But the strongest effects of Plan Colombia are not being felt by the armed actors to the conflict, but by civilians, the principal victims of the war’s escalation. On average, two civilians are killed for every combatant, most of them peasants in the countryside. The last decade of war and political violence has produced close to two million internally displaced persons. Of the two to three thousand unarmed civilians kidnapped yearly in Colombia, about 60% are taken by the guerrillas. Youths under the age of 18 make up approximately one-fifth of both the rebel forces and the paramilitaries. On all counts, the Colombian war is fought far below standards set by international humanitarian law for the due respect and protection of civilians. By escalating the war, Plan Colombia only contributes to the increased number of civilians massacred or forced to flee their homes.

Citizen peace initiatives and grass-roots peace-building efforts have also been severely hampered. In recent years, workers, peasants, women, students, as well as business leaders and the Catholic Church organized peace projects. [Link to DeCesare] Colombian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rigorously document and denounce human rights abuses. But often those who speak out against the war or in favor of human rights are seen by the armed actors as enemy agents. Peace activists, human rights advocates, labor leaders, university professors, students, and journalists, are the principal targets of political violence. Many of the country’s best and brightest have been forced into exile, adding to the Colombian diaspora thousands more who are leaving for economic reasons, as well.

Ironically, there is one aspect on which Plan Colombia is likely to have no impact whatsoever: drug trafficking. In the first place, it focuses almost solely on the coca producers, which make up the weakest link of the chain of illicit activities of narco-trafficking. Little, if any, advance is made on interdiction, not to mention money laundering, control of precursor materials, arms control, and other more delicate affairs on which Plan Colombia is mute.

Secondly, past experience has clearly demonstrated that aerial fumigation in one area only serves to displace the coca cultivation. While there is a demand to be met, the so-called "balloon effect" has shown that "successful" eradication in Peru and Bolivia led to an increase in coca crops in Colombia, just as massive fumigation in Guaviare and Caquetá in 1995 and 1996 simply pushed the illicit cultivation down to Putumayo. Already, Venezuela, Ecuador and Brazil have expressed concern over the spillover of Plan Colombia into their territories and its effects on regional security.

It must be said that, thanks to the lobbying efforts of many influential NGOs in Washington, D.C., the U.S. component of Plan Colombia also includes some positive elements (though these unfortunately have been overshadowed by the preponderance of negative ones). For the first time, the United States is funding alternative development projects, and even outspending the Europeans on this front. Protection for human rights activities and for strengthening the justice system are laudable lines of action within the "social portion" of Plan Colombia.