The attack on July 13 on a Hindu shantytown in Kashmir, in which
27 people were killed, has exposed the continuing fragility of prospects
for peace in the region. Two months ago, after India and Pakistan
appeared on the brink of war over Kashmir, a tentative pullback
was reached. Pakistans leader General Musharraf promised to
dismantle militant camps and "permanently" stop aiding
militant organizations that have been staging attacks in Indian-controlled
Kashmir. But both sides know that these efforts, even if undertaken
in good faith, will not prevent all attacks. As India readily acknowledges,
many militants originate in Indian-controlled Kashmir; they and
many other Kashmiris are deeply alienated from India. Why so many
Kashmiris have taken up arms against the Indian state has less to
do with the disputed status of the territory than with the government
of Indias policies toward the state.
Origins
of the Dispute
When
British India was partitioned in 1947, the rulers of some 500 "princely
states" which had nominal independence under the Britishhad
to choose to join one of the newly independent states, India or
Pakistan. For the most part, those whose territory fell within the
borders of India or Pakistan joined that state. Kashmir, which straddles
both nations at their northernmost border, was an anomaly. The Maharaja
of Kashmir equivocated, apparently in the hope that Kashmir could
remain independent. A pro-democracy movement in Kashmir led by Sheikh
Abdullah, who opposed the Maharajas autocratic rule, favored
joining India because its leaders felt that Kashmiri interests and
its autonomy were best preserved in a secular state. On the eve
of partition Sheikh Abdullah was jailed for dissent.
In
the weeks after partition, Pakistani tribesmen, apparently accompanied
by some Pakistani army regulars, invaded Kashmir, prompting a number
of uprisings against the Maharaja in the western part of the state.
The Maharaja sought Indias help in driving out the invaders.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru agreed, provided the Maharaja accede
to India. On October 27, 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh agreed to sign
the instrument of accession, and Sheikh Abdullah was released from
jail to negotiate the terms.
As
a condition of accession, the document stated that nothing in it
would commit Kashmir to any future Constitution of India. Indian
troops succeeded in halting the advance of the Pakistani forces
to the western third of the state. Prime Minister Nehru asked the
United Nations to intervene, and in January 1948 the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 39 (1948) establishing the United Nations
Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and mediate
the dispute. In April 1948, the Security Council adopted Resolution
48, expanding UNCIPs membership and mandate to include the
use of observers as a way to halt the fighting. In July 1949 India
and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement establishing the cease-fire
line, known as the Line of Actual Control, to be supervised by the
observers. 1
 |
A
soldier of the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) patrols the
Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC) near the strategic
town of Uri in Kashmir.
© Gary Knight, 2002 |
In
October 1947 the British Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, accepted Kashmirs
document of accession while noting that in "the case of any
State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute,
the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the
wishes of the people of the State, it is my Governments wish
that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and
her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the States
accession should be settled by a reference to the people."
Subsequent UN Resolutions also called for demilitarization and the
holding of a plebiscite.
Since
the early 1950s, however, India has maintained that the conditions
have never been met because Pakistan has not withdrawn from the
part of the state it controls, and because the Kashmiri people have
essentially ratified accession by voting in local and national elections.
Pakistan, which supports the idea of a plebiscite, argues that it
cannot include the third option of independence, as that was not
an option in 1947. Neither India nor Pakistan wants an independent
Kashmir.
Indian
Policy Toward Kashmir
As
a consequence of Kashmirs conditional accession, Article 370
was incorporated into the Indian Constitution, conferring a special
status on the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It stipulated that only
Article 1 of the constitution, which defines the territories of
India, applied to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Most other articles
could be applied only with the concurrence of the state government.
But
the Indian government soon reneged on its promise of autonomy. In
October 1951, Sheikh Abdullah was elected unopposed as prime minister
of the state. But after he protested the Indian governments
continued interference in Kashmiri affairs, the central government
removed him and charged him with conspiracy. Sheikh Abdullah was
jailed repeatedly over the next two decades, particularly after
he launched a new political party, the Plebiscite Front, to organize
a campaign for the plebiscite. The Indian government, meanwhile,
installed officials it could control. In 1964, growing frustration
among Kashmiris led some to form the first militant organization,
the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), and to seek out assistance
from Pakistan. In March 1965 the state constitution was amended
to make the prime minister a chief minister like every other Indian
state.
 |
An
anti-U.S. demonstration at the University of Kashmir.
© Gary Knight, 2002 |
India
and Pakistan went to war again in August 1965. The 1965 war began
with border skirmishes at the Rann of Kutch near Gujarat in April
and spread to the cease-fire line in Kashmir. At that time, UN observers
reported infiltrations from Pakistan into Indian-held Kashmir. The
U.S. and Britain cut military supplies to both countries, and on
September 23, a cease-fire was arranged through the UN Security
Council. 2
Civil
war broke out in Pakistan in 1971 over the secession of East Pakistan.
India intervened in December of that year to defeat Pakistan and
assure the independence of Bangladesh. On July 2, 1972, India and
Pakistan signed the Simla Accords which stipulated that both countries
would respect the cease-fire line, resolve differences over Kashmir
"by peaceful means" and negotiate a "final settlement."
After
Sheikh Abdullah died in 1982, his son, Farooq, succeeded him as
Chief Minister and head of the National Conference party. Farooq
Abdullah initially adopted a pro-independence stance as well, and
for that his government was dismissed in 1984. Jagmohan, the governor
who was installed to rule the state, had gained an anti-Muslim reputation
in the mid-1970s in Prime Minister Indira Gandhis government
after she declared a state of emergency and suspended civil rights.
Jagmohans
pro-Hindu policies in Kashmir, and the lack of economic opportunities
for educated Muslim Kashmiris, drove many Kashmiri youth to support
Islamist parties that were gaining influence in the state3.
The turning point came a few years later. In 1986 Farooq Abdullah
signed an accord with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that those in
the independence movement saw as a betrayal of Kashmiri interests.
Pro-independence activists formed a new party, the Muslim United
Front (MUF), which appeared poised to win a significant number of
seats in the 1987 state assembly elections. Instead, the elections
were rigged and scores of MUF candidates were arrested.
The
elections marked a watershed in Kashmir. Discontent found wider
popular support, and political activists in large numbers abandoned
politics for armed struggle. Some joined the JKLF, others formed
new militant organizations which were openly pro-Pakistan. Through
1988, the JKLF and other groups were responsible for a number of
bomb blasts that targeted government installations in Kashmir. Some
militant groups also began threatening and attacking local Hindu
residents, leading to a slow exodus of Hindus from the Kashmir Valley.
After
organizing a near total boycott of the 1989 elections, the JKLF
adbucted the daughter of the state Home Minister. They freed her
after the government agreed to their demand to release five detained
JKLF members. The militants returned home to a heros welcome,
and set off a wave of protests against both the state and national
governments. Indeed, the JKLF itself was unprepared for the strength
of the mass protests: the uprising preceded any serious military
strategy among the militant groups. 4
The
Insurgency and Indias Violations of International Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law
 |
The
family of a young man named Bashir protest his incarceration
by the Indian Border Security Forces. The boy was taken during
the night from his home to an interrogation centre. In many
cases young men are tortured to death during interrogation,
according to human rights lawyers.
© Gary Knight, 2002 |
On
January 18, 1990, the government of India again appointed Jagmohan
to govern the state and crack down on the militants. The state government
resigned in protest, and the state was put under direct rule from
New Delhi. In response to widespread threats and targeted attacks
and killings by militant groups, many Hindus had fled. Jagmohans
government ultimately assisted some 90,000 Hindus in leaving the
Kashmir Valley for camps in Jammu and New Delhi. Tens of thousands
of Indian troops were deployed throughout the Valley.
In
the weeks that followed, Indian army and security forces opened
fire repeatedly on unarmed protesters, in some cases shooting to
kill wounded prisoners. These killings constituted a serious violation
of international humanitarian law. Foreign journalists were expelled
from Kashmir for several months, and new laws enacted granting the
security forces increased powers, limiting defendants rights,
imposing restrictions on public gatherings, and prohibiting virtual
any public expression of dissent. 5
Indias
counterinsurgency tactics in Kashmir have continued to include practices
that directly contravene international humanitarian law, some of
which could be considered war crimes. Indian security forces regularly
execute captured combatants and suspected militants. Following a
massacre in a Sikh village on the eve of President Clintons
visit to India in 2000, Indian security forces claimed to have killed
the "foreign" militants responsible in an "encounter."
Angry villagers whose relatives had "disappeared" after
being arrested demanded that the bodies be exhumed. When they were,
villagers claimed that the so-called "foreign" militants
were their relatives who had been arrested and killed in secret
by the security forces who were under pressure to show results following
the massacre. In the subsequent investigation, DNA samples taken
from the bodies were found to have been tampered with, leading Chief
Minister Farooq Abdullah to state "that those responsible had
something to hide." He promised the incident would be investigated,
but there have been no further developments. 6
Indian
security forces have also tortured suspected militants, and raped,
tortured and killed civilians suspected of supporting them. Human
rights organizations have documented many such massacres by Indian
forces since 1990. In some cases, Indian forces have burned down
entire villages in apparent reprisal for militant attacks. These
abuses constitute war crimes. 7
Indian
authorities argue that abuses by their forces are rare and those
responsible are punished. But in fact official investigations are
infrequent, punishments, if any, are light, and the practices continue.
While some abuses, particularly indiscriminate shootings of civilians
and reprisal killings, were worse in the early years of the insurgency,
summary executions of persons taken into custody have never abated
and have even increased during periodic counterinsurgency operations.
 |
The
Special Boat Force patrols the canals of Srinagar.
© Gary Knight, 2002 |
The
courts provide no safeguard against these abuses because the security
forces routinely flout procedures that would provide some protection
against summary executions and "disappearances." Detainees
are held in unofficial detention centers and are frequently moved
or handed over to a different security agency; the security forces
maintain no records of arrest or falsify the ones they have; and
they ignore writs of habeas corpushundreds of habeas corpus
petitions remained pending before the Jammu and Kashmir High Court.
In private, Indian officials admit that they resort to such practices
because they believe there is no legal way to combat the militants.
8
In
late 1992-1993, a brutal campaign by the Indian security forces
succeeded in eliminating a large number of militant leaders, as
well as some important human rights activists who had been in regular
communication with international human rights organizations and
the media. Over the next few years, the security forces organized
the death squads into units to operate as subcontractors, carrying
out assassinations, kidnappings and other abuses, and informing
on former colleagues. Called "renegades" by the Kashmiris,
their efforts were directed not only at militants but at other elements
of civil society who opposed Indias policies in Kashmir, particularly
journalists and lawyers. 9
Ironically,
this new strategy only served to further alienate the Kashmir population
at a time when Kashmiris were growing disenchanted with the militant
groups, whom they blamed for extortion, corruption and other abuses.
By 1994, the militant groups no longer commanded the popular support
they did in the early 1990s. That support waned further as militant
activities came to be dominated by groups with a strong non-Kashmiri
leadership, and a very different political agenda.
The
Militant Groups and Pakistans Role
The
"foreign" element emerged as an important factor in militant
activity in Kashmir after 1994. The counter-insurgency campaign
had decimated the JKLF, which had also been torn by internal disputes,
and in 1994 the group declared a unilateral cease-fire. While other
Kashmiri groups continued to operate, those led or directed by Pakistanis
came to play an increasingly dominant role in militant activity,
and recruited local Kashmiris to join them.
During
a number of widely publicized incidents, including the kidnapping
and apparent murder of five foreign trekkers in 1995, it became
clear that the Kashmir militant leaders had no influence with these
new groups. Among these groups were Harakat-i Mujahidin and Lashkar-i
Toiba. Both groups had apparently received training at camps in
Afghanistan established by Pakistans Interservices Intelligence
(ISI). The character of the attacks also changed, as some militants,
particularly those who were not from the valley sought to impose
a conservative Islamist agenda on the independence movement. Some
have defined their objective as establishing Islamic rule throughout
all of India. With no accountability to the local population, the
groups have carried out brutal attacks, massacring hundreds of civilians.
10
 |
A
surrendered Kashmiri militant at an Indian Army base in Kashmir.
The militant, who has hidden his identity to prevent retribution,
works with the Rajput Rifle Regiment as a counter insurgent.
© Gary Knight, 2002 |
These
killings, and others carried out since the beginning of the insurgency
in 1990, constitute violations of international humanitarian law.
Those targeted have included Hindus, Sikhs and Kashmiri Muslims
who have opposed the militants or who have been accused of providing
information to the Indian government. In recent years, the groups
have also carried out suicide bombingsa practice previously
unheard of in Kashmir. Some two dozen groups are believed to be
active inside Indian-controlled Kashmir, many of which are loosely
allied under an umbrella group the United Jihad Council. According
to India, two of these groups, Jaish-i Mohammad and Lashkar-i Toiba,
were responsible for the attack on the Indian parliament on December
13, 2001.
Pakistan
has been complicit in these violations because of its role in helping
to arm and train the militant groups. Although Pakistan has long
claimed that it gives only moral support to the militants, there
is substantial evidence of its involvement in providing training
and facilitating the supply of weapons. Many of the weapons are
in fact procured from arms bazaars in Pakistans Northwest
Frontier Province. In some cases groups have bought arms from Indian
soldiers in Kashmir.
Pakistan
has supported militant groups in Kashmir since perhaps as early
as 1964, when the JKLF was founded. But that support increased dramatically
in the late 1980s as the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan
allowed for the diversion of arms and fighters to Kashmir. For Pakistans
ISI and its Islamist parties, Afghanistan under the control of the
mujahidin provided a perfect base for pursuing its objectives in
Kashmir: a ready supply of fighters eager to extend their jihad
to Kashmir, an enormous cache of weaponry, and territory for training
camps.
As
refugees and militants crossed the mountains into Pakistan-controlled
"Azad" Kashmir, the ISI also set up training camps. The
militants presence served another purpose as well: Groups
taking a pro-Pakistan, Islamist line could also stamp out any demands
for greater autonomy among minority groups in "Azad" Kashmir
and in the Northern Areas. (Pakistans claim of support for
Kashmiri self-determination does not extend to areas under its control,
where it has brutally repressed opposition activity). Pakistan has
long claimed in its official dealings that "Azad" Kashmir
is independent; with camps there and in Afghanistan, it could deny
that any such camps operated on Pakistani soil.
But
although the ISI has been deeply involved in training and arming
Kashmiri militants, its control over them is limited. As was the
case with the Taliban, support for the militants is spread over
a number of agencies: official, semi-official and private. In addition
to the ISI these may include retired army officers and political
party leaders as well as religious parties and the madrasas that
they operate. The militant groups themselves are only partially
susceptible to pressure from Islamabad. The current crackdown by
Musharraf appears to have had some effect in curbing cross-border
activity, but resistance to Musharrafs new policy is growing
among Islamist activists (as well as some members of the armed forces
and ISI) who were already deeply unhappy with the governments
decision to abandon the Taliban and side with the U.S. in Afghanistan.
The groups claim they will defy the governments efforts to
rein them in, and Musharraf himself is now a likely target for these
groups.
|
The
funeral of slain Kashmiri militant Fayaz Ahmed Lone (25) of
Doba Village at the Masjid Siddiari Mosque in Srinagar.
© Gary Knight, 2002 |
Rethinking
Kashmir and the War on Terror
The
war on terror has cast Kashmir in black and white terms, obscuring
the real causes of the insurgency inside Indian-controlled Kashmir.
Recent U.S. claims of evidence of al-Qaeda in Kashmir, and its quick
about-face on the issue after protests from Pakistan, demonstrate
a dangerous lack of understanding about the complexity of the conflict.
Whether or not any of the militant groups have contacts in al-Qaeda,
balancing Indian claims against Pakistani in Kashmir leaves the
demands of the Kashmiris themselves out of the picture altogether.
As
India has gained support from the West in its own corner of the
"war on terrorism," there is the risk that the entire
struggle in Kashmir for self-determination could be labeled as "terrorism."
In his recent visit to Pakistan, British Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw came close to making that claim when he pressed Pakistan to
take action against "terrorists dressed up as freedom fighters."
India appears ready to use the upcoming elections as a test: only
those who participate on Indias terms will escape the terrorist
label11. Eager to deflect criticism
about its own appalling human rights record in Kashmir, India has
long portrayed the conflict as principally a proxy war, and the
militants as foreign terrorists. But that is only part of the story.
Indias longstanding policy of denying Kashmiris any hope of
achieving change through politics and its brutal counterinsurgency
tactics have done more to swell the ranks of the militants than
any foreign militant organization has managed to do.
Elements
in Pakistan have taken advantage of the situation to support groups
whose agenda now threatens Pakistans own survival, pitting
factions in the Pakistan government and military-intelligence bureaucracies
against each other and against outside agencies beyond their control.
While it is appropriate for the international community to pressure
Pakistan to stem cross-border incursions by these groups, India
must also be pressured to end its repression in Kashmir, particularly
its policy of impunity for war crimes committed by its forces. Indias
promise of free and fair elections is meant to appease its international
critics, but most Kashmiris believe that without other changes,
including updating the voter registration list and allowing international
monitors, the elections will be meaningless.12
If the international community views Kashmir only through the prism
of international terrorism, there is no hope of achieving a peaceful
resolution of the conflict.
1.
India
and Pakistan UNMOGIP Background
2.
"Pakistan:
A Country Study by the USA Library of Congress,"
3.
Pankaj Mishra, "The
Birth of a Nation," New York Review of Books, October
5, 2000.
4.
For more on this see Tapan K. Bose, "Strategy for Peoples
Movement in Kashmir," a paper published by the South Asia Forum
for Human Rights, July 2002.
5.
Human Rights Watch has documented these incidents in a number of
reports, including Behind
the Kashmir Conflict: Abuses by Indian Security Forces and Militant
Groups Continue
(New York, 1999), India's
Secret Army in Kashmir (New York, 1996), The Human Rights
Crisis in Kashmir: A Pattern of Impunity (New York, 1993), and
Kashmir Under Siege (New York, 1991).
6.
Protest
against Kashmir 'disappearances', BBC World, March 30, 2000
Kashmir
massacre sampled 'faked', BBC World, Friday, 8 March, 2002
7.
See in particular Human Rights Watch, Kashmir Under Siege.
8.
Indian officials have admitted this to the author on several occasions,
some of which are included in the Human Rights Watch reports.
9.
For more on this see Patricia Gossman, "Indias Secret
Armies," in Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with
Deniability, Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner, Eds. (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), and Sumantra Bose, The Challenge
in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination and a Just Peace (New
Delhi: Sage, 1997).
10.
For more on this see Human Rights Watch, Behind
the Kashmir Conflict: Abuses by Indian Security Forces and Militant
Groups Continue
(New York, 1999).
11.
"UK
urges action from Pakistan," BBC World, May 29, 2002
12.
See Bose, "Strategy
"
Patricia
Gossman was a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch for 12 years,
and is now an independent consultant and writer on human rights
issues in South Asia.
Photographs
© VII photo agency
Related
chapters from Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know
Nuclear
Weapons
Paramilitaries
Terrorism
Terrorism against
Civilians
Related
Links
South
Asia Forum for Human Rights
Human
Rights Watch
Kashmir:
Confrontation and Miscalculation
International Crisis Group, July 2002
jammukashmir.net
An independent resource on Kashmir
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