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Vol 9. No. 6, July 2001

Trying Times in Cambodia

All eyes are on Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, as the country’s quest for justice—and answers about its past—continues.

by Dominic Faulder

Sitting in "The Tiger’s Den", his fortified residence outside Phnom Penh near Takhmau, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen was on a roll. It was September 1996, and he was about to fatally split the remaining Khmer Rouge guerrilla forces operating from the Thai border. A deal had been struck with Ieng Sary, Pol Pot’s former brother-in-law and foreign minister. In return for a pardon, Ieng Sary would defect to the government side bringing with him Pailin and the western theatre. Gem and timber rich, this was the Khmer Rouge’s economic heartland. "We can reduce their forces by 80 percent," he predicted, pretty much correctly as it turned out. This was the eve of the endgame, and for Hun Sen a dream was about to be realized.

Since 1977, when Hun Sen crossed into Vietnam along with other renegade Khmer Rouge fleeing Pol Pot’s lethal purges, virtually every waking moment had been devoted to smashing the military and political structures of the people who dropped at least 1.7 million Cambodians into early graves between 1975 and 1979. (Recent research puts the figure at over two million.) But once he had finally defeated the Khmer Rouge, how did Hun Sen plan to punish people responsible for almost unimaginable crimes against humanity? Hun Sen would not be drawn on that. At that time, peace was a far greater prize than justice. "I think we should not talk about how many kilograms of fish to cook, or whether to fry or to bake, at a time when the fish are still in the water," he commented. "If we do, it’s like throwing something into the water that will frighten all the fish away."


The last piece in the endgame jigsaw is the fate of Khmer Rouge leaders who have not died or been murdered. "Most profess ignorance of the holocaust they stewarded in the 1970s."

It had taken over six months to get that interview, driving my editors to distraction. About two-thirds of the way through, it became clear that the second prime minister had been waiting for the right time. He reached into his jacket and extracted a piece of paper which he gently unfolded. For a short while, he went uncharacteristically quiet, losing himself in contemplation of the single sheet. It was an astonishing moment. There was Ieng Sary’s pardon sitting in his hand.

Hun Sen explained that the following day he and First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh would seek an audience with King Norodom Sihanouk. He didn’t mention that signing the pardon would be exceptionally painful for Sihanouk. In the early 1970s, when the burgeoning Khmer Rouge were the military muscle in the anti-Lon Nol front nominally headed by Sihanouk, it was the arrogant bully Ieng Sary who shadowed him constantly. Sihanouk, who was subsequently imprisoned in his own palace by the Khmer Rouge, must nurture a deep ambivalence towards this man he once loathed but who also played a role in keeping him alive. The following week, he furiously berated the co-prime ministers for making his signature of the pardon public knowledge without first securing its endorsement from the National Assembly.

Ieng Sary’s pardon has turned out to be even more divisive than it seemed then. The Khmer Rouge was indeed devastatingly split by his defection, leaving hardliners Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok, Khieu Samphan, Son Sen and his wife Yun Yat to fester and murder madly to the north in and around Anlong Veng, the hardline Khmer Rouge’s final redoubt. "In my estimation, by late 1997 the situation will be very good," Hun Sen predicted. "If any Khmer Rouge remain, it will only be some hardliners." True enough, but he did not expect that by then they would have helped split his relations with Ranariddh.

Nearly five years on, much of Hun Sen’s dream is reality. Democratically elected, he is sole premier. Cambodia is at peace and rebuilding itself after some three decades of mayhem that included carpet-bombing, genocide and civil war. The Khmer Rouge has been defeated both militarily and politically. Rank-and-file Khmer Rouge have been amnestied and absorbed back into mainstream society. Pol Pot died—quite possibly he was murdered—along the Thai border in 1998. In 1997, he had ordered the killing of two of his most murderous accomplices, Son Sen and his wife Yun Yat, and members of their family.

The last piece in the endgame jigsaw is the fate of Khmer Rouge leaders who have not died or been murdered. Most profess ignorance of the holocaust they stewarded in the 1970s. There are probably fewer than a dozen in question. So far, only Ta Mok, Pol Pot’s bloodiest general, and Deuch, his top jailer and interrogator, have been arrested.

King Nordom Sihanouk who nursed bitter memories of earlier encounters with Pol Pot's foreign minister

Sihanouk has just signed a tribunal law that will provide for the inclusion of foreign judges and prosecutors. It is by no means clear that these will be provided by the United Nations, which has been in torturous negotiations with the Royal Cambodian Government and has a very checkered history on Cambodia. While the UN attempts to dictate from some dubious moral high ground, few in Cambodia can forget or forgive the fact that the international community allowed the Khmer Rouge to occupy Cambodia’s seat in the General Assembly until the late 1980s. The expensive, faltering tribunal the UN has convened in Tanzania in the wake of the Rwandan genocide meanwhile raises disturbing issues of basic competence.

Which is not to say the Cambodians, with their corrupt and inept judiciary still in tatters from the Khmer Rouge years, would do any better on their own. It is safe to say that there will not be a perfect tribunal in Cambodia, and it would be naive to expect such a thing anywhere. If there is to be tribunal with any credibility, a balance must somehow be struck between respect for Cambodia’s legitimate concerns over its historically much violated sovereignty and the incorporation of internationally acceptable judicial processes. This is easier said than done, but not impossible. The UN certainly ought to be the best source of foreign judges, but it does not have the monopoly.

Amidst all the wrangling, there is surprisingly little discussion of what purpose a tribunal in Cambodia would serve. China regards it as a hypocritical, Western-inspired exercise, but should also be embarrassed by its aid to the Khmer Rouge, which lasted until the early 1990s. Given what has occurred in Tibet, East Timor, Burma and Sri Lanka, there is discomfort in the region over the precedent a tribunal might set. So is it about punishment? Hardly. Some of the most guilty are already dead, Cambodia dropped the death penalty in its 1993, and lifetime incarceration is not much beyond the situation surviving Khmer Rouge leaders already find themselves in as they bleat implausible denials. Is it about revenge? Probably not. Most people in Cambodia want to avoid anything that might jeopardize their new peace. Is it about justice? If so, it is belated and of no use to the Khmer Rouge’s countless victims.

The real merits of a tribunal are twofold. Firstly, it could help establish some higher judicial standards in a country still cursed by violence, lawlessness and impunity. Respect for the law, the police and the judiciary is so low that petty thieves are regularly lynched in the streets by so-called "people’s courts". In a country where there is virtually no expectation of any form of justice, a decent tribunal would be an invaluable social exercise.

The second benefit is not so much closure as disclosure. Cambodians are owed an explanation for what went on under the Democratic Kampuchea regime when their country was supposedly at peace. Who was responsible? What drove them to such madness? The best people to shed fresh light here are surviving Khmer Rouge leaders, and they deserve a hearing in a properly constituted, impartial court. Some will continue to feign ignorance, some will lie, and some will talk frankly. The latter must be heard.

And this is why the issue of Ieng Sary’s pardon and whether he should be indicted is such a red herring. There was no mention in his pardon of crimes against humanity or genocide because he said he was not involved. By his own account, there was nothing that needed pardoning. If there are now those who charge otherwise, Ieng Sary should positively welcome the opportunity to clear his name in court.

Ironically, the real trial at the moment is of Hun Sen. He has calmed the waters, landed the big fish and must now decide how many to bake or fry. If Hun Sen gets it wrong on the tribunal, the man who more than any other defeated the Khmer Rouge will go down in history as the fisherman who let them back into the water.

Dominic Faulder is a veteran journalist based in Thailand. [Top]

Who to Indict?

NEVER TOO LATE If Pol Pot found rough justice in the jungle

After Vietnam invaded Cambodia with renegade Khmer Rouge forces under Heng Samrin on Christmas Day 1978, Pol Pot’s forces were pushed out of Phnom Penh towards the Thai border in less than a fortnight. During this time, some very rough justice was administered to low-level cadres. An unknown number were summarily butchered by the villagers they had once terrorized. Some committed suicide. A few were arrested, tried and jailed for relatively short periods. Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, his foreign minister, were sentenced to death in absentia in 1979 by a court that enjoyed little international recognition. Other Khmer Rouge slipped back into Cambodia’s devastated mainstream. Some of the guards at infamous Tuol Sleng, the country’s top concentration camp and interrogation center, live quietly within 30 km of Phnom Penh to this day.

Beyond the collation of evidence, little has happened on the legal front since Vietnam’s effort over twenty years ago. As the likelihood of a belated tribunal grows, there is inevitably speculation about who should be indicted. This is probably premature, and trespasses on the role prosecuting judges will play once the abundance of documentation is placed before them. Like the Nazis, the Khmer Rouge had a nasty little bureaucratic streak that left heaps of damning evidence, particularly at Tuol Sleng. Some believe that the indictment process, if properly conducted, could itself take a year.

Given the age and health of the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders, time is extremely short. This is one of the reasons why prosecutors are likely to indict only the most senior members of the regime, people who formed the core of Angkar, the murderous, obsessively secretive administration that boasted of "more eyes than a pineapple". These are the people who conceived policies and ordered their implementation. Pol Pot himself, always circumspect to a fault, left a weak paper trail, but not so his deputy Nuon Chea and his minister of defense, Son Sen (who Pol Pot had killed in 1997). All in all, it would be very surprising if indictments exceeded twenty. Indeed, they may very well amount to less than a dozen.

This is a good thing if the tribunal is to get under way before any more key personalities die. In the interests of national reconciliation, it is also important that rank-and-file Khmer Rouge are left alone, however heinous their individual crimes may have been. Whenever the tribunal issue is raised, the old bogey of the Khmer Rouge returning to arms is trotted out. If indictments are properly managed and contained, this is unlikely to happen. Most former Khmer Rouge are struggling in their new lives. One of the things they must come to terms with in their own way is that their lives were destroyed by people who misled them in every sense. It is the

top Khmer Rouge leaders alone who belong in the dock, not their victims on both sides.

A more dignified fate awaits Khieu Samphan in court

At present, the greatest controversy surrounds Democratic Kampuchea’s foreign minister, Ieng Sary, who is also probably the sickest of people facing possible indictment. In 1996, he was pardoned for being a Khmer Rouge (as were all other defectors under the terms of a 1994 law), his property rights were restored and his 1979 death sentence was lifted. He was not pardoned for any crimes he may have committed. Even if Ieng Sary succeeds in escaping actual indictment, he would be wanted as a witness—if he survives. Doubts about his professed innocence must include his failure to alert the outside world as to what was really going on insidecloseted Democratic Kampuchea when he traveled abroad.

His claims also have to be balanced against the thousand or so diplomats, students and expatriate Khmers he and the foreign ministry summoned back from abroad. Of these, an estimated 800 were executed. Did he really know nothing of this?

If Ieng Sary is summoned as a witness, he may have some illustrious company. King Norodom Sihanouk once offered to abdicate for a day in order to testify as a private citizen. Although he and his family were to suffer terribly at the hands of the Khmer Rouge, the King is still faulted by some for his disastrous alliance with the Khmer Rouge after his ousting in 1970 by the US-backed General Lon Nol. Other possible witnesses for the prosecution include Finance Minister Keat Chhon, who was an aide to Pol Pot, and a former president, Heng Samrin, who had a fairly brutal reputation before fleeing to Vietnam. Senate President Chea Sim and Interior Minister Sar Kheng were both provincial Khmer Rouge functionaries who defected to Vietnam relatively late.

Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, who was not a Khmer Rouge, has meanwhile been forced to defend himself over his role as an internee at Beoung Trabek, another school turned concentration camp in Phnom Penh. This facility held for observation more senior figures than Tuol Sleng, including close relatives of Queen Monineath. The commandant of Tuol Sleng, Deuch, was once rebuked by Nuon Chea for not destroying the records before he fled.

Somebody ensured the same mistake was not made at Boeung Trabek, and many would like to know who that person was. One other interesting witness might be Pol Ponnary, Pol Pot’s first wife. She was thought to have gone mad and ended up in a Beijing asylum, but recently turned up in Phnom Penh. She would have some interesting insights into the personalities involved.

Working in this huge can of worms, prosecutors will have their work cut out sifting the main instigators from those who were, as they say, simply following orders. They will not waste their time on Prime Minister Hun Sen who has not been linked to any atrocities at that time. Nor will they bother with president of the National Assembly Prince Norodom Ranariddh. He realized the barbarity of the Khmer Rouge earlier than most, declined to join his father in Beijing and went off to study law in France. Ranariddh unfortunately seriously blotted his copy in 1997 by entering into secret negotiations with remaining hardline Khmer Rouge. That imprudent initiative was one of the reasons he had to flee the country in July 1997 shortly before fighting erupted in the capital.

So who might be expecting a knock on their door? With Pol Pot’s death and his killing in 1997 of Son Sen and his wife Yun Yat, the original "dirty dozen" has been reduced to nine who are in varying states of health. Of these, Nuon Chea, 76, as Pol Pot’s Brother No. 2 and deputy, is probably the most seriously implicated and also the most defiant. A question mark hangs over Ieng Sary and his wife Ieng Thirith, who is Pol Ponnary’s sister. As Democratic Kampuchea’s Minister of Social Affairs, her responsibilities included the elimination of Buddhism.

Two others are already under arrest. Chhit Chouen, better known as Ta Mok, was Pol Pot’s bloodiest executioner. He may have more blood directly on his hands than any other person alive. Kang Khek Iev, better known as Deuch, ran Tuol Sleng and as such was the regime’s top jailer and interrogator. Three others involved in bloodletting similar to Ta Mok but still at large are Ke Pauk, Sou Meth and Meas Muth. Last, but not least, there is Khieu Samphan, Pol Pot’s head of state and the so-called "acceptable face of the Khmer Rouge". In an uncertain world, it’s a fair bet that they will all be blaming Pol Pot, who is in no position to defend himself. How convenient.

Dominic Faulder

[Top]

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