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	<title>Crimes &#187; tribunal</title>
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		<title>Bangladesh War Crimes Tribunal: A Near-Justice Experience</title>
		<link>http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/bangladesh-war-crimes-tribunal-a-near-justice-experience/</link>
		<comments>http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/bangladesh-war-crimes-tribunal-a-near-justice-experience/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Jul 2011 19:41:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Morris</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bangladesh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Guantanamo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tribunal]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.crimesofwar.org/?p=2768</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The government's reluctance to incorporate IHL refinements detracts from what could be a crowning achievement.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="attachment_2757" class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 630px"><a rel="attachment wp-att-2757" href="http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/2752/attachment/national-liberation-war/"><img class="size-full wp-image-2757" title="Bangladesh National Liberation War Monument" src="http://www.crimesofwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/National-Liberation-War.jpg" alt="" width="620" height="456" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Sculpture entitled &quot;Undefeated Bangla&quot; at Dhaka University is a monument to the National Liberation War (photo - Embassy of Bangladesh)</p></div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><em>By Morris Davis</em></strong></p>
<p><span style="float: left; color: #000000; font-size: 44px; line-height: 35px; padding-top: 3px; padding-right: 3px;">A</span>ttorney and specialist in international humanitarian law Katherine Iliopoulos posed an important question in the title of an article she wrote in August 2010: “<a href="http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/bangladesh-a-free-and-fair-war-crimes-tribunal/" target="_blank">Bangladesh: A Free and Fair War Crimes Tribunal</a>?” It is almost a year later and whether the trials will be free or fair is still unsettled.</p>
<p>The article by Ms. Iliopoulos was the first one we published after I joined the Crimes of War Education Project. To be honest, when I saw the title I wondered if there would be much interest in the topic. Now, having published three articles and co-sponsored a conference on the tribunal, my original concern about interest was clearly unfounded.</p>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h5><strong>The Bangladeshi government&#8217;s reluctance to incorporate the refinements to IHL to bring the Tribunal up to international standards detracts from what could be a hallmark for the rule of law and a crowning achievement for the people of Bangladesh.</strong></h5>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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<p>Before I read the article I knew Bangladesh was once linked with Pakistan and there were atrocities committed during the struggle for independence in 1971. I was too young at the time of the Liberation War to notice and by the time I was an adult Bangladesh was so far away and the war so far in the past that it never attracted my attention. As a result, until I read the article by Ms. Iliopoulos in August 2010, I was unaware of the extraordinary magnitude of the war’s impact on people in the region.</p>
<p>The battle for independence was relatively brief – March to December 1971 – and came to an end soon after India joined the fight against Pakistani forces. There is no authoritative accounting of how many lives were lost in the war, but estimates range from 200,000 to 3,000,000 deaths. Pakistani forces specifically targeted intellectuals like professors, students, doctors, and engineers who were rounded up, murdered, and buried in mass graves. Some 8 to 10 million refugees fled into India to avoid the effects of the conflict. About a quarter-million women and girls were raped by Pakistani forces and some were held as sex slaves. In retrospect, it is hard to comprehend so much carnage in so brief a period of time in just one small corner of the world.</p>
<p>The constitution of the newly created country of Bangladesh was amended in 1973 to authorize criminal prosecution of any person accused of “genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and other crimes under international law.” Bangladesh also enacted the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act of 1973 to establish a process for such prosecutions. War crime prosecutions have become common over the last decade or so, but in 1973 the people of Bangladesh were taking pioneering steps to prevent impunity for grave atrocities, steps that drew praise from the international community at the time.</p>
<p>There were major advancements in the rules and procedures for assessing accountability under international humanitarian law (IHL) in the 38 years since the Tribunal Act of 1973. The Rome Statute establishing and governing the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 2002. It was signed by 139 countries and 116 are parties to the treaty. Bangladesh signed the Rome Statute in 1999 and became a state party in March 2010. While seven countries voted against the Rome Statute – Iraq, Israel, Libya, China, Qatar, the United States, and Yemen – it is the most widely accepted set of principles on genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Additionally, internationally sanctioned tribunals created specifically to handle similar offenses have completed trials and developed an ever-growing body of IHL case law. They include the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002), and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (2003).</p>
<p>As Ms. Iliopoulos noted in August 2010 and as Kristine Huskey noted in an <a title="The International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh – Will Justice Prevail?" href="http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/the-international-crimes-tribunal-in-bangladesh-will-justice-prevail/" target="_blank">article</a> we published in June 2011, while the efforts of the Bangladeshi government to end impunity are laudatory, its reluctance to incorporate the refinements to IHL that occurred the past four decades in order to bring the Tribunal up to international standards detracts from what could be a hallmark for the rule of law and a crowning achievement for the people of Bangladesh.</p>
<p>U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Stephen Rapp visited Bangladesh in January 2011 at the request of the government, and in March he submitted a <a href="http://icsforum.org/library/files/354_ICSF2011.pdf" target="_blank">letter</a> suggesting areas the government should consider to enhance the Tribunal’s standing. [Interestingly, Ambassador Rapp’s letter cites rules from the ICC, suggests reconsidering the death penalty, and recommends establishing criteria to limit prosecution to the most serious offenders. The United States voted against and is not a party to the ICC, is seeking the death penalty for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and prosecuted Salim Hamdan as a war criminal for being Osama Bin Laden’s driver.] Ambassador Rapp visited Bangladesh again in May shortly before he spoke at a conference the Crimes of War Education Project co-sponsored where he lauded the effort to provide justice for the victims of the 1971 war and reiterated his suggestions on improving the Tribunal.</p>
<p>While the rules and procedures have been modified and improved – the latest version of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure is dated June 28, 2011 – many believe they are still deficient under current IHL. In announcing the new rules the Registrar for the Tribunal, <a href="http://icsforum.org/mediarchive/2011/07/04/new-ict-rules-give-accused-%e2%80%98universally-recognised-standards%e2%80%99/" target="_blank">Shahinoor Islam</a>, said with respect to measuring up to international requirements, &#8220;we are not yet there, but I would say that the tribunal rules now match universally recognised standards of due process and justice.&#8221; Others <a href="http://icsforum.org/mediarchive/2011/06/24/bangladesh-war-crimes-trial-to-start-in-july/" target="_blank">disagreed</a>. On July 11, Human Rights Watch issued an <a href="http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/07/11/bangladesh-guarantee-fair-trials-independence-era-crimes" target="_blank">appeal</a> to the government of Bangladesh to improve the rules for the Tribunal before going forward with trials. Brad Adams, Human Rights Watch&#8217;s Asia director, said, &#8220;Bangladesh has promised to meet international standards in these trials, but it has some way to go to meet this commitment. Now is the time for one last demonstration of political will to make this happen.” Mr. Adams added, “Bangladesh could then set the standard for other nations that have suffered from unspeakable abuses at the hands of its own people.&#8221;</p>
<p>Perhaps justice will be done in the trials conducted before the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh, but justice should be, to the maximum extent possible, guaranteed by the law – the rules and procedures governing the trials – rather than by hope for the good will and skills of the trial participants. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously said that sunlight is the best disinfectant, a phrase that underscores the value of transparency in matters of public policy. Efforts to silence those who believe there are flaws in the Tribunal process and to delegitimize criticism of the rules of procedure cause concern about its efficacy. For instance –</p>
<p>Ambassador of Bangladesh to the United States Akramul Qader attended the <a href="http://www.asil.org/activities_calendar.cfm?action=detail&amp;rec=194" target="_blank">conference</a> the Crimes of War Education Project co-sponsored on May 19 and he was the first member of the audience to speak when the three panelists finished their remarks. He began by saying the absence of anyone from Bangladesh on the panel kept the other side of the story from being presented, implying the program was biased. His comment ignores the fact that neither he nor any member of his staff responded to multiple messages over several weeks soliciting official Bangladeshi participation in the event. The Ambassador went on to say the Tribunal would be fair, but he did not address the specifics of the substantive issues raised by the panelists.</p>
<p>A representative of the International Crimes Strategy Forum (ICSF), an organization that supports the government of Bangladesh and the Tribunal through various means, attended the conference as well. Afterwards, the ICSF representative expressed his disappointment to me that Ambassador Rapp, as a United States government official, would publicly criticize the Tribunal. When I noted that Ambassador visited the Tribunal at the invitation of the government of Bangladesh he said the invitation was to demonstrate the fairness of the Tribunal, not to critique its fairness, and that Ambassador Rapp did not understand diplomacy if he thought his criticisms were welcomed or appropriate. The same sentiment is expressed in an <a href="http://icsforum.org/library/files/354_ICSF2011.pdf" target="_blank">ICSF paper</a> dated May 15, 2011, posted on the ICSF website:</p>
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<h5>The January 2011 invitation conveyed towards Mr. Rapp by the Bangladesh Government reflects its commitment towards conducting the war crimes trials in a manner that is fair and transparent. However, it must nonetheless be mentioned that Mr. Rapp’s recent actions and opinions he expressed with regard to the war crimes trials process in Bangladesh, a purely domestic and an internal process, amounts to a direct violation of Article 41(1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It is the responsibility of those enjoying diplomatic immunity, like Mr. Rapp, to be respectful towards the laws and regulations of a receiving state, including a duty not to interfere with the internal affairs of that state. This particular provision has long been a part of customary international law and is included in an international convention that the US is a signatory. These suggestions of Mr. Rapp are undoubtedly a subtle form of diplomatic bullying and amounts to a lapse in diplomatic norms because they are designed to interfere in an internal Bangladeshi affair.</h5>
</div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>British barrister Toby Cadman spoke at an International Council of Jurists sponsored conference in London on June 21. The <a href="http://www.internationaljurists.org/objectives.php" target="_blank">International Council of Jurists</a> states on its website that its objective is to promote the rule of law and the administration of justice. Mr. Cadman informed the conference organizers in advance that he would be speaking about his views on the Tribunal, views which he had expressed before and were publicly available. Bangladesh Chief Justice Muzammel Hossain and Justice Shamsuddin Chowdhury Manik were present at the conference where Chief Justice Hossain was to receive an award. It is unclear if they were present and heard Mr. Cadman’s presentation, but a Bangladeshi barrister in the audience said it was unfair for Mr. Cadman to criticize the Tribunal when no one was present to defend it and he asked that Mr. Cadman’s remarks be stricken from the record. The chairperson for the session, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Chief Prosecutor Hassan Jallow, declined the audience member’s request. Mr. Cadman learned a short time later that the President of the International Council of Jurists, Dr. Adish Aggarwala, expunged his remarks from the proceedings saying they were “<a href="http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/international-council-of-jurists-expunges-critique/" target="_blank">controversial</a>.” It is remarkable that what purports to be an association of legal professionals committed to the rule of law would alter history at its convenience using an eraser.</p>
<p>On July 15 the Tribunal itself chastized an attorney for five accused men for comments critical of the Rules of Procedure. Tribunal Registrar Shahinoor Islam told journalists at a <a href="http://www.priyo.com/law-and-order/2011/07/13/tribunal-takes-umbrage-remarks-31674.html" target="_blank">press briefing</a>, &#8220;The tribunal firmly believes that everyone has the right to freedom of expression. But, by any consideration, it is not expected such remarks to be offensive and beyond civilized norms and etiquette.” Mr. Islam explained, &#8220;Such remarks might confuse the public mind about the tribunal, an independent judicial institution, established solely for trying the crimes that are recognized internationally.&#8221;</p>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h5><strong>Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously said that sunlight is the best disinfectant, a phrase that underscores the value of transparency in matters of public policy.</strong></h5>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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<p>An unproven judicial process that lacks the strength to stand up to the sunlight of public debate begins under a cloud of suspicion. The promise of what Bangladesh set in motion with its bold steps in 1973 is diminished by the obstinacy and callous indifference it displays in 2011.</p>
<p>A lesson I learned in the two years I was chief prosecutor for the Bush-era military commissions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is that when a government has a single-minded focus on achieving an objective, rejects any and all criticism and condemns the critics, and argues publicly “trust us, we know fair,” a healthy dose of skepticism is in order. In Guantanamo and in Bangladesh the prospect of what could have been remarkable examples of justice are overshadowed by hardheaded bureaucrats insistent that they alone hold all the answers. It is unfortunate when an opportunity to demonstrate the virtue of a legal process that is free and fair appears to be free of fair.</p>
<p><em>The views expressed are those of the author.</em></p>
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		<title>International Council of Jurists Expunges Critique</title>
		<link>http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/international-council-of-jurists-expunges-critique/</link>
		<comments>http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/international-council-of-jurists-expunges-critique/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Jun 2011 16:30:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Morris</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bangladesh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[due process]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tribunal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[war crimes]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.crimesofwar.org/?p=2674</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Bangladesh tribunal: Criticism of procedural shortcomings are not welcome]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: center;"><em> <a rel="attachment wp-att-2677" href="http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/international-council-of-jurists-expunges-critique/attachment/ictbd4_thumb/"><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-2677" style="margin: 2px; border: 2px solid black;" title="International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh" src="http://www.crimesofwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/ICTBD4_thumb.jpg" alt="" width="618" height="191" /></a></em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><em>By Toby M. Cadman<br />
</em></strong><em>June 26, 2011</em><em> </em></p>
<p><span style="float: left; color: #000000; font-size: 44px; line-height: 35px; padding-top: 3px; padding-right: 3px;">O</span>n June 21, 2011, I attended a conference hosted by the International Council of Jurists upon the<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>invitation of its President, Dr. Aggarwala. The <a href="http://www.internationaljurists.org/schedule.php" target="_blank">conference</a> was on the rule of law and judicial reform. I was asked to present a paper. I offered to speak about the International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh and international standards as this subject inevitably concerns matters of judicial reform and human rights. I provided the organizers of the conference with full notice of the topic that I intended to address. In the alternative, I offered to speak about three further topics involving defence rights and international criminal justice. No issue was taken at this stage by the President of the International Council of Jurists of the chosen topic and I was appointed to the Terrorism and Human Rights panel discussion.</p>
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<h5><strong>I spoke for no more than 10 minutes and covered the First Constitutional Amendment, the need for proper definitions of the crimes, the exportation of fundamental rights in the Constitution and the exclusion of the Criminal Procedure Act and the Criminal Evidence Act.</strong></h5>
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<p>The conference was attended by the newly appointed Bangladesh Chief Justice, Muzammel Hossain, and another Justice of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Justice Shamsuddin Chowdhury Manik. I introduced myself to the Honourable Chief Justice in the morning and informed him that I would be speaking about the International Crimes Tribunal.<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span></p>
<p>I started my brief address by congratulating the Honourable Chief Justice on his recent appointment and I applauded him for his presentation earlier in the day. I stated that it was encouraging to hear his strong words on ensuring the judiciary in Bangladesh remained truly independent. Shortly after commencing my presentation the Honourable Chief Justice left the conference room. As far as I recall neither the Honourable Chief Justice nor Justice Shamsuddin Chowdhury Manik were present during my address.</p>
<p>I spoke for no more than 10 minutes and covered the First Constitutional Amendment, the need for proper definitions of the crimes, the exportation of fundamental rights in the Constitution and the exclusion of the Criminal Procedure Act and the Criminal Evidence Act. I then spoke about the criticisms aimed by various international organizations. The point I made was that the discussions during the conference focused on human rights protection and the rule of law. There were also discussions that focused on bringing an end to impunity. I echoed these concerns and stated that none of the rights raised by the other speakers were being provided to accused in proceedings before the International Crimes Tribunal. I listed some of the rights that had been systematically removed by the Act and the Constitution. I concluded by stating that it was crucial to ensure the independence of the judiciary was maintained.</p>
<p>At the end of my speech, a member of the audience, whom I now know to be Mr. Anis Rahman<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>OBE, a Bangladeshi barrister based in London, made the point that I should not be making such statements in circumstances where the Government was not in a position to respond and clearly the Chief Justice could not respond. At this point I must state that I never intended to put anything to which the Honourable Chief Justice would be required to respond. Mr. Rahman stated that a number of accusations had been made against the Tribunal. He called for a point of order that my remarks be stricken or expunged from the record. The chair of the session, Justice Hassan B. Jallow, the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Chief Prosecutor, after some conferring with the other members of the panel refused to make such a point of order and stated that there was nothing inappropriate with what I presented.</p>
<p>At the end of the panel session, the audience were invited to ask questions. However, Mr. Rahman rather than ask a question directed abuse at me personally and professionally. This was followed by Ms. Sonia Zaman Khan, a British-Bangladeshi solicitor, directing a number of remarks rather than questions. I was told that I should be ashamed of myself as these people “committed genocide, rape, murder, torture” and the small group of about 10-12 Bangladeshi members of the audience started to chant repeatedly “shame, shame, shame” and bang the table repeatedly. This was all conducted in a very aggressive and provocative manner. I asked to be able to respond and reluctantly, the Chair of the Panel, Justice Jallow, permitted me to respond. I stated in reply that I had not attacked the Tribunal nor had I attacked any individual judge; I had criticized the procedures. Further, I had not opposed the establishment of the Tribunal but I had criticized the manner in which proceedings were being conducted. I further criticized the fact that despite widespread criticisms being made, including the recommendations by the US Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues, Stephen Rapp, to date no changes had been made to the Act, the Constitution or the Rules of Procedure. I used this opportunity to call the Government to bring the procedures in line with international standards. The small group of antagonists, and I must say this represented a very small segment of the audience, refused to listen to anything further and dismissed my answers out of hand. They continued to direct unsolicited abuse. Of particular note, Ms. Sonia Zaman Khan defended the legislation by stating that the international community, in particular the Canadian Government had heralded the legislative framework.</p>
<p>At the end of the session, a number of individuals approached me to commend me on my presentation and expressed their dismay as to how I was treated. I replied that this is a very emotive subject and therefore emotional statements are to be expected. I expressed some surprise; however, that at a gathering of distinguished jurists, there would be a complete disregard for a judicial process that met recognized fair trial standards. I was also taken aback by the suppression of any form of criticism of what is ostensibly a democratic nation.</p>
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<h5><strong>I stated in reply that I had not attacked the Tribunal nor had I attacked any individual judge; I had criticized the procedures.</strong></h5>
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<p>I left the conference shortly after my address. The following day I learned of a number of statements that had been made by members of the Bangladeshi community in the audience. In particular it was stated that Justice Shamsuddin Chowdhury Manik explained in detail the procedures of the International Crimes Tribunal and made it clear that all steps had been taken towards ensuring a trial process based on internationally accepted standards. It was also stated that I had made “grave insinuations against the legal process in Bangladesh but had also chosen the wrong forum to express views on the war crimes trial in the country.”</p>
<p>In response to these statements the following remarks are made. First, I made it quite clear in my<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>presentation that no offence was intended towards any member of the Bangladesh judiciary. Absolutely no accusations were addressed towards any judge or judicial institution of Bangladesh. I openly criticized the Act, the Rules of Procedures and the First Constitutional Amendment. I echoed the concerns of a number of international organizations, including Human Rights Watch, the International Center for Transitional Justice, Amnesty International, and importantly, the International Bar Association. In relation to Ms. Khan’s statements that the Act is heralded by the international community this is quite simply misleading and not supported by any credible facts.</p>
<p>Second, I am not in a position to respond to Justice Shamsuddin Chowdhury Manik’s comments due to the fact that none of these comments were made in my presence. However, I will state once again that, in my opinion, which is shared by the vast majority of international observers of the legislative framework at the Tribunal, that the laws and procedures fall woefully short of what is understood to be recognized international standards.<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span></p>
<p>Third, as to the suggestion that my remarks were “expunged” I am not in a position to comment on what may or may not have occurred after I left the conference. What I am able to state with absolute certainty is that when the request was made in my presence, the Chair of the Panel, Justice Jallow, refused to dismiss my remarks. He made it quite clear that my remarks were not inappropriate nor were they directed to cause offence. I have also been subsequently informed that Sir Gavin Lightman, formerly Mr. Justice Lightman of the High Court of England and Wales, in summarizing the conclusions of the conference, adopted the same position.</p>
<p>The article that appeared in <em>The Daily Star</em> on June 22, 2011 entitled “<a href="http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=191143" target="_blank">Judiciary Ensures Rule of Law in Bangladesh</a>” is quite misleading and does not represent what actually transpired. For example, it conveniently fails to mention that one of the dignitaries attending the conference, Sir Lightman, made the point that there was no malice intended in my address. It also fails to address the point above that Justice Jallow refused to expunge my remarks when requested to do so by Mr. Rahman.</p>
<p>Following the publication of the article in <em>The Daily Star</em> I sought to ascertain whether my remarks had in fact been expunged after my departure. Regrettably, I was informed that the President of the International Council of Jurists, Dr. Adish Aggarwala, had expunged my remarks from the proceedings. I immediately made contact with the International Council of Jurists and was informed by Dr. Aggarwala that if I submitted my paper the International Council of Jurists would take a final decision as to whether my <em>controversial </em>statement was relevant. By his own admission, the President of the International Council of Jurists confirmed that he was not present during my speech.</p>
<p>What I now find particularly worrying is that my remarks were expunged by the President of the<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>International Council of Jurists even though he had not heard them. He had concluded that my remarks were controversial again without hearing them. It is clear that my remarks were expunged at the request of those persons who had sought to suppress my criticisms of the legislative framework of the International Crimes Tribunal.</p>
<p>It is also of concern that the conference was organized with the “academic support” of the General Council of the Bar of England and Wales and the reputation of this organization may lend support to a process which now appears to be quite flawed.<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span></p>
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<h5><strong>The rule of law and free speech is what distinguishes a democratic nation. Expunging remarks due to the fact that they are considered to be controversial or against the interest of the State does not represent a democratic process.</strong></h5>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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<p>It is of course the cornerstone of any democratic process that there is free debate on the issues and that the administration must be called to account for any process it seeks to implement. The rule of law and free speech is what distinguishes a democratic nation. Expunging remarks due to the fact that they are considered to be controversial or against the interest of the State does not represent a democratic process. <span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span></p>
<p>My concluding remarks are as follows. I do not oppose the establishment of the International Crimes Tribunal as the State is under an obligation to bring an end to impunity. I have no desire to criticize the Government of Bangladesh nor do I have any desire to criticize the Tribunal or the Judges. I do consider, however, as I stated in my remarks on June 21, 2011, that the legislative framework of the International Crimes Tribunal requires urgent reform. I do not consider it sufficient to amend the Rules of Procedure, as has been suggested. In my view the First Constitutional Amendment that removes the protection of fundamental rights must be amended. The Act and the Rules of Procedure must also be brought in line with Bangladesh’s responsibilities under international law. Finally, the legislative framework must be brought in line with Bangladesh’s responsibilities as a State Party to the Rome Statute. It is difficult to see where the controversy lies.</p>
<p><em>Statements made by Toby Cadman of 9 Bedford Row International “expunged”</em> <em>by the International Council of Jurists</em></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span></p>
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		<title>The International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh &#8211; Will Justice Prevail?</title>
		<link>http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/the-international-crimes-tribunal-in-bangladesh-will-justice-prevail/</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Jun 2011 04:47:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jessica Chen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bangladesh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[due process]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Criminal Court]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international humanitarian law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tribunal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[war crimes]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.crimesofwar.org/?p=2620</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The court's lack of protection for witnesses and victims and overall lack of due process rights are among some of its numerous criticisms.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="attachment_2630" class="wp-caption alignnone" style="width: 630px"><a href="http://www.crimesofwar.org/?attachment_id=2630"></a><a rel="attachment wp-att-2634" href="http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/the-international-crimes-tribunal-in-bangladesh-will-justice-prevail/attachment/dhaka/"><img class="size-full wp-image-2634" title="dhaka" src="http://www.crimesofwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/dhaka.jpeg" alt="" width="620" height="412" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Located near Dhaka, this monument is dedicated to the lives lost during the War of Independence from Pakistan in 1971.  (Photo courtesy Rasekh Fatmi via flickr)</p></div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><em><strong>By Kristine A. Huskey<br />
</strong></em></p>
<p><span style="float: left; color: #000000; font-size: 44px; line-height: 35px; padding-top: 3px; padding-right: 3px;">A</span>lmost 40 years later, the people of Bangladesh will finally see justice done for war crimes and other atrocities committed during the 1971 War of Liberation.  Or will they?  The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) of Bangladesh, which just in the last year began gearing up to try individuals accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, mass rape and other international crimes, is certainly necessary to provide accountability and to address longstanding cries of impunity for the alleged criminals.</p>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h5>At the heart of Rapp’s interest &#8230; is the perceived need to have the laws and procedures of the ICT consistent or, at least up to par, with the standards of international law.</h5>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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<p>However, there has also been sharp criticism of the ICT’s statutes, rules of procedure, and practices, as well as deep concern over a related amendment to the Bangladesh Constitution.  Critics have pointed specifically to the lengthy pre-charge detention of suspects, interrogation without counsel present, inability to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal or make interlocutory appeals, lack of presumption of innocence, potential for self-incrimination, lack of protections for witnesses and victims, and overall lack of due process rights for defendants as just a few of the numerous infirmities present in the ICT.  Further, many have characterized the Tribunal as politically motivated, adding to an atmosphere in Bangladesh that is already fraught with political tension.</p>
<p>Justice can only be done for the victims, their families, and the perpetrators, if the Tribunal is fair and is seen as being fair by the people of Bangladesh and the international community, of which Bangladesh is a key participant as the first nation in South Asia to become a state party to the Rome Statute (for the International Criminal Court) and a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  Perhaps in the spirit of that participation, the Bangladesh government recently invited the United States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, <a href="http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/129455.htm" target="_blank">Stephen Rapp</a>,  to come to Dhaka.  The Foreign Secretary, Mohamed Mijarul Quayes, invited Rapp to ensure the “fullest credibility” in the tribunal process.  In anticipation of the visit, Quayes reportedly <a href="    http://www.priyo.com/story/2010/nov/29/12845-us-ambassador-war-crimes-due-dhaka" target="_blank">stated</a>, “There are two things we want from this process:  For it to be transparent and consistent with international standards.”  “We hope these consultations will help,” he said.   Since then, Rapp has visited Dhaka twice and, in March, submitted to the Bangladesh government a 10-page letter setting forth a number of concerns and recommendations.  At the heart of Rapp’s interest, like other international concern, is the perceived need to have the laws and procedures of the ICT consistent, or at least up to par, with the standards of international law and procedures of well-respected international crimes tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC).  Bangladesh now has a unique opportunity to have trials in its domestic court for international crimes of the most heinous nature.  Trials of such importance should be fair and consistent with international standards and, more importantly, they <em>must be</em>, for justice to prevail.</p>
<p><strong>A Brief History</strong></p>
<p>As set out in more detail in an <a href="    http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/bangladesh-a-free-and-fair-war-crimes-tribunal/" target="_blank">earlier article</a> published by The Crimes of War Project  and in a briefing by the International Center for Transitional Justice , the International Crimes Tribunal was established in 1973 to address crimes that had been committed during the 1971 War of Liberation in which East Pakistan seceded from West Pakistan, ultimately becoming the independent state of Bangladesh.  The armed conflict arose out of increasing discontent in the East and a national election won by Bengali nationalist leader, Sheikh Mujib.  The fighting began in March 1971, when West Pakistan launched “Operation Searchlight” against the Bengalese population in East Pakistan to quell nationalistic tendencies and ended ten months later when India invaded Pakistan and defeated the Pakistani forces in a matter of days.  Bangladesh declared its independence shortly thereafter and Sheikh Mujib became the new country’s first prime minister.</p>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h5>Though no systematic accounting was ever done, popularly-accepted figures within Bangladesh and reported in many external sources are that up to 3 million people were killed or tortured to death, 200,000 women were raped in organized camps with a great number subjected to forced pregnancy, and more than 10 million people were forced to flee to India.</h5>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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<p>The 1971 Liberation War is considered to be one of the most severe humanitarian crises of the modern century, involving widely-documented massacres, torture, displacement, destruction and confiscation of property, disappearances, and sexual violence.  Though no systematic accounting was ever done, popularly-accepted figures within Bangladesh and reported in many external sources are that up to 3 million people were killed or tortured to death, 200,000 women were raped in organized camps with a great number subjected to forced pregnancy, and more than 10 million people were forced to flee to India.</p>
<p>In response, the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act (ICTA)   was passed in 1973 “to provide for the detention, prosecution and punishment of persons for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other crimes under international law.”  At the time, the ICTA was a significant contribution to the development of international criminal law.  However, several legislative and/or executive orders effectively halted the trials and granted immunity to certain select groups.  The <a href="    http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=450" target="_blank">Bangladesh National Liberation Struggle (Indemnity) Order</a> issued in 1973 gave immunity to all “freedom fighters” in connection with the struggle for liberation.  Then, Prime Minister Mujib declared a general amnesty for all Bangladesh citizens who had collaborated with West Pakistan except those accused of murder, rape, arson, or genocide.  Later, Pakistani soldier prisoners of war, including those who had committed war crimes, were repatriated to Pakistan without ever being charged.  And, in 1975, individuals who had been tried and convicted under the Collaborators Order were pardoned and the Order repealed.  The ICTA, however, was never repealed and currently stands as a mechanism with which to prosecute Bangladeshi citizens who were not previously given immunity, for international crimes committed forty years ago.</p>
<p>The ICT lay virtually inactive until 2008 when current Prime Minister Sheik Hasina ran on a campaign to prosecute “the war criminals” from the Liberation War.  After her victory and with the Awami League in power, Parliament passed a resolution in early 2009 for speedy trials under the ICTA, which was marginally amended later in the year.  In mid-2010, the Tribunal issued its Rules of Procedure (ROP) and within a short time, six individuals had been arrested and detained by the authority of the Tribunal, though no charges have been brought to date.</p>
<p><strong>The International Community Voices Its Concerns</strong></p>
<p>Well before U.S. Ambassador Rapp entered the debate, the international human rights and humanitarian law community had already expressed concern about the ICT, claiming that the rules lacked adequate protections for the defendants and witnesses, a related constitutional amendment was fundamentally unfair, and the trials were politically motivated.  Organizations, such as the War Crimes Committee of the International Bar Association,  <a href="http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/05/18/letter-bangladesh-prime-minister-regarding-international-crimes-tribunals-act " target="_blank">Human Rights Watch</a>,  and the International Center for Transitional Justice,   have all separately submitted to the Bangladesh government letters of concern and recommendations regarding the ICT.   While the government has not rejected such recommendations outright, it has not publicly responded quite as positively to such suggestions as it has to Rapp’s participation, perhaps for obvious reasons.</p>
<p>Rapp was welcomed in Dhaka by the Bangladesh government twice this year, giving the U.S. dignitary the opportunity to meet with Tribunal judges, the registrar, investigators, prosecuting counsel and defense counsel and to visit the <a href="http://www.liberationwarmuseum.org/genocide/" target="_blank">Liberation War Museum</a>.  Rapp also met with the Foreign Minister, the Law Minister, and the Foreign Secretary, as well as representatives from the Bangladesh Supreme Court Bar.   His visits are of keen interest as they are the first high-level international “intervention” in the ICT.  More importantly, Ambassador Rapp brings a valuable experience and perspective on war crimes issues as the former lead prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court in Sierra Leone, which prosecuted Charles Taylor.  After his first visit, Rapp memorialized his concerns and recommendations in a letter  to the Bangladesh government and has since followed up with a second visit to Dhaka in early May.  As discussed in more detail below, Rapp’s concerns, like others’, include issues such as pre-trial detention, disclosure of evidence, time and facilities necessary for the defense, protection of victims and witnesses, and the right to raise legal challenges.</p>
<p><strong>Issues of Concern</strong></p>
<p>As a preliminary matter, one must wonder why Rapp and the international community are so exceptionally concerned with what goes on in Bangladesh’s <em>domestic</em> courts and why the Bangladesh government has shown to be at all receptive to outside “intervention.”  After all, the victims and the alleged perpetrators are Bangladesh citizens, the majority of crimes occurred in Bangladesh (or what was East Pakistan at the time), and the trials and post-conviction incarceration will occur in Bangladesh courts and prisons.  Moreover, as noted by the International Crimes Strategy Forum (ICSF), “the legitimacy of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act is dependent not upon any international instrument of law, irrespective of Bangladesh being or not being a party to it, but on an overwhelming decision of the Bangladesh Parliament, a democratically elected body of representatives constitutionally mandated to enact legislation.  As such, the ICT can only be interpreted in light of the <a href="http://www.ebangladesh.com/2011/05/23/stephen-rapp-of-misconceptions-unrealistic-expectations-and-double-standards/" target="_blank">framework set by ICTA</a> and not any other legal instruments of international nature.”   However, as Rapp has <a href="http://dhaka.usembassy.gov/press_releases4.html" target="_blank">pointed out</a>,  the ICT was established specifically to prosecute international crimes, such as genocide and war crimes, which are crimes defined under international law and recognized as violations of international law.  Despite the fact that the ICT proceedings will occur in domestic courts pursuant to domestic statute, there is justifiable interest in seeing that “international law” is followed according to international standards.  Since the promulgation of the 1973 Act, there has been considerable development in international criminal law and much can be gained by looking at other international crimes tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the ITCR, the Special Court of Sierra Leone and the ICC.  Finally, as a signatory to the ICCPR, Bangladesh is obligated at all times to honor the treaty, but most especially when it purports to be enforcing international law.</p>
<p><strong>Fundamental Rights Under the Constitution</strong></p>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h5>The ICT was established specifically to prosecute international crimes, such as genocide and war crimes. Despite the fact that the ICT proceedings will occur in domestic courts pursuant to domestic statute, there is justifiable interest in seeing that “international law” is followed according to international standards.</h5>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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<p>By far, the most troubling concern is that related to the constitutional amendments (Articles 47(3) and 47A), which deny a number of constitutional protections to Bangladesh citizens who are being detained or prosecuted under the ICTA.  For example, Article 47(3) prohibits such individuals from challenging any law, including the amendments themselves, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.  Article 47A <a href="http://www.banglaembassy.com.bh/Constitution.html; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Bangladesh" target="_blank">further strips</a> those individuals of specific constitutional rights that are guaranteed to all other persons in Bangladesh, such as the right to protection of the law (Art. 31), protection from <em>ex post facto</em> (retroactive) laws and the right to a speedy and public trial (Art. 33), and the ability to enforce guaranteed rights (Art. 44).   These are fundamental due process rights and are guaranteed in international law and to all other suspected criminals in Bangladesh.  Withholding such rights from suspected war criminals who have not even been convicted does not engender faith in the fairness of the process or outcome.</p>
<p><strong>Rights of the Accused</strong></p>
<p>There are a number of worrisome provisions in the ICT Act  and the Rules of Procedure (ROP)  and practices of the Tribunal, all of which have been set forth and discussed in detail, with specific reference to other tribunals’ rules and procedures for point of comparison, in Rapp’s letter and letters by the aforementioned international organizations.  The following are some of the many concerns going to provisions affecting the rights of the accused:</p>
<p>•	Individuals can be arrested and questioned before formal charges are brought and they can only challenge their detention <em>once</em> and have no right of appeal.  Currently, at least five individuals have been in detention for over six months, some as long as ten or more months, with no possibility of release until post-conviction, having already lost their initial applications for bail.</p>
<p>•	The rules also allow for the interrogation of the (informally) accused without counsel present and there is no procedure for informing a questioned individual of their privileges or rights or that they are entitled to counsel.   Already, several detainees have been  interrogated without counsel present based on the prosecution’s request to the Tribunal and during the interrogations, which lasted all day, the detainees were denied the opportunity to have private conversations with their counsel during breaks and were prohibited from discussing the interrogations with counsel altogether.  Further, there has been no investigation into claims of torture and abuse of individuals in detention.</p>
<p>•	There is no procedure for challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or making constitutional challenges to the ICT Act or Rules of Procedure.</p>
<p>•	There is no requirement that the prosecution disclose exculpatory evidence (“unused evidence”) to defendants or their counsel, nor are there any provisions that enable a defendant to request discovery.  Additionally, the prosecution is only required to disclose the evidence upon which it will rely <em>three weeks in advance</em> of the trial to the Tribunal and does not specifically require disclosure to defendants or their counsel.</p>
<p>•	The Act specifically provides that the Bangladesh Evidence Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure, both of which apply in all criminal proceedings in Bangladesh domestic courts, do not apply to proceedings under the ICTA.  Further, the Act provides that “the Tribunal shall not be bound by the technical rules of evidence”</p>
<p>•	Though the burden of proof is on the prosecution, there is no presumption of innocence.  Additionally, the burden of proof is reversed to the defendant in an alibi defense.</p>
<p>It could be argued that some of these inadequacies, standing alone, are not enough to evince a lack of due process.  However, allowing all of them in the same proceeding and together with the constitutional amendments, which deny fundamental protections to the defendants, the ICT, as it now stands, falls far short of the international standards of due process that are evident in the rules and procedures in the ICTY, ITCR and the ICC.  Moreover, the ICT rules and procedures together with the constitutional amendments clearly <a href="http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm" target="_blank">violate the guarantees</a> under Article 14 of the ICCPR,   which Bangladesh ratified in 2000.  In short, Bangladesh would be violating its international law obligations were the ICT to proceed without modification.</p>
<p><strong>Motions and Appeals<br />
</strong><br />
There is no appellate chamber within the ICT and the ROP only allow for appeal on matters of law to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court <em>after</em> the conviction of an accused.  There are no procedures that allow both parties to file motions for appropriate rulings and relief and to seek interlocutory appeal of key adverse decisions.  Allowing parties to appeal decisions on evidence and other significant issues during the course of the trial, particularly given the complexity of international crimes, is more efficient and fair and avoids waiting until an acquittal or conviction in the event error occurs during trial.</p>
<p><strong>Neutrality and Equality of Arms</strong></p>
<p>While an estimated 1,600 people took part in the atrocities, it is clear that the Tribunal will not be prosecuting soldiers in the Pakistani army or the Bengali freedom fighters.  Instead, the government appears to be targeting only Bangladeshi citizens accused of collaborating with West Pakistan and committing certain crimes.  Five of the seven alleged collaborators are members of the Jamaat-e-Islami party, Bangladesh’s biggest Islamic party and a partner in the main opposition alliance against the Awami League, the controlling party.  The other two accused are from another opposition party, Bangladesh National Party (BNP).   This has led to criticism that the Tribunal is merely a vehicle to repress political opposition.  To exacerbate the problem, there is no process in the ICTA or ROP to challenge the Tribunal judges.</p>
<div style="float: right;">
<div id="attachment_5" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 310px"><a href="http://www.crimesofwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Bangladesh-Tribunal-Panelists.jpg"><img class=" size-medium wp-image-124" style="float: center;" title="ASIL" src="http://www.crimesofwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Bangladesh-Tribunal-Panelists.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="240" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Caitlin Reiger (lt.), Ambassador Stephen Rapp, Kristine Huskey and John Cammegh on the ASIL panel</p></div>
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<p>“Equality of arms” is a fundamental component of a fair trial as every party must have the opportunity to present their case under conditions that do not place either party at a substantial disadvantage.  Accordingly, the Tribunal could enhance both the fairness of the process and the perception of fairness by establishing a “Defense Office,” which could play an important role in protecting the rights of the accused by ensuring that defense counsel have adequate support to prepare and present cases and by providing training on investigative techniques and access to jurisprudence and developments in international criminal law.  Further, a Defense Office could maintain a list of qualified lawyers who can be assigned to a defendant in the event he cannot afford legal counsel.  Cases involving allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide are already complex and the crimes here date back decades.  It is important for a fair and just outcome that the attorneys for both sides have the knowledge, the expertise and the ability to effectively bring their case or defend their clients.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Protection of Witnesses</strong></p>
<p>The ICTA does not contain any provisions for the protection of witnesses whose testimony may be necessary in the trials.  It is the experience of other international crimes tribunals, particularly those involving war crimes and genocide, that witnesses have legitimate concerns about being subjected to intimidation, threats and actual violence to keep them from testifying.  The ability to ensure the attendance and safety of witnesses is an essential component of a successfully functioning tribunal process.  Accordingly, at a minimum, there should be resources and a process in place to protect witnesses, victims and family members before, during and after court appearances, and provide secure transportation to and from the court, as well as address the protection of personal information in a manner that will not deny the right of defendants to see the evidence against them.</p>
<p><strong>Will Justice Prevail?</strong></p>
<p>Just a few weeks after Rapp’s second visit to Bangladesh, he spoke at a briefing on the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh, which was sponsored by the American Society for International Law (ASIL), the Center for Human Rights &amp; Humanitarian Law at American University&#8217;s Washington College of Law, and The Crimes of War Education Project.  During the discussion, Ambassador Rapp made clear he would be returning to Bangladesh to continue his involvement and to provide assistance to the ICT.  Interestingly, at the end of the briefing, Bangladesh’s top diplomat to the U.S., Ambassador Akramul Qader, passionately defended the Bangladesh justice system and Parliament, taking the opportunity to point out that nobody on the ASIL panel was from Bangladesh, resulting in a “one side of the fence” discussion.</p>
<p>Perhaps mirroring the political tension in Dhaka over the ICT, several Bangladesh citizens were quick to respond, including Zakir Hafez, an international law professor in the School of International Service at American University, who remarked that everyone in Bangladesh wants to see the perpetrators prosecuted, but he could not see “truth and independent justice” in the composition of the Tribunal judges or its rules.  Professor Hafez then summed up one reason why it is important that the ICT be fair:  “If the Tribunal is not in accordance with international justice and the rule of law, it will not be a good legacy for Bangladesh.”  As for why the ICT matters beyond Bangladesh, Retired U.S. Air Force Colonel Morris Davis concluded the briefing with the compelling and poignant remark, “I can tell you as a career military officer that war is hell.  The law of war makes it a little less hellish and as this Tribunal contributes to that body of law &#8211; international humanitarian law and the law of war &#8212; every little bit contributes to that body of law and it is important, to all of us.”</p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether pressure from the U.S. or other international sources or internal outcry will bring about any changes to the ICT statute or rules of procedure, or the Bangladesh Constitution and, thus, whether justice will finally prevail in Bangladesh.</p>
<p><em>Kristine A. Huskey is an attorney and consultant on matters of national security law and policy and international humanitarian and human rights law, an adjunct professor at Georgetown Law School, and a Fellow at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law.  She has taught national security law and international humanitarian and human rights law at the University of Texas School of Law, George Washington University Law School, Washington College of Law at American University, and Victoria University Law School in Wellington, New Zealand.<br />
</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Related Links</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong><a href="http://www.asil.org/activities_calendar.cfm?action=detail&amp;rec=194" target="_blank">Briefing by Ambassador Rapp at the American Society for International Law<br />
</a>May 19, 2011</p>
<p><a href="http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">Bangladesh War Crimes Tribunal Blog</a><br />
By David Bergman</p>
<p><a href="http://www.icsforum.org/" target="_blank">International Crimes Strategy Forum<br />
</a>1971 Bangladesh Justice</p>
<p><a href="http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/05/19/bangladesh-unique-opportunity-justice-1971-atrocities" target="_blank">Press Release and Letter from Human Rights Watch to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina<br />
</a>May 18, 2011</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Bangladesh: A Free and Fair War Crimes Tribunal?</title>
		<link>http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/bangladesh-a-free-and-fair-war-crimes-tribunal/</link>
		<comments>http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/bangladesh-a-free-and-fair-war-crimes-tribunal/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Aug 2010 13:53:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Morris</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bangladesh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[crimes against humanity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[due process]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tribunal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[war crimes]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://en.crimesofwar.org/?p=639</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Though the tribunal has been welcomed in Bangladesh, serious concerns have about its trial standards remain.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="attachment_640" class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 630px"><a rel="attachment wp-att-640" href="http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/bangladesh-a-free-and-fair-war-crimes-tribunal/attachment/daughters-of-freedom-fighters-2/"><img class="size-full wp-image-640" title="Daughters of Freedom Fighters" src="http://www.crimesofwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Daughters-of-Freedom-Fighters1.jpg" alt="" width="620" height="400" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Activists of “Daughters of Freedom Fighters” stand with a caricature of a war criminal to demand punishment, as others stand in a queue to pay tribute at the memorial for war heroes to mark the country’s Independence Day, in Saver, on the outskirts of Dhaka, Bangladesh, Friday, March 26, 2010.  The poster translates to “We demand punishment for war criminals. They are a disgrace.” (AP Photo/Pavel Rahman) </p></div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<div style="color: #000000;"><strong><em>By Katherine Iliopoulos</em></strong></div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<div style="color: #000000;">A war crimes tribunal set up in Bangladesh to try those responsible for atrocities during the country’s 1971 liberation war with Pakistan is facing increased scrutiny by the international community. While the International Crimes Tribunal has been widely welcomed in Bangladesh as a response to the longstanding need to address the issue of impunity for alleged war crimes and other crimes under international law, serious concerns have been raised, particularly regarding its statute, which contains several provisions that are incompatible with international law and international fair trial standards. In July, Rules of Procedure were adopted, which are also highly problematic in terms of international human rights law.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act was drafted in 1973 with some international input and well before the creation of the two ad hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, whose rulings have since clarified and expanded the body of international criminal law. The Act was later marginally amended in 2009.</p>
<p>The International Crimes Tribunal was established with a controversial amendment to Bangladesh’s Constitution in 1973. The amendment provides that a person charged with genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or other crimes under international law cannot challenge any law providing for their prosecution and punishment on the grounds that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Constitution. That means the Act cannot be challenged on the basis that it violates basic constitutional rights that apply in other criminal proceedings. The constitutional amendment is fundamentally at odds with the rule of law, which ensures equal treatment of all persons before the law.</p>
<p>Five leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami are now in detention awaiting trial.  Two of them, Mohammad Kamaruzzaman and Abdul Quader Molla, recently sought to challenge this amendment along with some sections of the Act, arguing that they were inconsistent with the Constitution. According to the media, their challenge was rejected by the High Court on August 23, 2010, but there are also reports that in fact the application was withdrawn by their lawyers for reasons because the judges seemed to have prejudged the matter.</p>
<p>In an interview with the <em>Crimes of War Project</em>, Professor Suzannah Linton of Hong Kong University, the author of the first comprehensive examination of the legislation and rules of procedure, welcomed the “important international precedent” that is being set by Bangladesh in creating the ICT and thereby trying to achieve accountability.  But, she cautioned that the legislation as it stands is now well out of date and “runs contrary to its international obligations and the wider objective of the international criminal justice movement, which is not to bring about revenge, but justice.” According to Professor Linton, the most critical shortcoming of the legislation is its lack of adequate fair trial and due process safeguards.</p>
<p>The independence movement in the former East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, began in 1971 and was attributed to the concentration of political power in West Pakistan and perceptions in the East of economic exploitation. Rising malcontent and cultural nationalism in the East culminated in a violent crackdown by West Pakistani forces on March 25, 1971, known as Operation Searchlight. All major cities in the East were seized, political and military opposition were eliminated, and foreign journalists were deported. Almost a thousand pro-liberation intellectuals were systematically executed.</p>
<p>Although no systematic or comprehensive accounting was ever done, multiple large-scale mass graves have been uncovered around the country, and the popularly accepted figure within Bangladesh is that up to three million people were killed.</p>
<p>The conflict ended when India invaded in December 1971 and decisively beat the Pakistani forces in a matter of days, capturing 93,000 Pakistani troops. Bangladesh declared its independence shortly thereafter and Sheikh Mujib became the new country’s first prime minister. The West’s army had the support of many of East Pakistan’s Islamist parties. They included Jamaat-e-Islami, still Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party, which has a student wing that manned a pro-army paramilitary body, called Al Badr. It is these collaborators the government wants to try, not the main culprits in the former West Pakistan army.</p>
<p>The events of 1971 have been described as “genocide” within Bangladesh and in several international publications.</p>
<p>Article 2 of the 1948 <em>Genocide Convention</em>, which reflects customary international law, defines genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.” It does not include “political groups,” although that term was added to the definition of genocide under the 1973 Act.</p>
<p>Killing members of a <em>political</em> group as such is not the crime of genocide under international law. As Professor Linton explains, “the problem with the Bangladeshi addition of political groups is that this was one of the groups deliberately excluded from the ambit of the crime of genocide set out in the Genocide Convention. States that were engaged in the drafting process did not want their own people to be tried for genocide for the very common practice of targeting their political enemies.” It is notable that attempts to expand the definition at the Rome Conference for the establishment of the ICC were also defeated.</p>
<p>The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), when it published its investigation into the events in 1972, stated that “to prevent a nation from attaining political autonomy does not constitute genocide: the intention must be to destroy in whole or in part the people as such. It can hardly be suggested that the intention was to destroy the Bengali people.” Yet the ICJ report does go on to say that particular acts may have constituted genocide against part of the Bengali people: “Where large numbers were massacred and it can be shown that on the particular occasion the intent was to kill Bengalis indiscriminately as such, then a crime of genocide would be established. There would seem to be a prima facie case to show that this was the intention on some occasions, as for example during the indiscriminate killing of civilians in the poorer quarters of Dacca during the &#8216;crack-down.’” The ICJ took a much firmer approach with respect to the Hindu population however, and in its view there was “a strong prima facie case that the crime of genocide was committed” against this particular group.</p>
<p>Professor Linton, as well as the War Crimes Committee of the International Bar Association, has pointed out that the definition of crimes against humanity in the 1973 Act misses important elements of the more modern definition, namely, the widespread or systematic nature of the attacks against the civilian population. In addition, the Act does not require that the offending actions be committed “with knowledge” of the widespread or systematic attack. The lack of a required nexus with an armed conflict reflects the current definition of crimes against humanity which emerged from modern ICTY jurisprudence, but not necessarily the law of 1971.</p>
<p>The two-tier “crimes in armed conflict” provision in the Act appears to mean war crimes.  It takes a form never seen before.  One section virtually mirrors that which appeared in the Statute of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. But, the other section provides that violations of <em>any</em> of the hundreds of humanitarian rules that make up the four Geneva Conventions can be prosecuted as war crimes. In the Geneva Conventions treaty framework, only Grave Breaches of the 1948 Geneva Conventions constitute the international crime commonly called war crimes. Then, there is a provision providing jurisdiction over “any other crimes under international law.” These are clear violations of the principle of legality; the universally recognised requirement that criminal laws be clear and people are not prosecuted for what was not criminal at the time that the acts were committed.</p>
<p>The eight grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are: (1) wilful killing; (2) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; (3) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; (4) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; (5) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power; (6) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of a fair and regular trial;  (7) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; and (8) taking civilians as hostages.</p>
<p>The Grave Breaches provisions, as incorporated into the Act, will only come into play if it can be established that an international armed conflict existed at the time of the crime. The early stages of the conflict can be characterised as a ”Common Article 3” situation, but as Professor Linton points out in her analysis, it is unclear as to whether customary international law in 1971 was such that individual criminal responsibility attached to violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Nonetheless, she finds that it is possible to argue for the criminalisation of violations of Common Article 3 by 1971, in itself and by linking it to the fundamental general principles of humanitarian law which are undeniably part of the ”laws and customs of war,” violations of which constitute war crimes.</p>
<p>Increasing Indian involvement, particularly with regard to the country’s support and assistance of the Mukti Bahini who were fighting against the Pakistani Army, served to ”internationalise” the conflict. Yet the armed conflict could be said to have become of a truly international character with India’s invasion of East Pakistan in response to Operation Chengiz Khan, the pre-emptive airstrikes carried out by Pakistan  India on the evening of December 3, 1971. The Grave Breaches provisions of the Act would thus apply to serious breaches of the Geneva Conventions occurring from that point.</p>
<p>During the conflict, an estimated 200,000 Bengali women and girls were said to have been raped by Pakistani soldiers, including Punjabi, Pashto and Sindhi, with an estimated 25,000 allegedly forcefully impregnated and many held captive as sex slaves. And the Pakistan Army’s local auxiliary forces, known as the Razakaar and Al-Badr, are alleged to have used rape to terrorise, in particular the Hindu population, and to gain access to its land and property.</p>
<p>But crimes such as sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity &#8211; which were codified for the first time in international law by the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court &#8211; are excluded from the Act. The only mention of sexual violence in the 1973 Act is “rape” and it appears as a core crime within crimes against humanity. No definition of rape is provided. The definition in regular Bangladeshi law (which has been expressly ousted) is a conservative and limited one, restricted to sexual intercourse.</p>
<p>In the <em>Akayesu</em> case, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda held that rape, which it defined as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive,” and sexual assault constitute acts of genocide insofar as they were committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a targeted group – in the case the Tutsi ethnic group – as such. In this vein, in the case of Bangladesh, forced pregnancy could be argued to constitute not only war crimes or crimes against humanity but also genocide, if it was found to have been committed with the requisite intent to destroy in whole or in part a particular group – that is, the Bengalis – as such.</p>
<p>Aside from the legal issues surrounding such crimes, it appears that as things stand, the Tribunal will face considerable difficulties in persuading the victims come forward to testify. Sexual crime during the armed conflict has “always been politicised and has now become a nationalistic issue,” said Professor Linton.  But, as she points out, very few women have actually spoken out publicly to substantiate the appalling figures of sexual violence that are regularly cited.    Not only are there significant social constraints on women speaking out, but according to Dr Bina D’Costa of the Australian National University and human rights barrister Sara Hussein, who have examined the issue of redress for sexual violence before the Tribunal, there has been no consideration given so far to the approach the Tribunal should take and what its priorities should be for addressing sexual violence. And as Professor Linton points out, there is no provision on witness protection or support in the law, beyond one that provides that the Tribunal may take proceedings in closed session.</p>
<p>The Act’s shortcomings do not end there. Human Rights Watch has recommended the removal from the legislation of the death penalty as a fundamental violation of human rights. Arguably, it is also inconsistent with Article 35(5) of Bangladesh&#8217;s constitution which prohibits &#8220;torture, cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment or treatment.&#8221; The International Bar Association is concerned that the Bangladesh tribunal not follow the example set by the Iraqi High Tribunal, which ordered the execution of Saddam Hussein.</p>
<p>But the availability of the death penalty “ought not to be the focus of the international community” says Professor Linton. “Here, the priority seems to be a matter of making the process in Bangladesh meet basic, not five star, international standards.” Professor Linton has identified several provisions that fall well below international fair trial standards.  Among these, she is concerned about the bar to Constitutional challenges and the lack of defences available to accused persons such as the defence of ”superior orders” (this exists in the domestic law that applied in 1971 and today) and the lack of disclosure obligations on the part of the prosecution. There is no mention of the right to silence, the presumption of innocence, nor the standard and onus of proof. Furthermore, the Act and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not contain any provision affirming the right to have counsel during the critical pre-trial phase. As such, they do not require that the suspect be advised of his rights on being deprived of his liberty, including the right not to answer questions without defence counsel present.</p>
<p>Despite the existence of the requisite political will and civil society support for a justice mechanism to address past crimes and fight impunity, the process remains controversial and politically charged. Serious concerns about the fairness and independence of the process cannot be ignored. Professor Linton commends Bangladesh’s courageous attempt at bringing truth and justice to victims, but says that doing so should not involve a manipulation of the justice system to achieve purely retributive ends. “Victims deserve better than this,” she says, and it is up to the international community to support Bangladesh where possible in its struggle to legitimately meet popular expectations of justice.</p>
<p><em> Katherine Iliopoulos is an international lawyer based in The Hague, Netherlands. </em></p>
<p><strong>Related Links:</strong></p>
<p><a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/d08677180p261r81/" target="_blank">Completing the Circle: Accountability for the Crimes of the 1971 Bangladesh War of Liberation<br />
</a> By Suzannah Linton<br />
Criminal Law Forum, May 2010</p>
<p><a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/l1251u65l1750334/" target="_blank">Redress for Sexual Violence Before the International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh: Lessons from History, and Hopes for the Future<br />
</a> By Bina D&#8217;Costa and Sara Hussein<br />
Criminal Law Forum, May 2010</p>
<p><a href="http://www.globalwebpost.com/genocide1971/docs/jurists/1_preface.htm" target="_blank">Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events in East Pakistan, 1971<br />
</a> International Commission of Jurists</p>
<p><a href="http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/08/letter-prime-minister-sheikh-hasina-re-international-crimes-tribunals-act" target="_blank">Letter to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Re: International Crimes (Tribunals) Act<br />
</a> Human Rights Watch<br />
July 8, 2009</p>
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		<title>Yugoslavia, The International Criminal Tribunal for (ICTY)</title>
		<link>http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/yugoslavia-the-international-criminal-tribunal-for-icty/</link>
		<comments>http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/yugoslavia-the-international-criminal-tribunal-for-icty/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 15 Mar 2008 15:49:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Morris</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[A-Z Guide]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Since its creation in 1993, the ICTY has indicted 162 people, ranging from political and military leaders to low-level fighters.]]></description>
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<p><em>By Michael H. Hoffman</em><br />
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<strong>Civil and military leaders often claim that their forces always administer and obey international humanitarian law (IHL). How those leaders reply to one simple question can do much to support—or undermine—their claims. What training do your forces receive in IHL?<br />
</strong><br />
The 1949 Geneva Conventions contain a provision compelling states to include the “study” of IHL in “programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire population, in particular to the armed fighting forces, the medical personnel and chaplains.” By extension, insurgents are expected to provide similar instruction to their own forces. Ultimate responsibility for IHL training remains with political authorities and military leaders. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies also conduct IHL training for civilians in many parts of<br />
the world.</p>
<p>Military instruction is, generally, hands-on in nature. Effective IHL training for soldiers usually requires a practical, problem-solving approach. Some armed forces integrate IHL-linked scenarios into their training exercises, others rely more on classroom presentation. In some armed forces IHL training is by military assistance teams from other countries. There are also militaries that offer little or no training, and a few that are not aware that this body of law exists.</p>
<p>Two civilian institutions play an important role in IHL training. The ICRC has a Division for Relations with Armed and Security Forces that conducts IHL training using a multinational faculty composed of retired military officers. The International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Italy, attracts military officers from around the world to its intensive IHL courses taught by IHL experts on active duty with their nations’ armed forces.</p>
<p>Armed forces that have not yet developed a program of IHL instruction can attain it externally from the military forces of allied nations and/or internationally recognized institutions. There is no real excuse for leaders who fail to train their armed forces in IHL.</p>
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		<title>Guantanamo</title>
		<link>http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/guantanamo/</link>
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		<pubDate>Sat, 08 Mar 2008 20:56:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Morris</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[A-Z Guide]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Guantanamo]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Nuremberg]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[By Jess Bravin &#160; Shortly before the first American military commissions held since the 1940s [...]]]></description>
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<td align="left" valign="top"><span style="color: #000000; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><em>By Jess Bravin </em></span></span>&nbsp;</p>
<div><span style="color: #000000; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><strong>Shortly before the first American military commissions held since the 1940s were to begin at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in August 2004, a handful of journalists was shown round the windowless hearing room where terrorist suspects would stand trial. The escort noted that, per orders from Washington, no film or video camera would record the proceedings. “You won’t be seeing this on the History Channel,” the officer said with apparent satisfaction.</strong></span></span></div>
<div><span style="color: #000000; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><strong> </strong></span></span></div>
<div><span style="color: #000000; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">The contrast, of course, was Nuremberg, where the International Military Tribunal convened within months of Germany’s surrender in 1945 to try the surviving leaders of the Nazi regime. Newsreels of those proceedings—now a perennial snippet on cable television—helped cement the moral standing of the Allied victory, and laid the legal groundwork for hundreds of military trials for lower-ranking Axis officials throughout the European and Pacific theaters.</p>
<p>Guantanamo Bay, the century-old naval base acquired in America’s first overseas war, stands at the crosshairs of contemporary thinking on war crimes. For Washington, the interrogation center it opened there in 2002 for men captured in counterterrorism operations was also to be the place where they faced judgment for war crimes, under a new code the U.S. Defense Department drafted to encompass 21st-century terrorism as well as resistance to American forces on the battlefield. To President George W. Bush and his advisors, the enemy that revealed itself on 9/11 was a monstrous aberration lurking outside the existing structure of domestic or international law.</p>
<p>The risk of additional terrorist attacks was too great, officials concluded, to follow rules that evolved in the prior century—and that were inconsistently followed, in any case, by other countries facing terrorist or internal security crises. The risk of mistaken arrest or conviction paled in comparison to the threat, officials concluded, as did the potential damage to America’s reputation by disclosure of cruel or inhuman interrogation methods that many scholars considered impermissible under such international instruments as the Geneva Conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.</p>
<p>But the aggressive detention, interrogation and prosecution policies the U.S. has pursued there have made Guantanamo a far different metaphor than Washington envisioned. Unlike Nuremberg, now shorthand for international justice, to many around the world Guantanamo symbolizes America’s selective adherence to norms of human rights. Whatever history’s ultimate judgment, the Guantanamo detention facility marks a watershed in thinking about war crimes: it is perhaps the first major military installation conceived for reasons of legal strategy as well as military necessity. The U.S. government sited its detention operation at Guantanamo because it believed the territory’s legal status would limit, if not eliminate, the rights of prisoners held there.</p>
<p>Guantanamo Bay originally came into American hands after another catastrophic event that seared the American psyche—the February 15, 1898, explosion of the U.S. battleship Maine in Havana harbor, killing 260 sailors. Americans blamed Cuba’s colonial ruler, Spain, for the attack, and war ensued. On June 10, 1898, U.S. Marines landed at Guantanamo Bay. Six months later, a defeated Madrid signed a treaty relinquishing remnants of its empire in the New World and the Pacific, setting Cuba on the path to an independence defined and protected by Washington, which won the right to build “coaling and naval stations” at Guantanamo. In 1903, the U.S. formalized the terms with Cuba, placing the 45-square-mile reservation under Washington’s “complete jurisdiction and control,” while Havana retained “ultimate sovereignty”—an arrangement that could not be terminated without American consent.</p>
<p>Aside from a few incidents after the 1959 Cuban revolution, the swampy inlet receded from American consciousness. During the 1990s, Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton used the base to house thousands of Cuban and Haitian migrants interdicted at sea, hoping to prevent them from reaching American shores where they could claim refugee status. The policy sparked lawsuits from immigrant-rights advocates which, while failing to fully clarify the application of treaties and American law at Guantanamo, revealed courts hesitant to second-guess presidential determinations.</p>
<p>The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, prompted not only a rapid military response, but an equally vigorous legal offensive by lawyers in the administration of President George W. Bush. The U.S. invoked its right of self-defense against the al-Qaeda network and its sponsors, backed within the week by a resolution of the U.S. Congress authorizing Bush to use “all necessary and appropriate force.” In the weeks that followed, as U.S. and allied forces joined Afghan militias to overthrow the Taliban regime and pursue al-Qaeda terrorists, administration lawyers drafted opinions advising that few limits, if any, applied to the powers the president had now asserted. Many of these documents were secret, but on November 13, 2001, Bush made one policy public: a “military order” declaring it “not practicable” to follow U.S. court procedures for foreign prisoners he determined were linked to international terrorism, and authorizing military commissions to try them.</p>
<p>In Afghanistan, indigenous forces such as the Northern Alliance tribal group initially held suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners, but the U.S. decided it needed to take custody of those it captured or obtained from militias and bounty hunters. On December 27, 2001, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told a press conference that Guantanamo was the choice.</p>
<p>“Mr. Secretary, we’ve gotten into trouble every time we’ve tried to use Guantanamo Bay in the past to hold people, for other reasons,” a reporter asked. “Why use it? Why is it the best place?”</p>
<p>“I would characterize Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as the least worst place we could have selected,” Rumsfeld answered. “It has disadvantages, as you suggest. Its disadvantages, however, seem to be modest relative to the alternatives.”</p>
<p>Rumsfeld didn’t elaborate, but contemporaneous legal opinions, later disclosed, provide some of the explanation. Officials rejected the Pacific Ocean bases at Midway, Tinian and Wake islands after recognizing that they fell within the jurisdiction of the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco. Judicial review could “interfere with the operation of the system that has been developed to address the detainment and trial of enemy aliens” if courts examined such issues as prisoner rights under the Geneva Conventions or “whether and what international law norms may or may not apply to the conduct of the war in Afghanistan,” wrote Justice Department officials Patrick Philbin and John Yoo. Guantanamo, however, was not formally within any federal court’s jurisdiction. While housing prisoners at the base bore “some litigation risk,” they wrote, “the great weight of legal authority indicates that a federal district court could not properly exercise… jurisdiction over an alien detained” at Guantanamo.</p>
<p>The first 20 prisoners arrived on January 11, 2002. Even as the manacled prisoners, in blacked-out goggles and orange jumpsuits, were led to their outdoor cells, senior officials in Washington debated whether any laws or treaties covered the men. President Bush settled the question for the Executive Branch in a February 7 order declaring that Geneva applied only between States parties, and therefore al-Qaeda prisoners, agents of a stateless terror network, were excluded. Moreover, while Afghanistan was a State party, the order concluded that forces of the country’s de facto government, the Taliban, had failed to meet the treaty’s criteria for lawful fighting and therefore were categorically excluded from its protection.</p>
<p>The 3rd Geneva Convention provides for case-by-case determinations “should any doubt arise”over a prisoner’s status. Under U.S. Army regulations implementing the treaty, a three-officer board is empowered to quickly classify prisoners on the battlefield. Officials told me that providing prisoners even this near-perfunctory process would needlessly dignify the enemy.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, Bush declared, “as a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces”—which do not include civilian entities such as the Central Intelligence Agency—”shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.” By the end of February, 300 men were held at Guantanamo. As many as 600 prisoners would be held there at any particular time.</p>
<p>Because of the secrecy surrounding Guantanamo’s operations, it has been impossible to assess independently the intelligence produced there. Journalists and dignitaries brought on escorted tours of the prison are not permitted to speak with prisoners, but as evidence of their humane treatment are shown a well-stocked infirmary, copies of the Koran and “comfort items” such as rubber sandals that are provided for detainees, along with fenced yards where they can kick around a ball. The U.S. permits prisoner visits by delegates from the International Committee of the Red Cross, which in general does not speak publicly about its observations. Prisoners have found ways to demonstrate their own views, however, occasionally attacking guards, attempting suicide and launching periodic hunger strikes, which U.S. jailers have frustrated by force-feeding.</p>
<p>Litigation, aggressive journalism, statements of released prisoners and selected disclosures by government officials have revealed other elements of the Guantanamo operation. At various times prisoners have been awkwardly shackled to the floor, deprived of light, subjected to blaring music and sexually humiliated. Officials have continuously wrestled over the degree of force and intimidation that lawfully could be used against defiant prisoners, sometimes out of concern that specific methods potentially could expose interrogators and their superiors to criminal liability.</p>
<p>Within weeks of Guantanamo’s designation as a prison site, activist lawyers filed suits alleging that the detentions there were illegal. Those suits initially faltered before judges hesitant to second-guess the president after 9/11, but in June 2004 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that federal habeas jurisdiction did extend to Guantanamo. The court did not say explicitly what would constitute a lawful detention, however, leaving lower courts to sort the details out.</p>
<p>While continuing to deny the application of the Geneva Conventions, the U.S. government responded to the Supreme Court ruling by convening panels called Combatant Status Review Tribunals, three-officer boards similar to those described in the Army’s regulations, to confirm that prisoners belonged there. Prisoners could not see classified evidence on which their detentions were based and essentially could only insist that they were held by mistake; 38 of the 558 prisoners who appeared before the tribunals were released, the Pentagon said. Similar panels, called Administrative Review Boards, were established to hold annual hearings on whether a prisoner had so declined in dangerousness to merit release. Prisoner advocates, however, contended these procedures were inadequate and pursued their lawsuits in federal court.</p>
<p>Those the U.S. approved for release met different fates, often depending on their origin. British citizens returned home to freedom, and even celebrity, as they denounced their captivity. At least 10 released Guantanamo prisoners, the Pentagon has claimed, joined al-Qaeda cells or forces fighting Americans. And others, for complex diplomatic and political reasons, entered an unexpected limbo: the U.S. could find no place to send them.</p>
<p>For instance, several Uighurs, members of a Muslim ethnic group from northeastern China, were held at Guantanamo for months after officials determined they were not enemies of the U.S. and should be released. Treaty obligations, however, prevented returning the Uighurs to China, where they were viewed as disloyal and likely to face retribution. But the U.S. was unwilling to resettle them within its own borders and could find no country prepared to accept them until May 2006, when Albania agreed to receive five Uighurs. They face an uncertain future in a country that, while predominantly Muslim, differs significantly in language and culture.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the U.S. government struggled to implement Bush’s order for military commission trials at the base. Some military lawyers and State Department officials urged procedures that closely followed the existing U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice, which adheres to the U.S. Constitution and satisfies international legal standards. Senior officials, however, remained convinced that recognizing a defendant’s absolute right to examine prosecution witnesses and evidence could force the government to choose between revealing intelligence methods, including the circumstances of interrogations, or forgoing convictions.</p>
<p>Moreover, because the most important al-Qaeda suspects were not initially held at Guantanamo—they, instead, were kept at secret CIA sites even less accessible than the Cuba base—officials could select defendants only from the mid- to low-level belligerents presumed to comprise the inmate population. Further impeding the commissions’ effort was the determination that intelligence took precedence over prosecution, with the practical effect that prosecutors were denied access to intelligence files on potential defendants and witnesses. Eventually, officials identified a half-dozen prisoners for trial, a decision President Bush approved in 2003.</p>
<p>Prosecutors selected cases they thought would be relatively simple to resolve, hoping to initiate the commissions with a slew of plea bargains and guilty verdicts. Military defense lawyers assigned to represent the defendants were expected to facilitate the trials by operating within the process conceived by the Pentagon. Instead, the lawyers advised their clients to reject plea bargains and launched a wholesale assault on the legitimacy of the military commission program itself. The prosecution’s initial selection of defendants would prove a strategic mistake; rather than an alleged killer or terrorist mastermind whose villainy might justify extraordinary measures, the case that would reach the Supreme Court involved an obscure functionary: Osama bin Laden’s admitted driver, Salim Hamdan, who prosecutors alleged also was a bodyguard and confidant of the al-Qaeda leader.</p>
<p>The Pentagon eventually commenced its first military commission hearings in August 2004, but the proceedings soon fell apart. Defense lawyers challenged the impartiality of the panel members, forcing the disqualification of several officers from serving on the commission. Translation errors—immediately raised by defense interpreters and Arabic-speaking observers from human-rights organizations who were invited to attend—marred the hearings. A commission presiding officer, apparently unsure of what rules against self-incrimination applied, silenced a defendant just as he appeared ready to declare his role in al-Qaeda. In November 2004, the proceedings were abruptly halted when a federal judge in Washington ruled the commissions illegal and a violation of the Geneva Conventions.</p>
<p>While legal skirmishing continued, the broader prisoner population at Guantanamo became increasingly restive, and in June 2006 three prisoners succeeded in hanging themselves. A Pentagon official, acknowledging that the prisoner deaths would further damage the U.S. reputation, described the suicides as acts of “asymmetric warfare.”</p>
<p>On June 29, 2006, in a 73-page opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens, a slim majority of the Supreme Court painstakingly refuted the legal theories upon which the Bush administration had built its prisoner policies. Viewed narrowly, the court found that the president held no inherent power to establish his own military commissions outside existing law, specifically the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The president was given the choice of either following the UCMJ or asking Congress to establish an alternative system.</p>
<p>More broadly, the opinion rejected the legal conclusion of Alberto Gonzales, the president’s counsel and later attorney general, that Guantanamo prisoners fell outside Geneva. The court found that existing U.S. law required adherence to a Geneva provision known as Common Article 3, which prohibits, among other abuses, “cruel treatment and torture” and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment,” while requiring that any trials be conducted by “a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” A plurality of justices found that the single charge lodged against Hamdan—conspiracy—was not a valid crime under the laws of war.</p>
<p>Essentially, in its 2004 and 2006 rulings, the Supreme Court ruled that the Guantanamo project had been based on a legal fallacy: that the U.S. president controlled a property outside the jurisdiction of any court, allowing him to operate a detention, interrogation and trial facility where nothing that transpired would ever face review by an independent judge.</p>
<p>Bush administration officials told me they had been so confident in their legal position, they had made no provision should the Supreme Court rule otherwise. Bush himself, however, in the weeks before the court’s decision, had begun voicing a hope that someday Guantanamo might be closed. A series of halting steps followed the June decision. The deputy defense secretary issued a directive that Common Article 3 be obeyed, and in September Bush sent 14 “high value” prisoners from secret CIA prisons to Guantanamo, where they would for the first time be visited by International Red Cross delegates and receive other Geneva conditions. Bush said that these prisoners, some of whom allegedly helped plan the 9/11 attacks, should be tried by military commission.</span></span></div>
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<div><span style="color: #000000; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">At the same time, the administration proposed legislation that would in large part authorize commissions to operate much as it had originally conceived them, including the power to exclude defendants from their trials and use hearsay evidence obtained through coercion. A month before midterm elections, Congress adopted much of the president’s proposal, including a provision purporting to bar all detainee lawsuits asserting claims based on the Geneva Conventions.</span></span></span></span></div>
<div><span style="color: #000000; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"> </span></span><span style="color: #000000;"> </span></div>
<div><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-size: small;"></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">In March 2007, the Bush administration concluded its first case before a military commission. David Hicks, an Australian captured in 2001 alongside Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, agreed to plead guilty to providing material support for terrorism, in exchange for nine months in jail, to be served in Australia. Even this conviction was problematic, however; critics noted that Washington was under pressure from Canberra, one of its few remaining allies in the Iraq war, to resolve the Hicks case, which had become an embarrassment to Prime Minister John Howard as he stood for re-election.  While the Hicks deal was unfolding at Guantanamo, the new defense secretary, Robert Gates, told a congressional hearing that he believed the offshore prison should be closed. “Because of things that happened earlier at Guantanamo, there is a taint about it,” he said.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></div>
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		<title>Darfur</title>
		<link>http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/darfur/</link>
		<comments>http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/darfur/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 08 Mar 2008 16:55:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Morris</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[A-Z Guide]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Term]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[crimes against humanities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Darfur]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[impunity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Janjaweed]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tribunal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[war crimes]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://en.crimesofwar.org/?p=435</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[By John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen &#160; Reports of war crimes and crimes against humanity [...]]]></description>
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<td align="left" valign="top"><span style="color: #000000; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><em>By John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen </em></span></span>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="color: #000000; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><strong>Reports of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, western Sudan, began appearing in the Western news media in early 2004. The government of Sudan’s counterinsurgency campaign against two Darfur-based rebel groups targeted civilians from the ethnic groups whom the regime suspected of supporting the rebellion. Government security forces and their proxy militias—the Janjaweed—orchestrated a campaign of mass murder, rape, forced displacement, and destruction of livelihood. At least 200,000 people have died in the conflict, and more than 2.5 million have been driven off their lands and into camps for the internally displaced. The international community’s failure to protect civilians in Darfur echoed the failure to respond in Rwanda a decade before.</strong></span></span></p>
<p>Sudan has been at war with itself almost continuously since independence from Great Britain in 1956. A succession of governments in Khartoum has hoarded the country’s wealth and treated its citizens with the utmost contempt. Khartoum’s wars against rebels based in Southern Sudan—the Anya Nya rebels from 1955 to 1972 and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) from 1983 to 2005—cost at least two and a half million lives. During the course of these campaigns the government honed a counterinsurgency strategy that exploited ethnic divisions by sponsoring ethnically-based militias to attack rebel groups, terrorize and forcibly displace civilians, and intimidate humanitarian workers to force their withdrawal.</p>
<p>Following nearly 20 years of ferocious conflict, a regionally brokered peace process between the SPLA and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) gathered steam in late 2002 and early 2003. Under intense international pressure—especially from the U.S. administration of President George W. Bush—the two parties met in neighboring Kenya and began negotiating a settlement. However, the two-party negotiating framework posited by the international community left numerous aggrieved populations out of the equation. The unyielding control of wealth and power by a narrow ruling elite in Khartoum had economically and politically marginalized not only southern Sudan, but most of northern Sudan. Only a genuine devolution of wealth and power from the center to the periphery could have brought stability to the country.</p>
<p>In Darfur—one of the poorest and most neglected regions of the North—peoples of non-Arab origin had for decades engaged in frequent disputes with nomadic groups of Arab origin over scarce natural resources. The government had armed and trained many of these Arab nomads during the 1980s to prevent the SPLA from opening up a new front in Darfur, and throughout the late 1980s and 1990s Khartoum consistently backed Arab groups in increasingly violent, racially motivated conflicts to take land from non-Arab groups.</p>
<p>As the North-South peace talks progressed, frustrated Darfuris rebelled in late 2002. An alliance of Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit political leaders and fighters formed the rebel Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and began attacking government outposts in February 2003. On 25 April, the SLA launched an audacious offensive against Sudanese military installations in El Fashir, the state capital of North Darfur. The rebels bombarded and temporarily captured the airport and the local military headquarters. They destroyed government aircraft, killed scores of government soldiers, captured the local military commander, and retreated into the bush with captured arms and ammunition.</p>
<p>Khartoum was humiliated and the military seemingly in disarray. Many of the army rank and file and numerous commanders were from Darfur, and their loyalty to the regime in a war against their own people was uncertain. But Khartoum’s long-time patronage of Arab nomadic groups against their non-Arab rivals offered an easy solution. Darfur’s descent into agony followed a grimly predictable blueprint.</p>
<p>The powerful security cabal within the governing NCP cut a land-for-war deal with its tribal allies in North and West Darfur. During mid-2003, Sudanese security services armed and trained Arab militias to attack suspected supporters of the rebellion—namely Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit civilians. Driven by ethnic and racial hatreds and the government’s promise of state-sanctioned robbery of land and booty, Arab fighters from within Darfur and neighboring countries (notably Chad and the Central African Republic) joined the militias and prepared for war. The government released criminals from jails to join the militias, made cash payouts to its surrogate killers of approximately 100 dollars, and provided them with AK-47 or G-3 rifles, camels, horses, and sometimes uniforms. By September 2003 the systematic destruction of Darfur at the hands of the Janjaweed militias had begun.</p>
<p>Government forces and Janjaweed usually attacked non-Arab villages before dawn. The onslaught often began from the air. Military aircraft—Antonov supply planes and helicopter gunships—would bombard and strafe civilians as they slept. In the chaotic aftermath of aerial attacks, government troops in 4&#215;4 vehicles and mounted units of up to 300 Janjaweed fighters rode through the carnage to murder, rape, and drive villagers from the area. Mass executions and gang rapes were frequent, and attackers looted livestock, food stockpiles, and household goods. They burned houses, schools, mosques and other public buildings. Corpses were dumped into wells to pollute the water supply and farmers’ crops destroyed or fed to the growing herds of stolen livestock. By April 2004, the UN reported that coordinated attacks against civilians had displaced more than 860,000 people, including over 100,000 refugees in eastern Chad.</p>
<p>As the Sudanese military and the Janjaweed laid waste to Darfur, the peace negotiations in Kenya between the government and the SPLA lurched forward. The international community was reluctant to intervene in Darfur for fear of losing a long-sought and tantalizingly close agreement in the Khartoum government’s war with the South. The U.S., UK, and others already had invested considerable diplomatic and financial resources to push the peace process forward, and Darfur threatened to scuttle the deal and expose the inadequacies of the entire framework for negotiation. In early 2004, Western policymakers decided to first push hard for a North-South peace agreement and then focus on resolving Darfur. This was a monumental miscalculation; the NCP cynically prolonged the talks in Kenya to buy more time for the military solution in Darfur. In January 2004, the NCP’s lead negotiator, Vice President Ali Osman Taha, suspended the talks at a decisive moment and announced that he was going on the hajj. While the mediators waited patiently for Taha to return, Darfur burned.</p>
<p>Although some non-governmental organizations documented the atrocities in Darfur throughout 2003, the Western media did not pay close attention to the conflict until early 2004. The Sudanese government effectively prevented most journalists from traveling to Darfur, but many visited the refugee camps in eastern Chad. Refugees’ stories were a catalog of horrors: children thrown into fires, rape survivors branded with scalding iron, and groups of men executed and dumped in ravines. Janjaweed and government troops yelled racial epithets as they marauded through villages; rape victims were told they would give birth to Arab children.</p>
<p>In April 2004, the U.S., the African Union (AU), the government of Chad, and others brokered a “humanitarian cease-fire” between the government, the SLA, and the Justice and Equality Movement (a second rebel group with a small military wing and murky political agenda). The parties agreed to a cessation of hostilities and to allow unrestricted humanitarian access, and the government committed to “neutralize the armed militias.” The agreement authorized the AU to deploy cease-fire monitors and troops to protect them. However, both parties systematically violated the cease-fire from the moment it was signed.</p>
<p>Fighting persisted between the rebels and the government, the Janjaweed continued to raid villages with total impunity, and the government blamed the violence on “armed bandits” and “tribal hatreds.” While the UN and international humanitarian organizations took the cease-fire as their cue to begin the Herculean task of caring for the growing numbers of internally displaced, the government of Sudan restricted humanitarian access through bureaucratic rules and a cultivated state of continuous insecurity. In the summer of 2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell traveled to Sudan to demand that the government comply with the cease-fire. The Sudanese government listened politely and signed further agreements to disarm the Janjaweed, but the killing continued apace.</p>
<p>On 9 September, the U.S. government made history when it became the first to accuse another State of committing genocide. During a hearing before the U.S. Congress, Secretary Powell cited a State Department report based on interviews with refugees in eastern Chad and stated that “genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility—and genocide may still be occurring.” Yet Powell’s words were all sound and fury with no real impact on U.S. policy. According to the State Department, the finding of genocide did not impose obligations on the U.S. to halt the massacres. The U.S. hoped that strong rhetoric would stir international outrage and build additional leverage on Khartoum to stop the killings. It didn’t work.</p>
<p>Each of us separately visited Darfur in 2004—before and after the genocide declaration—and saw numbing evidence of state-sponsored slaughter. In a ravine deep inside rebel held territory, bodies of fourteen young men were lined up in ditches, eerily preserved by the scorching desert sun. It looked as though they had been lined up and shot in the back or the back of the head: seventeen shell casings resting in the sand indicated how efficient the killing had been. The story the rebels told seemed plausible: the dead were civilians who had been marched up a hill and executed by government forces the previous month. The bodies lay unburied, covered only by a thin layer of dust, so that the rebels could show people like us exactly what happens to people who oppose the government. The rebels asserted that there were many other such scenes.</p>
<p>Riding along the roads in government-held territory was a journey through a depopulated wasteland. Burned villages lined the roads, stolen livestock roamed freely through abandoned millet fields, and every so often a man on a camel with an assault rifle glowered from the side of the road. During a visit to a camp for some 30,000 internally displaced civilians in West Darfur, at least 25 Janjaweed could be seen resting with their camels under a tree next to the makeshift shelters of their victims. The intimidation and fear in the camp was palpable and overwhelming. In one interview after another, Sudanese refugees and internally displaced told us that they would never trust the government to disarm the Janjaweed, and that only an international force could protect them.</p>
<p>While the U.S. declaration may have been intended to galvanize international pressure on the regime in Khartoum, multilateral intervention through the UN was a nonstarter: Sudan had powerful allies in the UN Security Council. China, keen to protect its substantial oil interests in Sudan, and Russia, the regime’s main arms supplier, threatened to block strong action. The Sudanese government’s cooperation on counterterrorism, the continuing North-South peace talks in Kenya, and a general disinclination to intercede militarily in Africa reduced international will to push for a non-UN intervention, as NATO had pursued in Kosovo.</p>
<p>There to monitor the nonexistent cease-fire, the AU mission in Darfur assumed the international responsibility to protect. With acquiescence from Khartoum, AU member States (including Rwanda) deployed additional troops to increase security in Darfur. However, the AU mission lacked a strong mandate, adequate troop strength to cover a war zone the size of Texas, and the operational capacity to respond to outbreaks of violence and use force to protect civilians. Making matters worse, African policymakers argued that Darfur was an African problem requiring an African solution, dismissed suggestions of increased non-African involvement as meddling in the continent’s affairs, and provided the international community with a convenient excuse not to take stronger action to protect civilians.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the UN Security Council authorized an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate violations of international law in Darfur. The Commission found evidence of serious abuses—including killing of civilians, rape and sexual violence, torture, forced displacement, and destruction of villages and livelihoods—and recommended that the Security Council refer the case to the International Criminal Court. (Contrary to U.S. findings, the commission concluded that the Sudanese government had not pursued a policy of genocide.) Remarkably, the U.S. and China put aside their strong ideological opposition to the Court and the Security Council referred Darfur to the Court in March 2005. However, the Sudanese government prevented Court investigators from visiting Darfur and thus significantly slowed the process of building cases against the people most responsible for the crimes against humanity committed there.</p>
<p>Under intense international pressure, a peace agreement for Darfur was signed in May 2006, but the deal was flawed and incomplete. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) lacked implementation guarantees for disarming the Janjaweed, security arrangements that would encourage the return of displaced people to their homes, and sufficient compensation for the conflict’s primary victims, Darfur’s civilians. Only one of the main rebel groups—a faction of the SLA led by Commander Minni Minawi—agreed to the terms. Although the Sudanese government had stated that a peace deal would be the trigger for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission, the handover from the African Union to the UN was not explicit in the DPA and the government quickly reneged.</p>
<p>Rather than peace, the agreement led to further conflict as non-signatory rebel groups realigned (often along ethnic lines) to continue military action. Violence intensified during the summer of 2006 and attacks increased on humanitarian workers, causing even greater hardship for Darfur’s displaced population On August 31, the UN Security Council passed a resolution authorizing a UN peacekeeping mission, but weak international efforts failed to gain the consent of the Sudanese government. Yet again, civilians suffered atrocities at the hands of the government, the Janjaweed, and, increasingly, splintering rebel factions.</p>
<p>The absence of punitive action against those who committed crimes against humanity during the first three years of the conflict established a dangerous state of impunity, especially in Khartoum. The NCP’s ruling clique saw that it need not fear any consequences for violating signed agreements and Security Council resolutions. While the ICC referral raises hopes that those responsible for crimes of war in Darfur may eventually be brought to justice, the international community’s glaring failure to protect the victims will undoubtedly be the conflict’s lasting legacy.</td>
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		<title>Courts and Tribunals</title>
		<link>http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/courts-and-tribunals/</link>
		<comments>http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/courts-and-tribunals/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Mar 2000 15:52:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Morris</dc:creator>
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		<category><![CDATA[East Timor]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[International Criminal Court]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kosovo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuremberg]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rwanda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sierra Leone]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[war crimes]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Punishing individuals who commit crimes enforces international law.]]></description>
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<td align="left" valign="top"><span style="color: #000000; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><em>By Charles Garraway</em></span></span>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="color: #000000; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><strong>“Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”</strong><br />
</span></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">These words are taken from the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. This was the first attempt in modern times to hold accountable in criminal proceedings before an international tribunal the perpetrators of crimes against international law. An earlier attempt at the end of World War I to establish a Tribunal to try the Kaiser for “a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties” had collapsed when the Dutch authorities refused to hand him over for trial. War crimes trials were held before the Supreme Court in Leipzig but these were before domestic courts and were described by one commentator as a “judicial farce.” The record of domestic courts in enforcing international law has not been impressive.</span></span></p>
<p>Following Nuremberg, and its sister Tribunal in Tokyo, the newly formed United Nations adopted the “Nuremberg Principles” establishing much of the jurisprudence but the Cold War prevented any further attempts to build on those foundations. Although consideration was given to the formation of an International Criminal Court to sit alongside the International Court of Justice, States were not prepared to give up their sovereign rights to that extent and the proposal was stalled.</p>
<p>It was only in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War that the project gained renewed support. This arose as a result of the atrocities committed during the breakup of the Yugoslav Republic and of the genocide in Rwanda. The United Nations Security Council established ad hoc Tribunals to try those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Statutes of the Tribunals were based strongly on the Nuremberg precedent. In the case of Rwanda, the Statute broke new ground in granting international jurisdiction for the first time over war crimes committed in a non-international armed conflict.</p>
<p>These developments led on to renewed efforts to establish an International Criminal Court. After lengthy negotiations, a Statute was adopted in 1998 and the Court came into effect in 2002 after the Statute had received the necessary number of State ratifications. The Court is treaty based and only has jurisdiction where crimes listed in the Statute are committed either by a national of a State Party or on the territory of a State Party. In addition, the Security Council can refer a situation to the Court under its binding powers, thus granting it jurisdiction. To date (2007), there have been three State referrals, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic, and one referral by the Security Council, Darfur. The Prosecutor has opened investigations into all these except the Central African Republic where at the time of writing he is still carrying out a preliminary analysis.</p>
<p>The crimes listed in the Statute are genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes with each crime closely defined both in the Statute itself and in a subsidiary document, “Elements of Crimes.” The Court will also have jurisdiction in the future over aggression but subject to a definition being agreed and adopted by the States Parties. There are currently (2007) around 100 States Party to the Statute though there are some important absentees, including the United States, Russia and China. The United States originally signed the Statute but has since withdrawn its signature and has sought bilateral agreements with States to prevent its personnel being handed over to the ICC. It did not, however, oppose the Darfur referral in the Security Council but instead abstained on the vote.</p>
<p>The main difference between the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc Tribunals is in the nature of their jurisdiction. The ad hoc Tribunals were established by the United Nations Security Council under its binding powers and have compulsory jurisdiction with primacy over domestic State courts. The International Criminal Court on the other hand is designed to be “complementary” to domestic State Courts and will only be able to act where a State with jurisdiction is “unable” or “unwilling” to act itself. The onus is therefore placed on national courts to take responsibility. Already, many States Parties to the Statute have introduced national legislation, some for the first time, giving their domestic courts jurisdiction over the crimes listed in the Statute in order to ensure that they can take advantage of the “complementarity” provisions.</p>
<p>Whilst the International Criminal Court may provide a forum for some future conflicts, there remain many which fall outside its scope either because of timing (the International Criminal Court does not have retroactive jurisdiction) or because relevant States were not Parties to the International Criminal Court Statute. The trend in such cases has been towards placing greater responsibility on States themselves rather than establishing new international tribunals. The ad hoc Tribunals have been criticized for being too expensive, too remote (they are located outside the territories with which they deal) and too slow. Inevitably, they can only deal with a small number of major cases and some other forum will be required to deal with the vast majority of alle gations. National authorities in both the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda have had to wrestle with this problem and take action themselves, either by means of empowering local courts or by some form of extrajudicial process such as the tribal Gacaca proceedings adopted in Rwanda.</p>
<p>In Sierra Leone, by a treaty between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone, a Special Court was established in 2002 to deal with the aftermath of the civil war in that country. This “hybrid” court has both international and Sierra Leonean judges and has jurisdiction not only over international crimes but also some crimes under national law as well.</p>
<p>In Cambodia, lengthy negotiations between the United Nations and the Cambodian authorities have led to the establishment of “Extraordinary Chambers,” established under Cambodian law but with international support and assistance, to “prosecute those most responsible for crimes and serious violations of Cambodian and international law between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979” during the Pol Pot regime. However, this Court has been beset by financial and political difficulties and has not yet begun to function fully.</p>
<p>In East Timor Special Panels of Dili District Court were established and in Kosovo, UNMIK created the War and Ethnic Crimes Courts, all to deal with international crimes. Whilst these are national courts, they are staffed by both international and national personnel though operating primarily under domestic law provisions. The Timor Panels in particular have run into difficulties, due partly again to funding difficulties and partly due to the failure of the Panels to obtain jurisdiction over many of the indictees who are now located in Indonesia. The Kosovo Courts will be watched closely by the domestic courts in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina as the ad hoc Tribunal in The Hague winds down its work and begins to refer cases back to the national jurisdictions.</p>
<p>Similarly, in Iraq, a Special Tribunal was established during the occupation to try the leaders of the Saddam regime. The new Iraqi Government has now passed its own law, based on that passed by the Occupying Powers, creating “The Iraqi Higher Criminal Court.” This Court has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as well as certain offences under Iraqi law principally involving the misuse of political power. The Court operates under a procedure that is a mixture of Iraqi and international law but is mainly staffed by Iraqi nationals. Originally the Court was required to appoint international advisers and observers to the various sections of the Court but that has, under the new law, become optional rather than obligatory. Initial indications are that international involvement has been limited, in part because the death sentence, suspended under the occupation, has now been restored. In the early trials, concern has been expressed about political interference both by the United States and by the Iraqi Government itself. Two presiding judges have been replaced during the proceedings. These concerns were particularly acute in respect of the appeals process culminating in the execution of Saddam Hussein and others.</p>
<p>Certainly States coming out of conflict and recovering from repressive regimes will face severe difficulties in coming to terms with the past. Each situation will be different and will require a slightly different solution. The move towards encouraging greater domestic involvement in judicial and other proceedings may assist in restoring the rule of law but international involvement will still be required to a greater or lesser extent to avoid allegations of vengeance or “victors’ justice.” However, the move towards individual accountability for international crimes is based firmly on the foundations laid long ago at Nuremberg where it was recognized that only by such accountability could international law be enforced.</td>
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