Defined as the cross-border use of force taken to prevent or stop crimes against humanity or other atrocities, "humanitarian intervention" is a term that evokes a range of passionate views and often-contradictory images. For advocates, the "right" or "duty" of intervention is clear: where massive violations of international law occur—for example, when governments set out to massacre their own populations, the international community under the 1948 Genocide Convention and the 1949 Geneva Conventions has an obligation to act.

At the same time, this notion of intervention comes smack up against the doctrine that for centuries has been at the heart of contemporary international law: state sovereignty. Thus, for opponents, the doctrine of "the right to intervene" is in direct conflict with the doctrine of non-intervention in the affairs of states. Moreover, opponents argue that intervention motivated by humanitarian concern can become an abusive use of force that simply enables a stronger power or group of powers to assert their will.

The succession of violent conflicts around the globe—in Croatia, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Chechnya, Rwanda and elsewhere—during the first post-Cold War decade challenged the international community to define a new framework for organizing the international political system. It was the Kosovo crisis in particular that brought the humanitarian intervention debate into sharp focus.

Arguably the most significant, observable shift may be support for the idea of intervening in order to prevent or punish what is—or appears to be—a massive violation of humanitarian law. In the past, humanitarian intervention was typically linked to the emergency nature of the need; Secretary General Annan's recent statements, as well as NATO's action in Kosovo, tends to support the notion that humanitarian intervention is linked to the law.

The statements and passages below fall roughly into two categories: speeches and statements by world leaders—including U.S. President Bill Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan—and articles from newspapers and journals that take issue with arguments made by these leaders. This list is not exhaustive but is intended to serve as a framework for the continuing debate.

Excerpts from Recent Major Statements on the Development of Humanitarian Intervention

In an article entitled "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," UN Secretary General Kofi Annan explores the tension that exists between traditional state sovereignty and the state's responsibility to observe and uphold human rights norms:

(Originally published September 18, 1999 in The Economist-http://www.un.org/Overview/SG/kaecon.htm)

In the following excerpt from the Secretary General's Annual Report to the General Assembly in September 1999, Kofi Annan identifies a "developing norm in favor of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter." He considers the implications of inaction to prevent genocide in Rwanda as compared to the action taken "in the absence of complete unity on the part of the international community" in the case of Kosovo:

(September 20, 1999)

...while the genocide in Rwanda will define for our generation the consequences of inaction in the face of mass murder, the more recent conflict in Kosovo has prompted important questions about the consequences of action in the absence of complete unity on the part of the international community...is there not a danger of such interventions undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system created after the Second World War, and of setting dangerous precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion to decide who might invoke these precedents and in what circumstances?...this developing international norm in favor of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter will no doubt continue to pose profound challenges to the international community...in response to this turbulent era of crises and interventions, there are those who have suggested that the Charter itself — with its roots in the aftermath of global interstate war — is ill-suited to guide us in a world of ethnic wars and intrastate violence... I believe they are wrong...

In response to the Secretary General's assertion of a "developing norm in favor of intervention," Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika argues that the doctrine of national sovereignty must remain paramount in interstate relations:

(September 20, 1999)

...interference can only occur with the consent of the state concerned...we do not deny that the United Nations has the right and duty to help suffering humanity. But we remain extremely sensitive to any undermining of our sovereignty, not only because sovereignty is our last defense against the rules of an unequal world, but because we are not taking part in the decision-making process of the Security Council...

In a speech entitled "Reflections on Intervention," given a year before NATO's campaign over Kosovo, Kofi Annan argues that "even national sovereignty can be set aside if it stands in the way of the Security Council's overriding duty to preserve international peace and security":

The Secretary General's remarks can be viewed in their entirety at: (http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980626.sgsm6613.html)

Ditchley Foundation lecture
June 26, 1998

...The Charter of the United Nations gives great responsibilities to great Powers, in their capacity as permanent members of the Security Council. But as a safeguard against abuse of those powers, Article 2.7 of the Charter protects national sovereignty even from intervention by the United Nations itself. I'm sure everyone in this audience knows it by heart. But let me remind you — just in case — that that Article forbids the United Nations to intervene "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State".

That prohibition is just as relevant today as it was in 1945: violations of sovereignty remain violations of the global order. Yet in other contexts the word "intervention" has a more benign meaning. We all applaud the policeman who intervenes to stop a fight, or the teacher who prevents big boys from bullying a smaller one. And medicine uses the word "intervention" to describe the act of the surgeon, who saves life by "intervening" to remove malignant growth, or to repair damaged organs. Of course, the most intrusive methods of treatment are not always to be recommended. A wise doctor knows when to let nature take its course. But a doctor who never intervened would have few admirers, and probably even fewer patients.

So it is in international affairs. Why was the United Nations established, if not to act as a benign policeman or doctor? Our job is to intervene: to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken out, or — when neither of those things is possible — at least to contain it and prevent it from spreading. That is what the world expects of us, even though — alas — the United Nations by no means always lives up to such expectations. It is also what the Charter requires of us, particularly in Chapter VI, which deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes, and Chapter VII, which describes the action the United Nations must take when peace comes under threat, or is actually broken.

The purpose of Article 2.7, which I quoted just now, was to confine such interventions to cases where the international peace is threatened or broken, and to keep the United Nations from interfering in purely domestic disputes. Yet even that article carries the important rider that "this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII". In other words, even national sovereignty can be set aside if it stands in the way of the Security Council's overriding duty to preserve international peace and security. On the face of it, there is a simple distinction between international conflict, which is clearly the United Nations business, and domestic disputes, which are not. The very phrase "domestic dispute" sounds reassuring. It suggests a little local difficulty which the State in question can easily settle, if only it is left alone to do so...

This year we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That declaration was not meant as a purely rhetorical statement. The General Assembly which adopted it also decided, in the same month, that it had the right to express its concern about the apartheid system in South Africa. The principle of international concern for human rights took precedence over the claim of non-interference in internal affairs. And the day before it adopted the Universal Declaration, the General Assembly had adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which puts all States under an obligation to "prevent and punish" this most heinous of crimes. It also allows them to "call upon the competent organs of the United Nations" to take action for this purpose. Since genocide is almost always committed with the connivance, if not the direct participation, of the State authorities, it is hard to see how the United Nations could prevent it without intervening in a State's internal affairs... Can we really afford to let each State be the judge of its own right, or duty, to intervene in another State's internal conflict? If we do, will we not be forced to legitimize Hitler's championship of the Sudeten Germans, or Soviet intervention in Afghanistan? Most of us would prefer, I think — especially now that the cold war is over — to see such decisions taken collectively, by an international institution whose authority is generally respected. And surely the only institution competent to assume that role is the Security Council of the United Nations. The Charter clearly assigns responsibility to the Council for maintaining international peace and security. I would argue, therefore, that only the Council has the authority to decide that the internal situation in any State is so grave as to justify forceful intervention...

Kofi Annan's remarks on the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 1, 1999
(http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19981201.sgsm6815.html)

In his seminal law review article "Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention," David Scheffer, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, foresaw eight years ago that in the post-Cold War order a new framework for humanitarian intervention was needed:

"Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention" by David Scheffer (published in the University of Toledo Law Review — Vol. 23 U Toledo L Rev, Winter 1992)

...there is a critical need to re-examine humanitarian intervention in the context of contemporary events. There was a time prior to World War II when unilateral military intervention for strictly humanitarian purposes was regarded as legitimate by a large community of international law scholars and was arguably embodied in customary international law. Following World War II, the U.N. Charter's prohibition on the use of force except in cases of self-defense or at the direction of the Security Council had the effect of generally de-legitimizing humanitarian intervention in the view of many legal scholars. In the post-Cold War world, however, a new standard of intolerance for human misery and human atrocities has taken hold. This intolerance will not necessarily translate into humanitarian intervention to end such misery or atrocities. But something quite significant has occurred to raise the consciousness of nations to the plight of peoples within sovereign borders. There is a new commitment‹expressed in both moral and legal terms‹to alleviate the suffering of oppressed or devastated people. To argue today that the norms of sovereignty, non-use of force, and the sanctity of internal affairs are paramount to the collective human rights of people, whose lives and well-being is at risk, is to avoid the hard questions of international law and to ignore the march of history...

In the following excerpts from his address to the nation at the outset of the NATO bombing campaign, President Clinton justifies the US-led military intervention over Kosovo. Among other factors, the President cites the genocide in Bosnia as an imperative for acting in Kosovo:

President Clinton's remarks can be viewed in their entirety by clicking here.

(March 24, 1999)

My fellow Americans, today our Armed Forces joined our NATO allies in air strikes against Serbian forces responsible for the brutality in Kosovo. We have acted with resolve for several reasons. We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war; to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results. And we act to stand united with our allies for peace. By acting now we are upholding our values, protecting our interests and advancing the cause of peace...We learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just a few years ago. The world did not act early enough to stop that war, either. And let's not forget what happened — innocent people herded into concentration camps, children gunned down by snipers on their way to school, soccer fields and parks turned into cemeteries; a quarter of a million people killed, not because of anything they have done, but because of who they were. Two million Bosnians became refugees. This was genocide in the heart of Europe — not in 1945, but in 1995. Not in some grainy newsreel from our parents' and grandparents' time, but in our own time, testing our humanity and our resolve. At the time, many people believed nothing could be done to end the bloodshed in Bosnia. They said, well, that's just the way those people in the Balkans are. But when we and our allies joined with courageous Bosnians to stand up to the aggressors, we helped to end the war. We learned that in the Balkans, inaction in the face of brutality simply invites more brutality. But firmness can stop armies and save lives. We must apply that lesson in Kosovo before what happened in Bosnia happens there, too... Do our interests in Kosovo justify the dangers to our Armed Forces? I've thought long and hard about that question. I am convinced that the dangers of acting are far outweighed by the dangers of not acting — dangers to defenseless people and to our national interests. If we and our allies were to allow this war to continue with no response, President Milosevic would read our hesitation as a license to kill. There would be many more massacres, tens of thousands more refugees, more victims crying out for revenge. Right now our firmness is the only hope the people of Kosovo have to be able to live in their own country without having to fear for their own lives. Remember: We asked them to accept peace, and they did. We asked them to promise to lay down their arms, and they agreed. We pledged that we, the United States and the other 18 nations of NATO, would stick by them if they did the right thing. We cannot let them down now...

In a speech to the Chicago Economic Club in April 1999, British Prime Minister Tony Blair asserts that the "most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people's conflicts." He sets forth five major considerations for deciding when and whether to intervene:

Prime Minister Blair's remarks can be viewed in their entirety at: (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html)

(April 22, 1999)

... now we have to establish a new framework. No longer is our existence as states under threat. Now our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end values and interests merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our national interests too. The spread of our values makes us safer. As John Kennedy put it "Freedom is indivisible and when one man is enslaved who is free?"

The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people's conflicts. Non — interference has long been considered an important principle of international order. And it is not one we would want to jettison too readily. One state should not feel it has the right to change the political system of another or foment subversion or seize pieces of territory to which it feels it should have some claim. But the principle of non-interference must be qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter. When oppression produces massive flows of refugees which unsettle neighboring countries then they can properly be described as "threats to international peace and security". When regimes are based on minority rule they lose legitimacy — look at South Africa.

Looking around the world there are many regimes that are undemocratic and engaged in barbarous acts. If we wanted to right every wrong that we see in the modern world then we would do little else than intervene in the affairs of other countries. We would not be able to cope.

So how do we decide when and whether to intervene. I think we need to bear in mind five major considerations

First, are we sure of our case? War is an imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress; but armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing with dictators. Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? We should always give peace every chance, as we have in the case of Kosovo. Third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term? In the past we talked too much of exit strategies. But having made a commitment we cannot simply walk away once the fight is over; better to stay with moderate numbers of troops than return for repeat performances with large numbers. And finally, do we have national interests involved? The mass expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo demanded the notice of the rest of the world. But it does make a difference that this is taking place in such a combustible part of Europe.

I am not suggesting that these are absolute tests. But they are the kind of issues we need to think about in deciding in the future when and whether we will intervene.

Any new rules however will only work if we have reformed international institutions with which to apply them.

If we want a world ruled by law and by international co-operation then we have to support the UN as its central pillar. But we need to find a new way to make the UN and its Security Council work if we are not to return to the deadlock that undermined the effectiveness of the Security Council during the Cold War. This should be a task for members of the Permanent Five to consider once the Kosovo conflict is complete...

In the following excerpts published in The New York Review of Books, Czech President Vaclav Havel argues that in the twenty-first century "the idea of noninterference — the notion that it is none of our business what happens in another country and whether human rights are violated in that country — should also vanish down the trapdoor of history":

"Kosovo and the End of the Nation-State" can be viewed in its entirety at: (http://special.northernlight.com/kosovo/end_nationstate.htm)

(June 10, 1999)

...Clearly, blind love for one's own country-a love that defers to nothing beyond itself, that excuses anything one's own state does only because it is one's own country, yet rejects everything else only because it is different — has necessarily become a dangerous anachronism, a source of conflict and, in extreme cases, of immense human suffering. In the next century I believe that most states will begin to change from cultlike entities charged with emotion into far simpler and more civilized entities, into less powerful and more rational administrative units that will represent only one of the many complex and multileveled ways in which our planetary society is organized. With this transformation, the idea of noninterference — the notion that it is none of our business what happens in another country and whether human rights are violated in that country — should also vanish down the trapdoor of history...The alliance to which Canada and now the Czech Republic belong is waging a struggle against the genocidal regime of Slobodan Milosevic. This struggle is neither easy nor popular and we can differ on its strategies and tactics. But there is one thing no reasonable person can deny: this is probably the first war that has not been waged in the name of "national interests," but rather in the name of principles and values. If one can say of any war that it is ethical, or that it is being waged for ethical reasons, then it is true of this war. Kosovo has no oil fields to be coveted; no member nation in the alliance has any territorial demands on Kosovo; Milosovic does not threaten the territorial integrity of any member of the alliance. And yet the alliance is at war. It is fighting out of concern for the fate of others. It is fighting because no decent person can stand by and watch the systematic, state-directed murder of other people. It cannot tolerate such a thing. It cannot fail to provide assistance if it is within its power to do so.

This war places human rights above the rights of the state. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was attacked by the alliance without a direct mandate from the UN. This did not happen irresponsibly, as an act of aggression or out of disrespect for international law. It happened, on the contrary, out of respect for the law, for a law that ranks higher than the law which protects the sovereignty of states. The alliance has acted out of respect for human rights, as both conscience and international legal documents dictate.

This is an important precedent for the future. It has been clearly said that it is simply not permissible to murder people, to drive them from their homes, to torture them, and to confiscate their property. What has been demonstrated here is the fact that human rights are indivisible and that if injustice is done to one, it is done to all...

In an article published one week into the NATO bombing campaign over Kosovo, The Economist magazine examines the legality of the NATO action:

(Originially published in The Economist, April 3, 1999)