The
killing of four private security contractors in the town of Fallujah
on March 31 was the catalyst for an upsurge in fighting in Iraq
that has seemed at times like a reopening of hostilities. Both the
original incident and much of the combat that has followed have
highlighted the role of private contractors in the military occupation
of Iraq. According to press reports, military contractors are playing
a greater role in Iraq than in any previous conflict – guarding
senior officials, escorting convoys carrying supplies like fuel
and food, and protecting coalition authority buildings.
Particularly
since the upsurge of violence over the last couple of weeks, military
contractors are also taking part in combat. According to press reports,
commandos from Blackwater Security Consulting fought off an attack
on the coalition headquarters in Najaf by hundreds of Iraqi militia
members on Sunday April 4. The security firm sent in a privately
owned helicopter to resupply the besieged commandos with ammunition
and to ferry out a wounded Marine who was fighting side by side
with the contractors. In other incidents, security contractors have
engaged in protracted firefights to defend their own bases or to
protect convoys, killing an unknown number of assailants. Several
contractors have been killed, wounded or taken captive.
It
has been estimated that there are 20,000 private military contractors
in Iraq. Although they work for a number of different firms, the
Washington Post has reported that they “have begun to band together…organizing
what may effectively be the largest private army in the world, with
its own rescue teams and pooled, sensitive intelligence.”
What
is the position of these private security forces under international
law? The issue of civilians accompanying military forces is not
new. Indeed, the outsourcing of military functions has been a growing
trend in recent years, fuelled both by the increasing technological
specialization of some weapons systems, and by a general movement
to contract out support functions in armed forces as in private
companies. Similarly, private companies working in occupied territory
have in the past used private security firms to protect their offices
and other assets.
The
essential point about private contractors under international humanitarian
law is that they are not combatants: that is, they do not have the
right to take part in hostilities. Only members of regular armed
forces and paramilitary groups that come under military command
and meet specified criteria (like carrying their weapons openly,
distinguishing themselves from civilians, and obeying the laws of
war) have this right. So one question raised by the presence of
military contractors in Iraq is how to draw the line between legitimate
support activities or security functions, on the one hand, and taking
“a direct part in hostilities” on the other.
Most
experts believe that armed contractors can carry out many functions
in a zone of occupation without being deemed to be taking part in
conflict. According to Col. Charles Garraway, a former officer in
the United Kingdom 's Army Legal Services, “private security contractors
can act to protect themselves and others without taking a direct
part in hostilities.” Similarly, Professor Michael Schmitt of the
Marshall Center for Security Studies in Germany told me that “individuals
simply maintaining personal security for civilians or general security
against traditional crime would not be directly participating any
more than police officers do.”
Armed
guards working for civilian companies – for instance those doing
reconstruction work in Iraq – would not present a problem under
normal conditions of occupation. Moreover, these contractors would
be entitled to use force in self-defence or to protect the facilities
they were guarding, as long as they did so in a defensive manner
and employed no more force than was strictly necessary. They would
emphatically not be entitled to take part in offensive military
actions, or to join in ongoing military engagements involving regular
U.S. forces.
Although
this distinction between defensive and offensive use of force seems
clear on paper, it is easy to see how it might become blurred in
practice. First of all, some armed contractors in Iraq are employed
directly by U.S. authorities and are protecting assets that are
clearly linked to the military side of the occupation. For instance,
some private security firms are guarding food or fuel convoys that
are intended at least in part to supply the needs of military forces.
These convoys would probably qualify as legitimate military targets
under the laws of war. Of course, it is not unusual for civilians
to be found in sites that are in themselves military targets (for
instance, civilian employees of TV stations that are used for military
communications). But to have armed civilians defending military
targets is getting close to a grey area under the law.
That
is particularly true given the conditions that have applied in Iraq
during the last two weeks – that is to say, in the face of simultaneous
uprisings by Sunni and Shi'ite fighters that have brought some parts
of the country close to a state of active hostilities. These Iraqi
militias have routinely targeted supply convoys, and have also targeted
other sites guarded by private security contractors, notably regional
offices of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Although these are
civilian not military buildings, they have nevertheless been regularly
attacked by Iraqi insurgents as part of a military campaign. They
are predictable if not lawful targets. Moreover, in most of these
cases, security contractors are either working directly for the
governing coalition, or for firms that are themselves on contract
to the U.S. government.
The
most difficult question posed by the role of contract security forces
in Iraq may well be this: is the official use of security contractors
to defend legitimate or predictable targets in the face of an organized
uprising tantamount to having them engage in hostilities? It seems
convincing to believe that it is. Certainly some of the accounts
of firefights in which security contractors have engaged during
the last couple of weeks read like an account of armed conflict,
rather than the suppression of low-level disorder.
The
problematic position of these private security contractors would
therefore seem to be another reflection of the U.S. government's
failure to anticipate or plan for the level of resistance it has
encountered on the ground in Iraq. Security contractors might well
be an appropriate way to protect coalition facilities and supplies
in an occupied country against threats like sporadic disorder or
petty crime. They would seem not to be an appropriate way to defend
vital assets against repeated and organized armed onslaught.
What
are the consequences if civilian security contractors take a direct
part in hostilities? Legally, their situation would be analogous
to al-Qaeda members who were found on the battlefield in Afghanistan:
they would be people participating in armed conflict without the
authority to do so – unlawful belligerents or in the description
favoured by the U.S. government “unlawful combatants.” As such,
they would become legitimate targets for enemy forces, and also
theoretically be liable to prosecution for offensive military acts
they committed.
In
practice, these consequences would probably be insignificant in
the context of Iraq. That is because almost all of the insurgents
are themselves unlawful fighters, so they would not be entitled
to use force even against legitimate targets. Whether the security
contractors are legitimate targets is therefore something of an
academic question. Moreover, whether or not they were classed as
belligerents, security contractors would presumably be entitled
to use force in self-defence. They might not therefore be liable
to prosecution for using force to repel attacks directed against
them or against people they were guarding, which is in practice
the most likely occasion on which they would fire their weapons
in any case.
Nevertheless,
it remains troubling that the United States is putting people into
conflict situations whose training, rules of engagement and legal
accountability are unclear. According to news reports, coalition
authorities and Iraqi officials are now drafting a set of operating
rules for private security companies. It seems likely that the guidelines
governing the role and use of these private security forces will
be clarified before the scheduled handover of power in Iraq at the
end of June.
Related
Links:
More
Limits Sought for Private Security Teams
By
Mary Pat Flaherty and Dana Priest
The
Washington Post
April
13, 2004
Under
Fire, Security Firms Form an Alliance
By
Dana Priest and Mary Pat Flaherty
The
Washington Post
April
8, 2004
Hired
Guns: What to Do About Military Contractors Run Amok
By
Phillip Carter
Slate
April
9, 2004
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