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APV
Rogers, OBE Author, Law on the Battlefield, Fellow,
Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, University
of Cambridge |
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Eyal
Benvenisti
Professor of International Law, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Visiting Professor, Columbia Law School |
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Michael
Matheson
Senior Fellow
U.S. Institute of Peace |
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H.
Wayne Elliott, S.J.D.
Lt. Col. (Ret.) U.S. Army Former Chief, International Law Division;
Judge Advocates General School, U.S. Army |
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Robert
Kogod Goldman
Professor, Washington College of Law
American University |
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Steven
R. Ratner
Albert Sidney Burleson Professor in Law University of Texas
Law School |
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David
Turns, LL.M (London), Barrister
Lecturer in Law
The Liverpool Law School |
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Marc
Cogen
Professor of International Law, Ghent University |
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Surya
Narayan Sinha, Former UN
Legal Adviser in Kosovo, Zagreb, and for UN Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees, International Lawyer based in
Chennai, India. |
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September
21, 2001
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There
are a lot of legal grey areas here! I sincerely hope that those in
charge will not act in anger but will proceed in a calm, calculated
and clinical manner and in accordance with international law. States
that claim to be civilized must uphold the rule of law.
Since the United
Nations Charter requires UN member states to settle their international
disputes by peaceful means, the tendency nowadays is not to use the
term warin a legal sense. When politicians speak about
a war against terrorism, they probably mean it in the
sense of an all-out international fight or struggle against terrorism.
The UN Charter does preserve states inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs (UN
Charter, Article 51) and the UN Security Council has the power
to take any action it deems necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security (under UN
Charter, Chapter VII).
In either case, if military force is used, there must be compliance
with the law of armed conflict. That is a substantial body of law,
found in numerous international treaties--including the Geneva Conventions
of 1949--which requires discrimination in targeting, the avoidance
of collateral damage, and the protection and humane treatment of civilians
and of the victims of armed conflict.
Given the sheer scale of the recent attack, which puts it on a completely
different level from previous terrorist acts and despite the unusual
weaponsused, it can be argued that it amounts to an armed
attack, giving rise to the right of self-defense.
Until now, the law of armed conflict has always been considered to
be a matter between states (unless a civil war), but the law has been
moving slowly towards recognizing as quasi-states dissident armed
factions and authorities representing liberation movements. It might
be possible to argue that a state can be involved in an armed conflict
against an organization. Traditional law of neutrality, if applied
by analogy (strictly it only applies between states), would require
a state not party to such a conflict to prevent belligerents (including,
in this case, the organization) from using its territory for the conduct
of operations and to intern belligerents so doing (Hague
Convention V of 1907).
Of course, things would be more straightforward if it could be established
that a state was using the organization as its fighting arm1.
Even so, the response has to be what is necessary and proportionate
in self-defense until the UN Security Council has taken appropriate
measures. The Security Council has so far passed resolution 1368,
in which it categorizes the September 11 attacks as a threat to international
peace and security and mentions the right of self-defense, but does
not lay down any specific measures. It is interesting that Article
5 of the North Atlantic Treaty has been invoked by NATO, so that
the attack on the USA is considered an attack on all NATO states.
Some have called the attack a war
crime. War crimes are violations of the law of armed conflict,
which comes into operation only when fighting actually starts. An
attack on a civilian object like the World Trade Center would be a
war crime under that law. But, because of the difficulty of determining
when an armed conflict occurs, tribunals have tended to err on the
side of caution and label an attack without warning aggression
rather than a war crime.
If the events of September 11 remain an isolated incident without
any military armed response (as opposed to diplomatic and judicial
follow up), then it could be treated as an act of terrorism, albeit
on a huge scale, and dealt with under ordinary U.S. domestic criminal
law, as well as under applicable international law relating to terrorist
acts. Because the Lockerbie incident occurred over Scotland, the case
was dealt with under Scottish law, but on neutral territory,
the Netherlands.
There is at present no international tribunal that could deal with
the crimes committed on September 11. The Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court is not yet in force, and will not apply to acts committed
prior to its entry into force. Even if it were in force, the decision
was taken at Rome to limit its jurisdiction to the four basic customary
law crimes of genocide, aggression, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity, and not to extend it to acts of terrorism as
proscribed by the various conventions against terrorism. As to waging
a war of aggression, there is still no agreement on its definition
and the Rome Statute reflects this. Thus the attack, however murderous,
barely fits within existing legal categories set out in the Rome Statute.
On the other hand, it clearly falls within a number of the conventions
defining terrorist acts, and it would be open to the UN Security Council
to establish a tribunal to give effect to existing international law
with respect to such acts, as it did for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda.
There has been talk of reprisal,
retaliation and revenge. Only the first of
these terms is defined in the law of armed conflict. It relates to
coercive measures resorted to in certain circumstances to enforce
compliance with the law of armed conflict by the enemy. Retaliation
and revenge are not legal terms and have no place in the law of armed
conflict. For example, in the war crimes trials that followed the
Second World War, military commanders who ordered the execution of
a set number of civilians for every soldier killed by partisans were
found guilty of war crimes.
For the armed forces, the fight against terrorism is different from
a conventional armed conflict. Their role, apart from protection and
security, is likely to be in support of the law enforcement agencies
in classic anti-terrorism measures, including surveillance and intelligence
and, possibly, special-forces operations. Should the armed forces
be involved in operations in exercise of the right of self-defense,
it is to be hoped that the lessons of Vietnam, Iraq, Somalia, and
Kosovo will be applied to training and structuring fighting forces
and that the general public, who may be expecting a spectacular response,
will realize the limitations of strategic bombing in dealing with
a low- technology opponent.
Perhaps the current universal mood can be captured to secure a convention
on international co-operation against terrorism (and not just that
directed against the U.S.A.). In the past, piracy was eliminated by
international co-operation. Perhaps the same can be done to eliminate
terrorism.
1There
is interesting legal background on this point. In 1986, the International
Court of Justice ruled that the United States had no legitimate claim
of self-defense in arming, equipping, financing, and supplying the
paramilitaries known as the Contras. It further ruled that in circulating
a training manual, the U.S. had encouraged these forces to commit
acts contrary to the general principles of humanitarian law.
However, the judgment did not find the United States imputable for
the acts committed by the Contras.
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