U.S. Army Clears Senior Officers of Responsibility for Detainee Abuse

According to several news reports, the U.S. Army's Inspector General has cleared four senior Army officers of responsibility for the abuses against detainees carried out in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.  The investigation concluded that the officers -- including Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the senior commander in Iraq from June 2003 -- should not be held liable for any wrongdoing or failure of leadership, according to comments by officials on Friday April 21.

The Inspector General's investigation, which followed a request from the Senate Armed Services Committee last September, was intended to be the Army's final judgement on whether senior officers should be held accountable for the abuses in Abu Ghraib.  Earlier investigations -- including the Army investigation headed by Lt. Gen. Anthony R. Jones and Maj. Gen. George R. Fay and the independent Schlesinger investigation -- did not have the power to recommend disciplinary action.

The Inspector General recommended that one officer -- Brig. Gen. Janis L. Karpinski, who was in charge of U.S. prison facilities in Iraq -- should be punished.  Karpinski has been issued with an administrative reprimand, a punishment that has the potential to end her career as an officer.

Apart from Lt. Gen. Sanchez, the other officers who have been cleared by the Inspector General -- all key members of Sanchez' team in the autumn of 2003 when the worst abuses occurred -- are Sanchez' deputy, Maj. Gen. Walter Wojdakowski, intelligence officer Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast and legal officer Col. Marc Warren.

A further seven officers were also investigated by the Inspector General, but their names have not been released.  One case remains to be decided, and it is not know whether disciplinary action has been recommended in any of the other cases.

All four of the officers cleared by the Inspector General had been criticized in earlier reports into detention policies in Iraq.  The report by former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger said that Gen. Sanchez should have dealt with command and resource problems at Abu Ghraib, and found that the unclear chain of command contributed to the atmosphere that allowed the abuses to take place.  It criticized Maj. Gen. Wojdakowski for failing to request additional personnel after it became clear that Abu Ghraib was understaffed, and said Maj. Gen. Fast failed to advise Sanchez properly about the interrogation center at the prison.  Finally, it said that Col. Warren had failed ro respond appropriately to a November 2003 report from the International Committee of the Red Cross that contained scathing criticism of practices at Abu Ghraib.

According to press reports, some officials associated with the Inspector General's investigation said that the lack of senior officers at the time and the rising insurgency were seen as mitigating factors in concluding that charges of leadership failure were not appropriate.

Guy Womack, the lawyer for Specialist Charles A. Graner, Jr., one of the Army reservists convicted by court-martial for his role in the abuse of prisoners, told the New York Times that he believed both Fast and Warren should have been disciplined.

In addition to the officers being investigated by the Army's Inspector General, two senior military intelligence officers who worked at Abu Ghraib -- Col. Thomas M. Pappas and Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan -- are under separate investigation by field commanders and may face criminal charges.

Related Chapters from Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know:

Terrorism

Torture

Related Links:

Schlesinger Report (.pdf file)

August 2004

Fay-Jones Report (.pdf file)

August 25, 2004

U.S. Department of Defense Detainee Investigations

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