In
determining the applicability of the law of war the first step is
to properly define the type of conflict. Press reports (18 November
1999) indicate that Russian leader Boris Yeltsin sees the current
conflict in Chechnya as an internal problem, one the resolution
of which is entirely and solely up to Russia. In fact, he goes even
further and says to the western leadership, "You have no right to
criticize Russia for Chechnya."
Russian
military and civil leaders have referred to the Chechen forces as
terrorists and bandits. If that is an accurate description, then
the fighting in Chechnya is, indeed, an internal matter. Of course,
even so, the way in which the Russian government deals with the
culprits might still be a subject of interest and criticism. So
exactly what is the nature of the conflict in Chechnya?
Truly
internal matters, such as criminal activity, even when done with
a political motive are not the concern of the traditional law of
war. The very idea of State sovereignty and equality cut against
outside involvement in such matters. Nonetheless, the 1949 Geneva
Conventions do provide some level of international cognizance of
internal conflicts. Common
Article 3 relates to a "conflict not of an international character."
When fighting rises to a certain level Article 3 is automatically
triggered. It provides minimum humanitarian standards for those
caught up in the fighting. Generally, these victims of the internal
conflict are entitled to humane treatment, including care of wounds;
protection from mutilation and physical harm; and recognition of
personal dignity. Also prohibited is collective punishment and pillage.
Establishing
the international standard of humane treatment is relatively easy.
The more difficult issue is determining exactly when an internal
conflict rises to the level of a "conflict not of an international
character" and, thus, becomes an Article 3 conflict. While the language
of Article 3 itself provides little guidance, the Red Cross Commentary
on the Article does. The Commentary is supplemented by Article 1
of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. The criteria
may be summarized as:
1.
Does the party in revolt possesses an organized military force with
a responsible chain of command?
2.
What is the response of the de jure government to the revolt?
Is it forced to rely on its military forces rather than the police?
3.
Has the de jure government acted as if the rebel forces are
lawful combatants? Has it demanded the protections of the law of
war for its own forces?
4.
Do the insurgent forces have the characteristics of a State? Do
these forces act in accordance with the law of war? Does the dissident
group exercise control over enough territory to carry out sustained
military operations?
Applying
these criteria to Chechnya, it is difficult to make the case that
Russia is not now engaged in at least an Article 3 conflict. Recognizing
the nature of the conflict as one falling within the safeguards
of Article 3 does not change the nature of the conflict. It is still
an internal matter. But, it is an internal matter subject to some
minimal safeguards found in international law. Reminding Russia
of its obligations under that law hardly constitutes outside interference.
It is the sovereign State of Russia which agreed to the standards
set out in Article 3 and in Protocol II. It is the sovereign State
of Russia which must now comply with the standards it freely and
independently adopted. Doing so, might even make outside "interference"
much less likely.
H.
Wayne Elliott, S.J.D., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired),
is a former chief of the international law division at the Judge
Advocate General's School, U.S. Army.
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