I represent the Memorial organization which has been working in the Caucasus, specifically in the Northern Caucasus, for several years. We have been monitoring human rights in the region since the early 90�s.

During the first war, we organized a human rights observation mission in areas of conflict. Between the wars, we repeatedly sent teams both to Chechnya and to neighboring regions. Our mission has been working in Ingushetia since the beginning of the present second war.

Representatives of human rights organizations are virtually unable to get into Chechnya itself due to the obstacles erected by the Russian authorities. Nevertheless, our field workers have been able to collect on-sight information and, frequently, from Chechnya as well.

I'll begin with several general words about Memorial's position on the conflict. First of all, I must say that we have a significant amount of material enabling us to state that in the period 1996-1999, power structures in the Chechen Republic showed a complete inability to protect the lives and ensure the security and civil rights of people living in Chechnya. Moreover, the state in the process of formation manifested disregard for issues relating to human rights. For example, here is a copy of so called Criminal Code of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria. Everybody familiar with its will note that it seriously violates international human rights standards. Additionally, I should point out that the power structures of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria failed to tackle the wave of banditry, kidnapping and criminal violence coming from the republic and spilling into neighboring Russian regions.

The sum of these factors allows us to state that, from our point of view, the question of granting Chechnya the status of an independent state cannot be on the agenda of talks on any level at the present moment. The essence of the dangers Chechnya poses to its neighbors is evident in the attacks of armed groups, carried out from the Chechen territory, late summer and early fall last year. I was in Dagestan myself at that time and I witnessed those events.

The attack on Dagestan forced the Russian government to take serious measures to secure the lives and civil rights of the Russian as well as the Chechen population. In order to fulfill these goals, the use of force was acceptable. But it should have been implemented in strict accordance with the law, selective and proportional to the threat. The Russian leadership launched a military campaign which cannot be considered proportional to the threat.

The operations of the Russian forces in the Northern Caucasus are in breach of the laws and the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Many constitutional rights have been curtailed, such as those relating to the freedom of movement, the freedom of choice of residence, and so on. Russian law allows for such measures - in the event of a declaration of a state of emergency. But a state of emergency has not been declared.

We believe that the violent means used by the Russian federal forces and authorities in Chechnya have turned the war into a great and terrible crime. The way force is being used by Russia, let me say it once more, is a crime.

Of course, human rights and humanitarian laws have been seriously violated by both sides. But the number of civilian casualties and the scope of destruction of civilian property caused by the activities of the Russian federal forces is incomparably higher. Moreover, I must stress that the operations of the Russian military and police are operations of forces under the command of the Russian state which, by signing a number of international treaties, is obliged to observe human rights. This fact lends particular seriousness to the violations of Russian forces.

The war has been going on against a backdrop of constant lying. Russian authorities have coined a whole range of phrases and terms, such as "anti-terrorist operation", "accurate strike", "humanitarian corridors for the exit of population", "safe zones". They have even begun to believe these euphemisms refer to things which actually exist. If there is any reality behind these terms, it is a virtual reality, which has nothing to do with the real developments in Chechnya.

There is no reason to call the current war in Chechnya an anti-terrorist operation. Undoubtedly, it is not an "international" conflict, which is subject to the Geneva Conventions, namely Article 3 common to the Geneva conventions and the Second Additional Protocol. The conflict in Chechnya has fulfilled all criteria of a conflict not of an international character as stipulated by the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. We can see a large-scale operation with the use of air force, salvo fire and tactical rockets. Inhabited places are attacked and nearly wiped off the face of the earth. And Mr. Putin calls that an anti-terrorist operation. The operation cannot be considered anti-terrorist even by Russian anti-terrorist legislation, which again underlines the serious violation of Russia's own laws.

Let me change the subject for a minute in order to correct some misunderstandings which may divide some even in this audience. Some say: "Yes, military operations were under way - but peace is coming and the military part of the conflict in the North Caucasus is over." Unfortunately, this is not true. These are misperceptions intentionally disseminated by official Russian propaganda. They are in sharp contrast with the figures provided by official Russian representatives themselves. For example, over the week of April 27 - May 4, Russian federal forces suffered 32 deaths and 107 injuries in Chechnya. Over the second week of May, the losses of Russian federal forces reached as many as 51, with an additional 70 men injured. And this was is when they were claiming that there were no serious military operations under way. Dozens of Russian soldiers are being killed every week.

On April 30, a debate was held on the possible commitment of long-range bombardment aviation and an increase in ammunition for bombing mountainous parts of Chechnya. The number of sorties for the bombardment of these areas significantly increased in May. This shows that the war is not over. The war is going on and there is no sign that it will stop. Information coming from the mountains now is very limited and poor - and this is due to deliberate censorship by the Russian authorities.

Let me return to the assessment of the conflict. I should say that if this were an anti-terrorist operation, it would have to have one distinctive feature, namely selectivity. An anti-terrorist operation should aim, first of all, at the protection of civilians and then at the isolation and liquidation of terrorists. What do we witness in reality? It is completely the other way around. Since the very beginning, the operation carried out by Russian armed forces in Chechnya has been characterized by its indiscriminate nature.

I'll give you just a few examples from different periods of the conflict. At the beginning of the conflict, on October 27, Russian media announced that Shamil Basayev's house of had been hit by a rocket strike. They announced that the house had been destroyed and that Shamil Basayev himself had survived, though some people around him, namely his bodyguards, had died. It was presented as a successful Russian military operation. They did not mention, however, that the rocket strike and bombardment destroyed the entire neighborhood. At least five twelve-flat houses were destroyed, one five-storied house, many one-storied houses, a market, a taxi stand including cars, passengers, and drivers. At the moment, we do not know how many innocent people died so that several fighters and supporters of Shamil Basayev could be killed. And we will never find out.

In the full course of this war, large numbers of civilians are killed in an attempt to kill those who are referred to as terrorists by the Russian government. We are not able to say how many innocent people have died, but we know there have been thousands. T h o u s a n d s. Russian authorities called the strike against Shamil Basayev's house an accurate strike. There was a tremendous amount of similar strikes throughout Grozny and, as you know, Grozny has virtually been wiped off the face of the earth.

Here is another example from a later period of the conflict which shows that both parties pay absolutely no attention to the interests of the civilian population. Shali, a large town-like village, was taken without fighting by the Russian federal forces at the end of 1999. The federal command called that zone a safe zone. This is another interesting term - a "safe zone".

Russian authorities encouraged refugees to return and many people indeed started doing so. Life in the safe zone was not easy: People were abused by those who were asked to protect them, namely by the police troops sent to Chechnya from various parts of Russia. We have at least one documented case of rape and murder of a woman in Shali during that period. Another example: authorities started distributing pensions to people who hadn�t received them for a long time. Pensions were distributed for the first time on February 8 and on February 9 a big crowd of people gathered at the Shali central square in order to receive additional payments, make lists etc. No one knew that a small group of Chechen fighters entered Shali at that moment. The group came to the local military HQ and surrounded it. The people had no idea about it - they were simply surprised to see different armed people close to them. At that very moment, a Russian tactical missile exploded above their heads. It was a response of the Russian command to the report that a group of fighters entered Shali. The tactical missile is estimated to have killed, roughly speaking, some 150 civilians. Then there came an attack by combat helicopters, which also caused civilian casualties. The group of fighters left Shali, with quite small losses, amounting to several men. Thus, we see that in order to kill several men, Russian forces kill hundreds of peaceful citizens

And here is another example which exposes the direct responsibility of the military command for the indiscriminate use of force causing civilian deaths. This February Grozny itself was still under the control of Chechen armed groups. The adjacent regions were already under the control of the Russian federal forces and in these regions so called "safe zones" were to be established. The large village of Katyr-Yurt was declared a safe zone. Refugees were encouraged to come back and people began to do so. As it was a safe zone, many gathered in Katyr-Yurt, not only refugees from Katyr-Yurt, but from other regions as well. The announcement of the zone being declared a safe zone had been signed by Russian generals.

Later on we discovered that the same generals were simultaneously working out a crafty and complex special operation with the aim of luring the fighters out of Grozny. Misinformation was released claiming that some Russian commanders were allegedly willing to provide Chechen fighters with a safe corridor in exchange for a large amount of money. The Chechen fighters believed it and having paid some money they set off in the corridor deliberately provided to them by the Russian military command. In the corridor they came across mine fields, artillery fire, air strikes, they suffered high losses. They managed to get to the mountains, nevertheless.

This was officially presented as an excellent and successful operation. Russian generals spoke completely openly on TV about the fact that they had prepared the operation. But they did not speak about the fact that the corridor of death went through safe zones, such as the zone in Katyr-Yurt. Thus after the Chechen fighters left Grozny and entered a village, the village immediately came under systematic Russian artillery fire. This was the case of Alkhan-Kala, Zakan-Yurt, Shami-Yurt, Katyr-Yurt. Some 200 peaceful inhabitants of Katyr-Yurt died in the village.

The village of Gekhi-Chu, closer to the mountains, fell under terrible artillery fire after the fighters left. This was documented by Russian television. I assume they did not understand themselves what they were actually showing. They showed the use of vacuum charges in the village, which was full of peaceful inhabitants. Then the footage recorded by Western journalists on the following day was presented, which showed women and children who were killed in the village.

The shelling of the villages was followed by mopping-up operations. This is another dreadful word, a "mopping-up operation" ("zachistka"), which came from the police jargon and stands for the across-the-board inspection of people and houses in a town or village. Terrible things often occur during these operations, such as executions, looting, violence... We have documented evidence that in the village of Gekhi-Chu, for example, at least three people were executed by shooting.

So this was a military operation, one of many, with the only difference that the direct command responsibility of the generals was documented. In my opinion the Russian command simply do not comprehend that they must take into consideration the civilian population. They are completely ignorant of this fact.

The detention in the above mentioned village Katyr-Yurt was indiscriminate. Similarly in addition to indiscriminate shelling, Russian forces carry out indiscriminate arrests. This is another aspect of the current events in Chechnya, I mean indiscriminate arrests, the system of filtration camps, the abuses of detainees.

What is a filtration camp? In fact, the term "filtration camp" is not very accurate. In the previous war, filtration camps were places where all detainees were taken. However, there is no such term in Russian legislation. Thus they can only be considered illegal places where Russian citizens are deprived of freedom. Now, official status is occasionally assigned to these facilities.

For example, the famous filtration camp in Chernokozovo has official status, namely as a pre-trial establishment (sledstvennyj izoljator). There are other filtration camps, which have retained their name "filtration camp" and are officially called temporary detention facilities (izoljator vremennovo soderzhaniya). They are established at district departments of interior forces in various parts of Chechnya. They have an official status and the guard consists of members of interior forces or so called "Specnaz" of the Russian Ministry of Justice. The Specnaz is ill-famed for being extremely cruel. It is used for suppressing prison revolts and it acts with extreme cruelty throughout Russia. It is quite understandable that here, in Chechnya, when it enjoys full impunity, and in the context of war, its cruelty is amplified.

After Chernokozovo attracted public attention and the Committee for the Prevention of Torture of the Council of Europe as well as the delegations of the OSCE and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe visited the place, the situation really started improving. The staff in Chernokozovo was replaced, the food improved, and torture and beatings stopped. A great part of the detainees were moved to the territory of the Stavropol region. But concomitantly, violence, brutality and torture were merely moved to other camps, such as that in Urus-Martan.

Here is one testimony which we received from Urus-Martan. It is from a man who asked us not to disclose his name, but we know it. "Throughout the first night, they bet us all nearly till the morning. They made us call: �Long live Penza OMON! Hurrah!' Those who refused to chant were brutally beaten. There were at least thirty people in the cell, which was 3 metres long and 2 metres wide. We would sit on our knees. There was no space to sit or lie. Four of us were unable to walk anymore. ... I was called five times for investigations. They asked me where the fighters were, who helped them, they beat me with truncheons, rifle butts, boots. They tried to make me sign a paper saying that I was a fighter. ... There were also 14 fighters, many of whom were injured and had fractures. Some of them had already suffered from gangrene but no medical care was provided to them. ... Upon leaving, they made me sign a document stating that they had not insulted nor beaten me." That man was released, which means that he was innocent.

Besides official detention facilities, there are many facilities without official status. They include various places in the territory of military units or around road checkpoints. For example, as in the previous war, detainees are transported to Khankala, a large military base near Grozny. This is done officially, though Khankala has no official status as a detention facility.

The people who are transported to the territory of military bases are kept either in holes dug into the ground, or in vehicles for transporting prisoners. In Khankala, railway cars for transporting prisoners appeared. Where did they come from? We have an inkling: Earlier this year a temporary detention facility was established at the Chervlyonnaya railway junction. They combined railway cars for moving prisoners, named that a temporary detention facility and held detainees there. The Committee for the Prevention of Torture of the Council of Europe visited the place and considered it absolutely unsuitable for detention and insisted on its closing down. Two months later, the Committee visited the site again. The facility had in fact closed down and the railway cars had been moved somewhere else. And we have now discovered the cars in Khankala. In other words, the official temporary detention facility was closed but the cars were moved to Khankala where detainees are � unofficially - held.

Guards treat detainees in Khankala very cruelly, even more cruelly than in other places. The reason is that people in unofficial detention facilities are not registered anywhere. In official places, like Chernokozovo, the staff is accountable and they keep lists of detainees. In unofficial places, crueler methods of inquiry can be applied to the detainees because no one will bear responsibility if something bad happens. Detainees "disappear" there more easily. Here is another example of how people disappear in unofficial detention places. We have documented evidence from one of the checkpoints, specifically, a checkpoint on the road near the village Duba-Yurt. I underline that it is one of many checkpoints. During January, February and March , at least three cases of disappearance of a group of men occurred. The first case took place on January 13, when four men were detained under the pretense of checking documents. They then disappeared. On May 10 the inhabitants of the Tangi-Chu village discovered the bodies of three of the men. The whereabouts of the fourth man is still unknown.

The second case occurred on February 18, when two men disappeared. Their relatives went off in search of them and discovered their two cars, which were buried not deep under ground, and apparently crushed by tanks or armored fighting vehicles. No one knows where the two missing persons are.

The third case occurred in March. Twelve people were detained, of whom five women were released afterwards.. These people came from the mountain village Ulus-Kert and were accompanied by a Russian paratrooper. Some time before that a group of Russian paratroopers had entered the village and warned the villagers: �Other units are coming behind us and they will treat you very brutally. You�d better leave the village now.' And one of the paratroopers offered to accompany the group of villagers to the plains. When they reached the Duba-Yurt checkpoint, soldiers at the checkpoint took the paratrooper aside, beat him up, claiming that he had sold himself to the Chechens and asked him how much they had paid him. Then they took him somewhere, released the women and detained the men, who were twelve. Nothing has been discovered about them since, despite official inquires sent to various Russian official bodies by relatives, us, and members of parliament. So far, no clear responses have been offered.

We hope that criminal proceeding will be launched because it is known that at least in two cases the checkpoint was under the command of one specific officer and people are ready to identify him. His real surname is not known because officers at checkpoints generally do not use their names. So this was just one example of the numerous disappearances which occur.

Now I'd like to say that despite these terrible stories, soldiers do not always behave with uniform brutality. There is usually a difference and things strongly depend on the commander. For example, General Shamanov is known as a man who cultivates cruelty in his units. General Troshev is a bit different, though he is is accused of war crimes as well. We also know that younger officers behave in very different ways. It must be stressed that people in Chechnya themselves identify a big difference between young conscript soldiers ("srochniki"), and so called contract soldiers ("kontraktniki"), who came to Chechnya to make money. Contract soldiers commit the stark majority of crimes. Witnesses say that, on the other hand, young soldiers have sheltered civilians from the abuses of contract soldiers in many instances.

The worst thing is that serious crimes are committed by members of law enforcement bodies, namely special police units, sent to Chechnya from various Russian regions. This is frightening for many reasons - we can imagine how these people who, figuratively speaking, have tasted blood in Chechnya, will keep law and order after they return home.

There are some distinctions to make here as well, however. For example, on April 24 there was an incident in a small village Novaya Zhizn, belonging to the Gelda-Gen region. Before that, Chechen fighters attacked a Russian military convoy in the same district, near the village Serzhen-Yurt, and killed some Russian soldiers. In response, the OMON troops started "mopping up" many villages and towns. They indiscriminately detained many people in Shali, who had no connection with fighters, and severely beat them. A special police unit from the Ural entered the Novaya Zhizn village and started indiscriminately detaining men and beating them up. The unit also beat women, including a pregnant one, who aborted. But there was another special police unit in the Novaya Zhizn village, an OMON unit coming from the Russian region Mordovia. There was somewhat of a mutual understanding between this OMON group and the villagers. This OMON tried to stop the abuses and thus a skirmish took place between the two OMONs. However, the newly arrived unit was more numerous and better armed and beat the Mordovian OMON up and rid it of a video camera by which they tried to record the abuses. They then beat locals and took eleven innocent men to their military base where they tortured them. They moved these men by a helicopter to Khankala, where they held them in railway cars for transporting prisoners.

Then a peculiar thing happened. When journalists came to the site, these prisoners were presented as Chechen fighters. They were, however, allowed to comment and one man actually managed to say: "I'm from Novaya Zhizn, I'm not a fighter, I haven't committed any offence." After that journalists interviewed general Troshev, who responded without hesitation: "No, they are fighters!", accusing them of some attack or another. All of this was presented on TV. In the evening, the inhabitants of Novaya Zhizn discovered that people from their village had been detained and accused of being fighters. The people from Novaya Zhizn organized a large demonstration demanding the release of the detainees. So in addition to the scandal involving 0the fight between the two OMONs, there was another debacle relating to the detention of the Novaya Zhizn villagers. In the end, the people were freed. I underline, they were officially released, without any accusation being brought against them. They were freed after being beaten, some of them seriously so. No apologies have been made.

Criminal proceedings have been started against the special police unit from the Ural by the local pro-Moscow Chechen prosecution. However, I don't believe they will have much effect because the prosecution on the national level, that is by Russian bodies, is de facto dysfunctional.

At the end of my speech, I�d like to underline once more that the war is not over. The violations that are being committed in close connection with and during military operations are pressing issues for Chechnya. But what is no less important is the behaviour of Russian law enforcement bodies in so called liberated territories. It is crucial to ensure that those guilty of crimes are somehow prosecuted.

[This is a translation of a spoken report.]

Oleg Orlov is the Head of the Memorial Chechnya War Program.