PEACE
TALKS
Since assuming office in 1998, President Andrés Pastrana
has staked his political life on the peace process. Showing great
boldness, he created a demilitarized zone by pulling government
security forces out of an expanse of jungle and savannah the size
of Switzerland. But once the euphoria of Pastranas success
in bringing the FARC to the table subsided, it was clear the talks
were burdened with procedural red tape and going nowhere fast.
UN Special Envoy Jan Egeland--a veteran of peace efforts in the
Middle East, Bosnia, Sudan, and Central America--described Colombia
as one of his toughest-ever challenges. "There are more actors
involved, more bitterness, and more dirty money fuelling the conflict,"
he explained in a June 2000 interview. "The peace process here
will be long, hard, uphill, and have many disappointments ahead....
But I think it will succeed."
One year on, the vast majority of Colombians disagree. Opinion polls
consistently show that more than three-quarters of ordinary citizens
believe talks are stalled, and that the government has granted too
many concessions to the rebels like the demilitarized zone
for little in return.
Egeland believes the consequences will be dire for the entire region
if talks collapse. U.S. officials have periodically warned that
the war could destabilize neighboring Panama, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador
and Brazil.
In recent weeks, hopes of progress have been revived thanks to a
limited prisoner exchange between the government and the FARC
a proposal the rebels first floated in March 1998. Under the deal,
the rebels have released over 100 sick police and soldiers, of the
approximately 500 they have captured in combat and been holding
in jungle camps for as long as three years. In return, the government
released 15 ailing guerrillas from prisons across the country. FARC
warlords seem to believe the accord will boost their politico-military
status in the international eye and give them de facto recognition
as a legitimate warring faction seeking to topple the state.
Efforts to negotiate with the ELN have been less fruitful than the
slow-moving talks with the FARC. The area slated as a safe haven
for talks with the ELNs Central Command has for the last two
years been under constant assault by paramilitaries and the army.
That forced the ELN to retreat and, in an effort to compensate for
its weakened stance on the battlefield, it has resorted to terrorist-style
attacks on civilians to show it still has muscle. The government,
however, insists it has not given up on separate peace talks with
the ELN before the end of Pastranas administration in August
2002.
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