Prosecutor
v. Akayesu
The Akayesu
case was the first international genocide trial in history, and
its findings have been relied upon quite extensively by subsequent
ICTR decisions. Jean-Paul Akayesu was the bourgmestre (mayor) of Taba
commune in Rwanda. In this position he had significant authority or
influence over military, political, and civil activities in Taba.
As a result of mass crimes committed in his territory by Hutus against
Tutsis and Hutu moderates, Akayesu was charged with genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes for crimes including extermination,
murder, rape, torture, and other inhumane acts.
The
Trial Chamber considered the scope and elements of genocide. In its
Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998), the Trial Chamber held that to incur responsibility
for genocide, any one of an enumerated list of acts must be committed
against an individual specifically because the individual belonged
to a racial, ethnic, religious, or national group. The "victim
is chosen not because of his individual identity, but rather on account
of his membership" in the protected group. It thus concluded
that a victim of genocide "is the group itself and not only the
individual." The Trial Chamber defined each protected group:
in general, an ethnic group is one "whose members share a common
language or culture"; members of a religious group "share
the same religion, denomination or mode of worship"; a national
group constitutes "a collection of people who are perceived to
share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity
of rights and duties"; and a racial group "is based on the
hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region,
irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors."
In considering whether groups protected by the Genocide Convention
should be limited to these four groups, the Chamber opined that protection
should extend to "any stable and permanent group," markedly
extending the reach of the Convention.
The Trial Chamber held that direct and public incitement to
commit genocide is punishable even if the accused is not successful
in achieving the result desired; contrarily, for complicity
in genocide to be punishable, it must be proven that genocide has
indeed been committed.
Considering the scope of crimes against humanity, the Trial Chamber
noted that certain inhumane acts must be committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population. It defined a civilian
population broadly, as comprising "people who are not taking
any active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed
forces who laid down their arms and those persons placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause."
Notably, it would appear that crimes against humanity - historically
associated with civilians - can be committed against prisoners of
war.
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