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Lessons from Bosnia-Herzegovina had been learned by both sides. The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement of October 1998 gave NATO satellite and spy planes the right to monitor the situation on the ground, leading to an increased level of caution on the part of the perpetrators. One significant departure from Bosnia-Herzegovina was the widespread use of wells for the disposal of bodies which, along with the use of grenades to collapse the walls and landmines to hamper excavation, led to increased difficulties for investigators. Given the chaotic situation on the ground, the finite resources of the ICTY, and the rapid onset of winter which curtailed the exhumation process, ICG personnel were well placed to support the tribunal with the task of witness documentation.

Articles 2,3,4, and 5 of the statute of the ICTY detail the crimes that the tribunal is charged with investigating in former Yugoslavia. Article 3 lists the violations of the laws or customs of war which include the "attack, bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;" and the "plunder of public or private property". Article 5 deals with Crimes against humanity, which include "murder; extermination; deportation; torture and rape." It is under these two articles that Slobodan Milosevic and leading members of the Yugoslav cabinet have been indicted.

The task facing ICTY investigators following the withdrawal of Yugoslav army, police, and paramilitary units from Kosovo in June 1999 was on an unprecedented scale. Unlike Bosnia-Herzegovina, freedom of movement in post-conflict Kosovo was less complicated and entailed fewer security risks than in the immediate aftermath of the Dayton Agreement. In addition, the ceasefire in Bosnia was declared in winter, which limited the exhumation process, while the ceasefire in Kosovo came at the height of summer.

The pattern of killings and burial in Kosovo also differed from that of Bosnia -Herzegovina and hindered investigations in that the crime scenes and body disposal points were often scattered over a radius of several kilometers. Mass graves in western Kosovo tended to hold fewer bodies than their counterparts in Bosnia, reflecting the lower volume of killing, but also the more scattered distribution of remains. Some bodies were burnt individually, some in groups, while others were transported in refrigerated trucks to industrial crematoria at meat-processing plants.

The difficulties of documenting war crimes in a post-conflict environment should not be under-estimated. The wellbeing of the witness is of course paramount, and that of the local staff a close second. Daily field work often entailed attending mass grave exhumations and reburials, marking newly discovered bodies with Global Positioning Satellites (GPS), and recording crime scenes with digital cameras. With a fleet of 15 jeeps, the ICG focused on the municipalities of Decan/Decani, Gjakova/Djakovica, Rahovec/Orahovac, Malisheve/Malisevo, Istog/Istok, Suhareke/Suva Reka and Prizren/Prizren. The international legal staff were comprised of lawyers, some of whom had worked for the ICTY in the Hague; while local legal staff were drawn predominately from the various sub-committees of the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF), the leading Kosovar human rights NGO. Data base entry was supervised by international IT support staff and a logistics unit.
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