Plan Colombia’s greatest potential lies in its insistence on the rule of law. It should impel Colombian security forces to improve their abysmal human rights record and to sever all links with the paramilitaries. Unfortunately, however, by invoking the presidential waiver for reasons of national security, Washington sent exactly the wrong signal: violations of human rights will be overlooked in the name of the war on drugs.

Lastly, Plan Colombia must be viewed in a larger economic context. The broad-reaching agreement the Pastrana administration signed with the International Monetary Fund, though technically unrelated to Plan Colombia, seems more than consonant with its aims. The IMF agreement dictates severe cuts in the transfer of revenues from the central government in Bogotá to the regional and local authorities, a deep reform of the pension system, privatization of several state-owned entities, and reductions in social spending. All of these measures clearly go against the grain of commitments that will surely arise from any future peace accords. The Pastrana administration has recently stressed the importance of free trade in attracting foreign investment, and enthusiastically endorses the Free Trade Area of the Americas.

All of this serves to indicate that U.S. involvement in Colombia goes far beyond Plan Colombia. Yet drugs continue to dominate the US optic of what takes place in Colombia.

While Colombia is at war, no drug policy will ever be successful. And the fighting will not stop until the root causes of Colombia’s crisis--land distribution, social inequity, political exclusion, and violence--are addressed through a negotiated settlement of the armed conflict. For this reason, the best way to defend U.S. national interests is to actively support the peace process in Colombia.

Although the U.S. has formally supported Pastrana’s peace negotiations, it has largely limited itself to paying lip service, avoiding any serious commitment. Thus far, U.S. policy has confused backing Pastrana with support for the peace process, which will necessarily extend beyond his presidential term (which expires in August 2002).

In recent history, when the United States defined peace as the clear central policy objective, it has even "stepped on the toes" of its traditional allies—Israel, in the case of the Middle East, and the UK in the conflict with Northern Ireland. In Colombia, the U.S. should apply its huge leverage with the army and civilian elite to effect the democratic transformation that is needed to stop the bloodshed. In the process, the U.S. would cease to be the prime instigator of the war as it is today, and become the key player in the peace of tomorrow.