I don't think in terms of lists, I don't think about who we should pursue. I look at this in purely legal terms: we need to clarify and advance legislation. Governments need to perceive these cases as legitimate, driven by legal--not political or vindictive--factors. The process must be transparent, accessible to all, and open to critique.

So I approach the issue more conceptually: we must open a legal space in which these atrocities can be addressed, adjudicated. We want to move these cases outside the normal calculus of diplomacy and politics. In this regard, if the ICC had been up and running, it would have saved Jack Straw a lot of trouble. Countries could offload politically hot issues, but they need to be confident that there are rules and safety valves. The message must be unambiguous: legality is the prime concern, and certain acts, like torture and genocide, are simply beyond the pale. With universal jurisdiction, it doesn't matter if you are a head of state, or former head of state; if the charges are solid, and the evidence is credible, you will be vulnerable to prosecution. Like anyone else.

The [1998] Rome Statute [which laid the groundwork for the ICC] and Pinochet's arrest definitely marked a new legal moment. For one thing, it showed how much is not in place, not only in terms of legal structures, but knowledge, training of lawyers and others. A whole series of projects got underway on universal jurisdiction, for example. At The Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, we have been doing seminars on the subject in the context of the ICC, and it's been instructive to see how much confusion there is, especially in regions of conflict. The initial reaction, particularly, though not exclusively, among military officers, is that universal jurisdiction is illegitimate, forever attached to politics. In our seminars, the military participants are initially suspicious, even hostile. But after about two days, I tend to find that their views have softened. They come to see that the ICC is fraught with concessions, and that universal jurisdiction is not what they thought it was.

It is true that in many countries, prosecutors are under quite tight political control. This is something the ICC can remedy. Another major misapprehension we see is that the ICC will fatally undermine sovereignty, interfere with democracy. It's imperative to make the distinction between autonomy and sovereignty in an international context in which, again, certain acts are simply inadmissible: by ratifying human rights treaties, incorporating universal jurisdiction into domestic legislation, and approving the ICC, states will have consented to participate in a rigorous, transparent system of international justice.

It is also important to understand the military position. And here we come to a question of culture, the need for consciousness-raising on both sides. Perhaps the biggest issue is that military and police are often charged with maintaining internal security. And military people argue, in good faith, that there are certain exigencies that go with the job, that in order to maintain order in difficult places, they need a margin of leeway.

We need to consider when impunity and amnesty might be legitimate; when a truth and reconciliation commission might be a sufficient legal process. This whole thing is about a slow, coming-to-understanding of the law.

It will take a couple of decades. But that's how history works. We need precedents to establish the norm that certain actions will not be tolerated; we must demonstrate that the process is driven by legal concerns and constrained by legal structures.

The Pinochet arrest was extremely important, in itself, and in terms of its effects in Chile. And even though it has had a fatal setback, Habre's arrest is a huge victory. We may now see progress in domestic law reform in Senegal. In fact, the failure itself may prove to be the impetus for reform. That this is happening below the Sahara is trememdously important. Let it be noted that Senegal was the first country to ratify the ICC.

Ultimately, the real work will be done in domestic forums. The ICC will only be able to try about twenty cases a year. It simply won't have the capacity to do more. So the crucial link to be forged is between international and domestic law.

Bruce Broomhall is the International Justice Coordinator, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, New York.

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