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PEACE TALKS

Since assuming office in 1998, President Andrés Pastrana has staked his political life on the peace process. Showing great boldness, he created a demilitarized zone by pulling government security forces out of an expanse of jungle and savannah the size of Switzerland. But once the euphoria of Pastrana’s success in bringing the FARC to the table subsided, it was clear the talks were burdened with procedural red tape and going nowhere fast.

UN Special Envoy Jan Egeland--a veteran of peace efforts in the Middle East, Bosnia, Sudan, and Central America--described Colombia as one of his toughest-ever challenges. "There are more actors involved, more bitterness, and more dirty money fuelling the conflict," he explained in a June 2000 interview. "The peace process here will be long, hard, uphill, and have many disappointments ahead.... But I think it will succeed."

One year on, the vast majority of Colombians disagree. Opinion polls consistently show that more than three-quarters of ordinary citizens believe talks are stalled, and that the government has granted too many concessions to the rebels – like the demilitarized zone – for little in return.

Egeland believes the consequences will be dire for the entire region if talks collapse. U.S. officials have periodically warned that the war could destabilize neighboring Panama, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Brazil.

In recent weeks, hopes of progress have been revived thanks to a limited prisoner exchange between the government and the FARC – a proposal the rebels first floated in March 1998. Under the deal, the rebels have released over 100 sick police and soldiers, of the approximately 500 they have captured in combat and been holding in jungle camps for as long as three years. In return, the government released 15 ailing guerrillas from prisons across the country. FARC warlords seem to believe the accord will boost their politico-military status in the international eye and give them de facto recognition as a legitimate warring faction seeking to topple the state.

Efforts to negotiate with the ELN have been less fruitful than the slow-moving talks with the FARC. The area slated as a safe haven for talks with the ELN’s Central Command has for the last two years been under constant assault by paramilitaries and the army. That forced the ELN to retreat and, in an effort to compensate for its weakened stance on the battlefield, it has resorted to terrorist-style attacks on civilians to show it still has muscle. The government, however, insists it has not given up on separate peace talks with the ELN before the end of Pastrana’s administration in August 2002.

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