
to in certain circumstances to enforce compliance with the law of
armed conflict by the enemy
. Retaliation and revenge are not
legal terms and have no place in the law of armed conflict. For
example, in the war crimes trials that followed the Second World
War, military commanders who ordered the execution of a set number
of civilians for every soldier killed by partisans were found guilty
of war crimes.
Please click on the names of any of the experts on the left of this
screen to read their responses in full, or on any of the questions
on the right to read summaries of their analyses.
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